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This PhD thesis consists of three empirical papers. Each paper can be read 
independently. However, all three papers investigate different factors affecting 
the performance of firms involved in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and 
initial public offerings (IPOs).  
A private firm seeking to become listed and who also wish to grow through 
acquisition can do so with an IPO followed by acquisitions or a reverse 
takeover (RT). In a RT, a private firm is acquired by a public firm, but the private 
firm controls the combined public entity after completion of the deal. Chapter 
2, “Post-acquisition performance when firms list and acquire simultaneously 
versus sequentially: Reverse takeover versus IPO-M&As”, examines the 
differential performance of firms conducting an IPO prior to undertaking follow-
on acquisitions (IPO-M&As) versus firms that combine the process of obtaining 
the listing and acquiring another firm by conducting a RT. I investigate how 
acquirers’ choices affect their post-acquisition performances. In this paper, I 
also investigate the impact of board structure changes on firm performance in 
IPO-M&A and RT deals. This event study covers RTs and acquisition-motived 
IPOs listed on the London Stock Exchange during 1995-2012. Challenging the 
theoretical expectation that IPOs increase the likelihood of optimal exercise of 
acquisition options by reducing valuation uncertainty, my results show that an 
IPO does not alleviate the stock market underperformance of acquirers within 
3 years post-acquisition. Private firms seem to self-select into different listing-
and-acquisition routes depending on firm-specific characteristics and the 
board members keep the same level of control preference. However, the 
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choice of listing-and-acquisition does not appear to significantly affect 
performance. I find no significant difference in the post-acquisition 
performance of firms undertaking IPO-M&As or RTs. 
Chapter 3, “Post-acquisition performance of target firms: The impact of 
management turnover”, investigates the efficiency of the takeover market and 
the impact of management turnover on target firm performance. Investigating 
separately the operating performance of targets and acquirers in U.K. 
domestic acquisitions during 2006-2014, I find that the post-acquisition peer-
adjusted profits significantly improve in the unprofitable targets but do not 
change significantly in profitable targets. Both profitable and unprofitable 
targets experienced high management turnovers, but the improvement in 
profits does not appear to be driven by the management turnover. The reason 
of management turnovers is more complex than the acquisitions’ market 
discipline function or resource-based management hypothesis. However, a 
complete turnover of top management in target firms seems to hurt the post-
acquisition performance of acquirers, suggesting target management team 
may possess valuable information to facilitate the integration process. This 
study sheds light on the post-acquisition restructuring of target firms and their 
management teams, especially in private targets. 
Chapter 4, “Identifying leaders among IPO firms: a content analysis of analyst 
coverage reports”, investigates how analysts identify firms as a leader and 
whether leader firms go on to generate superior operating performance to non-
leaders. Using a content analysis approach, I extract sentences including the 




IPO firm is identified as either an “industry leader” or “partial leader”. I examine 
the textual content of initial coverage reports on U.S. IPOs during 1999-2012 
and find that lead-underwriter analysts appear not to be more optimistic than 
non-lead-underwriters in their leadership identification of IPO firms, however, 
nor are they more accurate than non-lead-underwriters in identifying leader 
firms. I find that neither firms identified by analysts as industry leaders nor firms 
identified as having partial leadership advantages tend to generate superior 
peer-adjusted net sales or profit margins compared to non-leaders. The Global 
Settlement in 2003 significantly reduced the likelihood, frequency and intensity 
of partial leadership identification. Although there is no explicit regulation 
requirement on the text content in analyst reports, analysts have become more 
conservative in identifying a firm as a leader after the Global Settlement. This 
study helps investors to understand the incremental information of leadership 
















This PhD thesis consists of three empirical papers, which investigate factors 
affecting the performance of firms involved in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
and initial public offerings (IPOs). Each paper can be read independently.  
A private firm seeking to become listed and who also wish to grow through 
acquisition can do so with an IPO followed by acquisitions or a reverse 
takeover. In a reverse takeover, a private firm is acquired by a public firm, but 
the private firm controls the combined public entity after completion of the deal. 
Chapter 2, “Post-acquisition performance when firms list and acquire 
simultaneously versus sequentially: Reverse takeover versus IPO-M&As”, 
examines the differential performance of firms taking each route. I investigate 
how acquirers’ choices and the board structure affect their post-acquisition 
performances. Challenging the theoretical expectation that IPOs increase the 
likelihood of optimal exercise of acquisition options by reducing valuation 
uncertainty, my results show that an IPO does not alleviate the stock market 
underperformance of acquirers within 3 years post-acquisition. Private firms 
seem to self-select into different listing-and-acquisition routes depending on 
firm-specific characteristics and the board members keep the same level of 
control preference. However, the choice of listing-and-acquisition does not 
appear to significantly affect performance. I find no significant difference in the 
post-acquisition performance of firms undertaking IPO-M&As or RTs. 
Chapter 3, “Post-acquisition performance of target firms: The impact of 
management turnover”, investigates the efficiency of the takeover market and 
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the impact of management turnover on target firm performance. Investigating 
separately the operating performance of targets and acquirers in U.K. 
domestic acquisitions during 2006-2014, I find that the post-acquisition peer-
adjusted profits significantly improve in the unprofitable targets but do not 
change significantly in profitable targets. Both profitable and unprofitable 
targets experienced high management turnovers, but the improvement in 
profits does not appear to be driven by the management turnover. The reason 
of management turnovers is more complex than the acquisitions’ market 
discipline function or resource-based management hypothesis. However, a 
complete turnover of top management in target firms seems to hurt the post-
acquisition performance of acquirers, suggesting target management team 
may possess valuable information to facilitate the integration process.  
Chapter 4, “Identifying leaders among IPO firms: a content analysis of analyst 
coverage reports”, investigates how analysts identify firms as a leader and 
whether leader firms go on to generate superior operating performance to non-
leaders. Using a content analysis approach, I find that lead-underwriter 
analysts appear not to be more optimistic than non-lead-underwriters in their 
leadership identification of IPO firms, however, nor are they more successful 
than non-lead-underwriters in identifying leader firms. I find that neither firms 
identified by analysts as industry leaders nor firms identified as having partial 
leadership advantages tend to generate superior peer-adjusted net sales or 
profit margins compared to non-leaders. The Global Settlement in 2003 
significantly reduced the likelihood, frequency and intensity of partial 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This thesis consists of three empirical projects which investigate different 
factors affecting the performance of firms involved in mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) and initial public offerings (IPOs) in the U.K. and the U.S. Each chapter 
is self-contained, with its own literature review, methodology, data and results. 
The present chapter introduces the motivations and research questions, 
provides a summary of research methods, and briefly discusses the main 
findings of the three projects. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate post-acquisition 
performance of acquirers and target firms in the U.K, respectively. Chapter 4 
examines the post-listing performance of IPO firms in the U.S. Chapter 5 draws 
overall conclusions, discusses contributions, implications and limitations, and 
provides suggestions for future research. 
Chapter 2 – “Post-acquisition performance when firms list and acquire 
simultaneously versus sequentially: Reverse takeover versus IPO-M&As” – 
focuses on the choice between a reverse takeover (RT), whereby listing and 
acquisition take place simultaneously, versus getting listed first through a 
conventional IPO and engaging in an acquisition subsequently. In particular, I 
examine the impact of this choice on post-acquisition performance, using a 
sample of U.K. firms. The same chapter tests Hsieh et al.’s (2011) conjecture 
that an IPO leads to a more efficient acquisition strategy, and therefore 
enhances firm value. Chapter 3 – “Post-acquisition performance of target firms: 
The impact of management turnover” – examines the efficiency of the U.K. 
takeover market and studies the impact of top management turnover following 
acquisitions upon target firm performance. Chapter 4 – “Identifying leaders 
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among IPO firms: a content analysis of analyst coverage reports” – 
investigates whether U.S. IPO firms that have leadership position qualities 
according to analysts generate superior performance post-listing.  
The main findings are discussed in Section 1.4 below. However, in summary, 
Chapter 2 finds that the choice of listing-and-acquisition route does not affect 
post-acquisition performance of acquirers. Firms opting for each route also 
show a similar proportion of insider ownership after the acquisition. Insiders in 
IPO firms retain 34.4% of common shares after listing, which is not statistically 
significantly lower than the 36.1% of common shares retained by insiders in 
RTs.  
Chapter 3 finds that the peer-adjusted operating performance of unprofitable 
targets improves significantly but deteriorates insignificantly in profitable 
targets. Furthermore, Chapter 3 finds that top management turnover in target 
firms does not tend to affect the post-acquisition performance of target firms. 
On the other hand, the complete TMT turnover in target firms is harmful to 
acquirers’ post-acquisition performance. 
Chapter 4 finds that, in general, leader firms identified by analysts tend not to 
generate superior post-listing performance compared to firms not identified as 
leaders. Furthermore, the inaccurate forecast is not due to the conflicts of 
interest in LUWs. I find that LUWs do not tend to provide more optimistic 
leadership identification than non-LUWs. Financial analysts appear to be more 




leadership identification. The industry leadership identification tends to be less 
affected by the GS than partial leaders. 
The rest of this chapter discusses research motivations and questions and sets 
out the main contributions, outlines the data, summaries the research methods, 
and outlines the main findings.  
1.1 Motivation, research questions and contributions 
M&A is a complex corporate restructuring event that has a high risk of failure 
(Bruner, 2002). Prior M&A literature generally suggests that target firms 
generate positive market-adjusted returns after acquisition, but acquirers earn 
returns close to zero (Bruner, 2002; Sudarsanam, 2003). In Chapters 2 and 3, 
this thesis intends to investigate post-acquisition performance and factors 
affecting the post-acquisition performance of target and acquirer firms. 
Chapter 2 contributes to the acquisition literature by examining Hsieh et al.’s 
(2011) conjecture that an IPO helps acquirers to conduct acquisitions at the 
optimal time and therefore acquisitions conducted after a firm has gone public 
in an IPO are more likely to outperform acquisitions conducted by private 
acquirers. Chapter 2 also extends existing RT studies by investigating the 
post-listing ownership structure of RT and acquisition-driven IPO firms. In 
addition, it may help practitioners to establish, if there is, a more suitable 
practice to improve the long-run performance of acquirers. Chapter 3 extends 
existing research on target performance by investigating the post-acquisition 
operating performance of both public and private target firms. Chapter 3 also 
extends existing research by investigating the impact of top management team 
(TMT) turnover on the post-acquisition performance of target firms.  
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Existing studies of acquisitions generally focus on deals with public firms, as 
price and performance data for private firms is limited (Bruner, 2002; Zollo and 
Singh, 2004; Capron and Shen, 2007). Several studies suggest that public 
acquirers tend to realise higher returns than private acquirers, as a public 
listing status provides benefits to subsequent M&As (Celikyurt et al., 2010; 
Hovakimian and Hutton, 2010; Hsieh et al., 2011; Maksimovic et al., 2013).  
Celikyurt et al. (2010) and Hovakimian and Hutton (2010) show that IPOs are 
frequently followed by acquisitions within a short period after listing. Although 
do not prove that making acquisitions is the primary motivation for firms to take 
an IPO, Celikyurt et al. (2010) and Hovakimian and Hutton (2010) suggest that 
an IPO can provide an infusion of cash and publicly traded stocks as 
acquisition currencies to facilitate subsequent M&As. Hsieh et al. (2011) 
suggest that an IPO reduces the information asymmetry of acquirers’ firm 
value between acquirers and target firms, and help acquirers to conduct 
subsequent M&As at the optimal time. Furthermore, Maksimovic et al. (2013) 
find that public acquirers generate higher profit margins than private acquirers.   
However, these studies do not provide any empirical evidence that these 
benefits of an IPO help improve firms’ post-acquisition performance. Chapter 
2 aims to fill the gap by investigating the acquisition performance of acquirers 
and exploring factors that influencing the listing-and-acquisition choice 
between IPO-M&As and RTs. By comparing acquirers’ post-deal stock 
performance of acquisitions conducted by recently listed IPO firms and RTs, 
Chapter 2 tests whether an IPO provides benefits in subsequent acquisitions 




In addition, Chapter 2 contains an analysis of the impact of ownership structure 
on the choice of listing routes and post-acquisition performance. Firms 
involved in RTs, unlike those undertaking IPOs, are not required to issue 
capital at the time of listing. Private firms with a preference for retaining more 
concentrated control are expected to be more likely to opt for a RT than an 
IPO. Jensen and Meckling (1979) suggest that large insider ownership helps 
to enhance firm value by aligning management and shareholder interests. 
Thus, acquirers with large insider ownership may be more likely to undertake 
value-enhancing acquisitions than acquirers suffering from severe agency 
problems (Jensen, 1986 and 2004; Fu et al., 2013). If acquirers are found to 
generate lower returns in acquisitions conducted by recently listed IPO firms 
than in RTs, can this be attributed to a potentially high extent of agency 
problems in public acquirers? Chapter 2 extends existing RT research by 
exploring the relation between insider ownership and acquirers’ post-deal 
performance.  
The main aims of Chapter 2 are to empirically test whether an IPO helps 
private acquirers conduct more value-enhancing acquisitions than private 
acquirers opting for a RT (the conjecture in Hsieh et al. (2011)), and to explore 
insiders’ preference to control ownership post-listing in IPOs versus RTs in the 
U.K. market.  
While Chapter 2 investigates the post-acquisition performance of acquirers, 
Chapter 3 examines the post-acquisition performance of target firms. While 
there are numerous studies examining the efficiency of the market for 
corporate control in terms of targets’ and acquirers’ announcement returns and 
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the combined firms’ operating performance, existing literature on post-
acquisition performance of target firms, especially private targets, is limited.  
Several studies provide survey evidence of target firms’ post-acquisition 
operating performance, with performance rating scales, and indicate that 
target performance improves post-acquisition (Cannella and Hambric, 1993; 
Very et al., 1997; Zollo and Singh, 2004). Maksimovic et al. (2011), a U.S. 
based study, find that target firms experience a significant improvement in 
operating margin up to three years after being acquired. However, Jang and 
Reisel (2015) investigate E.U. acquisitions and find no improvement in target 
firms’ operating performance post-acquisition. Therefore, the findings on target 
firms’ post-acquisition performance changes are inconclusive. 
Much less is known about performance change in target firms, which is due to 
the general lack of data on accounting performance and stock price 
information of target firms, especially private targets, post-acquisition. In the 
U.S., there is no federal statutory requirement for unlisted subsidiaries to make 
their accounts public (FASB, 2013). However, in the U.K., all registered limited 
companies, including subsidiaries, and small and inactive companies, must 
make their annual financial statements and information of appointment and 
termination of officers publicly available through the Companies House 
(GOV.UK, 2016).  
The requirement for target firms, as a separated legal entity, to report 
accounting performance separated from that of the parent company allows me 




U.K. takeover market, which is measured by the improvement in the operating 
performance of target firms. Second, and more importantly, I investigate a 
potentially key source of efficiency improvements in target firms post-
acquisition, which is the TMT turnover rate. 
Existing studies on the impact of target TMT turnover generally restrict their 
analyses to the combined firms’ post-acquisition performance (Kennedy and 
Limmack, 1996; Krishnan et al., 1997; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Fich et al., 2016), 
or focus on public targets’ announcement returns (Martin and McConnell, 1991; 
Kennedy and Limmack, 1996; Walsh and Ellwood, 1991; Walsh and Kosnik, 
1993; Franks and Mayer, 1996). However, acquirers’ existing business does 
not experience a change of ownership or control after acquisition. The post-
acquisition performance of private targets that constitute a substantial part of 
M&As, is also under-investigated (Zollo and Singh, 2004). Chapter 3 extends 
prior literature by investigating the impact of target TMT turnover on the 
operating performance of both public and private targets. 
To the best of my knowledge, no similar studies appear to examine the 
correlation between target TMT turnover and post-acquisition performance in 
both public and private target firms. Prior studies, such as Cannella and 
Hambrick (1993) and Jang and Reisel (2015), investigate the negative 
correlation between pre-acquisition performance of targets and post-
acquisition TMT turnover of targets, and argue that acquisitions have a 
disciplinary function in terms of replacing inefficient TMTs. However, showing 
the negative correlation between the TMT turnover and the pre-acquisition 
performance may not be sufficient to prove the market discipline hypothesis. It 
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is also necessary to show that replacing inefficient TMTs creates value. TMT 
turnover may not change the post-acquisition performance of targets. For 
example, Martin and McConnell (1991) show that abnormal announcement 
returns to target firms with and without CEO replacement are not significantly 
different at the 10% level. Prior studies fail to show that replacing inefficient 
TMTs helps to improve post-acquisition performance.  
Chapter 3 overcomes these problems by investigating how pre-acquisition 
performance of target firms affects TMT turnovers, and the impact of target 
TMT turnover on the long-run operating performance of both public listed and 
private targets. The main aim of Chapter 3 is to examine the market discipline 
theory of acquisition versus the resource-based management view of TMTs. I 
conduct empirical tests to examine the market discipline theory of acquisitions, 
which states that a target firm with poor pre-acquisition performance 
experiences a higher degree of TMT turnover and that its performance 
improves after removing inefficient TMTs, and to examine the resource-based 
view that retaining efficient TMTs helps targets to generate superior operating 
profits.  
Chapter 4 investigates the operating performance of IPO firms that are 
identified as leaders by analysts in initial coverage reports. Prior studies of 
analyst reports investigate the impact of stock recommendations, financial 
forecasts, and sentiment of text content on stock returns and operating 
performance (Lys and Sohn, 1990; Stickle, 1992; Previts et al., 1994; Hirst et 
al., 1995; Francis and Soffer, 1997; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Brav and 




2004; Asquith et al., 2005; James and Karceski, 2006; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2013; Twedt and Rees, 2012; Huang et al., 2014). To the best of 
my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate what is said about leadership 
identification in analyst reports. Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on IPO 
firm performance by testing whether firms identified by analysts as leaders 
provide superior future operating performance. 
Chapter 4 examines whether leadership attributes identified by analysts 
convey valuable information to investors about IPO firms’ future operating 
performance, and explores factors that affect analysts’ decision to identify an 
IPO firm as a leader. Using a content analysis approach, I extract sentences 
including the keyword “lead” from initial coverage reports and pick out 
sentences where the IPO firm is identified as either an “industry leader” or 
“partial leader”. Chapter 4 extends the existing literature on analysts’ research 
output by showing that leader firms identified by analysts tend not to provide 
superior operating performance post-listing compared to firms without 
leadership identification. Chapter 4 not only extends existing research on the 
accuracy of analysts’ research outputs, but also helps to measure the impact 
of competitive advantages due to being a leader on IPO firms’ performance. 
In addition, Chapter 4 analyses the impact of regulatory reforms on leadership 
identification. Previous studies conjecture that the text content in analyst 
reports is less affected by regulatory reforms than recommendations and 
earnings forecasts (Stocken and Verrecchia, 2004; Bradley et al., 2008; Huang 
et al., 2014). The Global Settlement (GS), introduced in 2003, requires 
financial analysts (especially affiliated analysts) to disclose conflicts of interest 
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and limit relations between research and investment banking departments 
(Kadan et al., 2009). The GS also requires analysts to disclose the proportion 
of buy/hold/sell recommendations (Kadan et al., 2009). The GS does not, 
however, regulate the text of analyst reports (Kadan et al., 2009; Corwin et al., 
2017). Therefore, the GS would not be expected to have an impact on the 
leadership identification in analyst reports. This study empirically examines this 
conjecture. Chapter 4 also investigates how analysts’ affiliation affects 
leadership identification and prediction accuracy.  
1.2 Data  
Each chapter has its own sample and data applied. Chapter 2 investigates 
acquisitions conducted by recently listed IPO firms and RTs on the London 
Stock Exchange between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 2012. I identify 
128 RTs and 513 IPO firms that conduct 948 acquisitions within one year of 
listing. However, due to data limitations in pre-listing financial data, post-listing 
stock price data, and insider ownership data, data is available for 179 public 
acquirers in IPO-M&As and 66 private acquirers in RTs.  
Chapter 3 investigates U.K. domestic acquisitions announced and completed 
between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 2014. As Chapter 3 focuses on 
the targets’ TMT turnover and operating performance, target firms without 
information of TMT appointment and resignation or pre- and post-acquisition 
operating performance are excluded from the sample. Data is available for 




Chapter 4 explores initial coverage reports provided for U.S. non-financial IPO 
firms within six months of the IPO. I identify 1,850 IPOs conducted between 1 
January 1999 and 31 December 2012. Excluding IPOs without initial coverage 
reports available from the Investext database results in a final sample of 1,501 
IPOs, with a total of 4,021 initial coverage reports from analysts.  
1.3 Research methods 
The research method of this thesis contains three parts: an event study 
approach, regression models and a content analysis.  
In Chapter 2, an event study approach is employed to examine acquirers’ post-
acquisition abnormal returns. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and buy-
and-hold returns (BHARs) over a two-year window are estimated based on the 
market-adjusted model. I use an instrumental variable approach to control the 
self-selection issue in private firms’ decision of listing-and-acquisition, as 
introduced in Section 2.5.2. Both maximum likelihood treatment estimations 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are provided to examine 
whether acquisitions conducted by IPO firms outperform those conducted by 
private firms in RTs. 
In Chapter 3, I use logit and OLS regression models to examine factors that 
affect post-acquisition TMT turnover in target firms. I also use OLS models to 
investigate factors that affect post-acquisition operating performance changes 
in target and acquirer firms.  
In Chapter 4, I use a content analysis approach to extract leadership 
identification sentences from initial coverage reports, as introduced in Section 
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4.4.1. Similar to Chapter 3, I use logit and Tobit models to examining factors 
affecting analysts’ decision of whether to identify a firm as a leader, and OLS 
models to investigate factors affecting operating performance changes in IPO 
firms.  
1.4 Main findings 
Each chapter contains a section that presents and interprets the results. I offer 
a short overview of the main findings here. The findings in Chapter 2 suggest 
that private firms self-select into different listing-and-acquisition routes 
depending on firm-specific financial characteristics. Private firms with higher 
leverage and cash-to-total assets ratios are more likely to opt for the RT route, 
as these firms may not be able to bear the considerable transaction costs in 
an IPO process. Contrary to the conjecture in Hsieh et al. (2011), an IPO tends 
to provide limited benefits to the long-run post-acquisition stock returns. On 
average, acquisitions conducted by recently listed firms and RTs experience 
negative two-year CARs of 35% and 45% respectively, and the difference is 
not statistically significant. Controlling for self-selection and firm- and deal-
specific characteristics, RTs on average outperform IPOs by 13% to 27% 
within two years of the acquisition, but the difference is not statistically 
significant.  
There are at least two potential explanations of an IPO’s negative impact on 
the performance of subsequent acquisitions, as introduced in Section 2.3. First, 
the benefits of valuation surprise or overvaluation in public acquirers’ capital 
do not outweigh the costs of overvalued synergy (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; 




level of insider ownership are less likely to suffer from agency problems and 
conduct value-decreasing acquisitions compared to public acquirers with a low 
degree of insider ownership (Jensen, 1986 and 2004). Section 2.6.4 provides 
evidence to support the two explanations.  
Chapter 3 finds that post-acquisition peer-adjusted performance improves 
significantly in unprofitable targets but insignificantly deteriorates in profitable 
targets. On average, acquisitions improve unprofitable targets’ peer-adjusted 
return on assets (ROA) by 3.2% over the period to year +1 (not different from 
zero), 16.3% over a two-year period to year +2 (significant at the 5% level), 
and 25.5% over a three-year period to year +3 (significant at the 1% level). By 
contrast, for profitable target firms, acquisitions decrease the peer-adjusted 
ROAs by -3.2% over the period to year +1, -1% over a two-year period to year 
+2, and -4.2% over a three-year period to year +3, and these decreases are 
not significant at the 10% level. The results reveal that the U.K. takeover 
market is generally efficient and improves the profit margin of unprofitable 
targets.  
Results in Chapter 3 suggest that the reasons for TMT turnover could be much 
more complex than the disciplinary role of acquisitions. Both profitable and 
unprofitable targets experience high TMT turnover post-acquisition, at 29.6% 
in unprofitable targets and 23.2% in profitable targets. Chapter 3 also finds that 
TMT turnover does not appear to affect the peer-adjusted post-acquisition 
performance of targets. Therefore, TMT turnover tends not to be the main 
driver of post-acquisition profitability improvement. A possible interpretation of 
the results in Chapter 3 is that other sources of efficiency improvements may 
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explain the improvements of profit margins in unprofitable targets. I speculate 
that an increasing financing capacity provided by acquirers to targets may 
explain the improvements of profit margins in target firms, as Erel et al. (2015) 
show that acquisitions relieve target firms’ financial constraints. Exploring this 
speculation is not the focus of this thesis and could be a future expansion.  
To address the question of the informativeness of analyst reports, I investigate 
the post-listing operating performance of U.S. IPO firms. Results in Chapter 4 
suggest that, in general, firms whose leadership position is identified by 
analysts tend not to experience superior peer-adjusted performance compared 
to non-leaders within three years of the IPO. Results in Chapter 4 suggest that 
the leadership identification tends to pick out firms with large size or venture 
capital and lead-underwriter sponsoring, regardless of future superior 
performance. Thus, investors should be aware of how to use analysts’ 
leadership identification to make their own investment decisions.  
Other results on the impact of regulatory reforms on the content of analyst 
reports and how analyst affiliation affects the tone and accuracy of leadership 
identification in initial coverage reports are discussed in Section 4.5. Generally, 
I find that analysts reduce the likelihood, frequency and intensity of leadership 
identification after regulatory reforms. Although text content in analyst reports 
is not subject to regulation requirements to the extent that analyst 
recommendations are after the GS, analysts tend to be more conservative in 
the text content of coverage reports after the GS, implemented in 2003. 
Analysts with a lead-underwriter affiliation tend not to be more optimistic in 




with superior performance, compared to analysts without a lead-underwriter 
affiliation. Therefore, analyst affiliation tends not to affect analysts’ research 
outputs.  
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 investigates the 
impact of the choice of listing-and-acquisition route between IPO-M&As and 
RTs on post-acquisition performance in acquirers. Chapter 3 explores the 
changes in post-acquisition performance of target firms in U.K. domestic 
acquisitions, and tests whether TMT turnover in target firms affects the post-
acquisition performance of target and acquirer firms. Chapter 4 explores the 
analysts’ leadership identification in initial coverage reports, and tests whether 
firms with leadership qualities according to analysts generate superior 
performance post-listing. Finally, Chapter 5 summarises findings related to the 
hypotheses tested, shows the main contributions and implications, and 
discusses limitations and potential research extensions.
16 
 
Chapter 2. Post-acquisition performance when firms list 
and acquire simultaneously versus sequentially: Reverse 
takeover versus IPO-M&As 
2.1 Introduction  
A private firm can conduct listing and acquisition simultaneously or 
sequentially through a reverse takeover (RT)1 or IPO-M&A. In an IPO-M&A, a 
private acquirer firstly conducts an initial public offering (IPO) and 
subsequently takeover another business through a merger or acquisition. In a 
RT, a private firm is acquired by a public firm, but the private firm controls the 
combined public entity after completion of the deal. Prior research suggests 
that an IPO can provide a springboard effect to facilitate subsequent 
acquisitions and increase the gains from potential acquisitions (Eckbo et al., 
1990; Mikkelson et al., 1997; Hsieh et al., 2011). However, none of these 
acquisition-motived IPO papers theoretically or empirically analyse whether an 
IPO contributes to a profitable acquisition outcome. 
My study empirically examines whether IPOs provide springboard effect to 
subsequent acquisitions and improve the post-acquisition stock performance 
of acquirers. If there is positive springboard effect from IPOs as conjectured in 
Hsieh et al. (2011), I would observe acquisitions conducted by public acquirers 
generate superior performance to private acquirers conducting RTs. My study 
seeks to help practitioners to establish, if there is, a more suitable listing-and-
                                                          




acquisition route for private firms, which enhances acquirers’ value in the long-
run. 
Prior literature generally suggests that private firms self-select to become 
public or remain private, depending to their pre-listing financial characteristics 
and transaction costs of listing (Pavkov, 2006; Sjostrom, 2007; Adjei et al., 
2008; Jindra, 2012; Maksimovic et al., 2013). Using a sample of 66 RTs and 
179 acquisitions conducted by newly listed IPO firms in the U.K. over the 
period 1995 to 2012, I examine what pre-listing firm characteristics affect 
private firms’ self-selection into different listing-and-acquisition routes, and 
investigate the post-acquisition performance of acquirers after controlling for 
the self-selection (Derrien and Kecskés, 2007).  
Recent literature suggests that IPO firms are engaged in a significant amount 
of merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. In Brau and Fawcett’s (2006) survey, 
59% of 336 chief financial officers in the United States (U.S.) agree that 
creating an acquisition currency ranks as the most important reason for an IPO. 
Empirically, Schultz and Zaman (2001) find that the internet IPO wave in the 
late 1990s was followed by an acquisition wave. The post-IPO M&A waves 
tend to be stock-financed (Jo and Harjoto, 2012). Celikyurt et al. (2010) and 
Hovakimian and Hutton (2010) show that an IPO can provide an infusion of 
cash and overvalued public shares, which help facilitates subsequent M&As.  
An IPO can not only provide a cash infusion to facilitate future acquisitions, but 
also alleviate the asymmetric information problems in private acquirers 
attempting to conduct stock acquisitions (Mikkelson et al., 1997; Eckbo et al., 
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1990). A private firm intending to acquire another firm in the future faces 
uncertainties in the value of private acquirer’s capital. Hsieh et al. (2011) 
present a theoretical model that an IPO helps a private acquirer to evaluate 
more precisely the value of gains from potential acquisitions, assuming that 
investors are rational and that firms are fairly priced. Thus, Hsieh et al. (2011) 
predict that an IPO increases the likelihood that an acquisition option is in the 
money and lead to a more efficient acquisition to enhance firm value. 
An alternative route is to conduct listing and acquisition activities 
simultaneously. With a RT, a private firm inherits the public listing status as 
well as the operational business, if any, of the public firm. A distinct feature 
between a RT and an IPO is that a RT is not required to issue shares to the 
public at the time of listing (Gleason et al., 2005; Appadu et al., 2014; Brown 
et al., 2010; Sjostrom, 2007; Asquith and Rock, 2011).  
When firms issue shares to the public, their insider ownership is diluted. Floros 
and Shatri (2009) claim that insiders of the U.S. RT private firms remain the 
owners of the combined firm and tend to sell less to the public than they would 
in an IPO. They observe that the median values of the percentage of common 
shares given up by insiders as a result of going public is 16% in U.S. RT 
transactions, which is significantly smaller than the 24% in U.S. penny stock 
IPO transactions (Floros and Shatri, 2009).2 However, these studies do not 
show whether the post-listing board ownership is higher in RTs than in IPOs. I 
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extend the RT research by investigating the post-listing board ownership in the 
U.K. RTs and IPOs. 
Previous studies suggest that the concentration of insider ownership raises the 
issue of corporate governance. Jensen and Meckling (1979) propose the 
agency cost hypothesis that larger managerial equity ownership helps to 
enhance firm value by aligning management and shareholders’ interests. Later, 
Jensen advanced the implication of agency theory on M&A activities with a 
free-cash-flow hypothesis and overvalued-equity hypothesis (Jensen, 1986 
and 2004). Jensen speculated that firms with more free cash flows and 
overvalued equity suffer severe agency costs and that these firms are more 
likely to undertake low-benefit or even value-destroying mergers than firms 
distributing cash to shareholders or issuing additional debt (Jensen, 1986 and 
2004).  
In this paper, I explore the impact of board ownership on acquisition routes 
and outcomes. According to agency theory, firms with a higher insider 
ownership are more likely to have better corporate governance and, therefore, 
are more likely to conduct well-conceived acquisitions to enhance long-run firm 
value.  
To investors, what matters should be the outcome of listing and acquisition (for 
example, the post-M&A profits and stock market returns), rather than the 
process of an M&A. Contrary to the conjecture in Hsieh et al. (2011), I find no 
evidence of significant difference in terms of long-run post-acquisition 
cumulative abnormal returns between acquirers opting for RT or IPO routes. 
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My results suggest that although private firms self-select into different 
acquisition routes depending on firm-specific financial characteristics, their 
long-run post-listing-and-acquisition performance is not fundamentally 
different. Public acquirers significantly outperform private acquirers at the 5% 
level only in the first month after acquisition, with differences in cumulative 
abnormal returns ranging from 2.6% to 5.1%. The outperformance of public 
acquirers disappears in the second month after acquisition, and firms opting 
for each route perform similarly two years after acquisition.  
Since insiders of RT acquirers and recently listed acquirers retain control of 
the combined public entity, whether post-acquisition board ownerships are 
different between RTs and IPOs is an empirical issue. Contrary to the U.S. 
finding and claims, my results suggest that private firms in the U.K. reach a 
similar level of board ownership after listing. I find U.K. RT firms on average 
only have 2% higher post-listing board ownership than IPO firms and the 
difference is not significant at the 10% level. A sub-sample test of 24 RTs and 
163 IPO-M&As, for which data is available, suggests that the firms opting for 
each route have similar board ownerships that control half of the common 
equities in the pre-listing private firms. Without considering listing costs, private 
firms achieve a similar proportion of board ownership and post-acquisition 
performance.  
My study extends the prior literature in several ways. First, I extend prior 
studies of private acquirers to test the conjecture that a springboard IPO 
enhances post-acquisition firm value (Hsieh et al., 2011; Maksimovic et al., 




some indication that post-acquisition performance could differ depending on 
which of the two routes firms opt for. Using census data on a sample of 
approximately 40,000 firms during 1977-2004, Maksimovic et al. (2013) 
document that public acquirers conduct more acquisitions and realise higher 
productivity gains than private acquirers. However, Maksimovic et al. (2013) 
suggest that higher productivity gains are only partially explained by acquirers’ 
public status, and acquirers’ productivity is the fundamental factor. Comparing 
the acquisition outcomes of public and private acquirers provides no direct 
examination of the conjecture in Hsieh et al. (2011) and Celikyurt et al. (2010) 
that an IPO increases a firm’s ability to make a profitable acquisition. 
Investigating the post-acquisition performance could also help to explain the 
underperformance of RTs and that of IPOs observed in previous RT literature. 
Previous studies in the U.S. suggest that acquisitions following either route 
could cause stock market underperformance and delisting of newly listed firms. 
Gleason et al. (2005) observe little improvement in operations or profitability 
on public firms after RTs and the delisting rate is 46.3% two years post-RT. 
Adjei et al. (2008) find that 42% of RTs are delisted within three years of listing, 
compared to 27% of IPOs. Brau et al. (2012) show that firms acquiring within 
a year of going public significantly underperform in the long-run, with a -32.1% 
five-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) on average, whereas non-
acquiring IPOs do not significantly underperform over these time frames, with 
a 1.1% five-year BHAR. Similarly, Amor and Kooli (2015) find that frequent 




Second, I explore the impact of board ownership and other board 
characteristics on acquisition routes and outcomes in the U.K. According to 
agency theory, firms with better corporate governance are more likely to 
conduct well-conceived acquisitions to enhance long-run firm value (Jensen, 
1986 and 2004). The U.S. empirical evidence supports Jensen’s hypothesis. 
Fu et al. (2013) observe that overvalued stock acquisitions have weak pre-
acquisition corporate governance, which encourages valuing-destroying 
acquisition. Cuñat et al. (2012) find that when shareholder-sponsored 
corporate governance proposals are passed at annual meetings, which 
indicates an improvement in internal corporate governance, acquisition 
activities and capital expenditures fall and long-term performance increases. 
On the contrary, I find that in the U.K., board members in RTs and IPO-M&As 
tend to hold a similar level of shareholdings post-listing and generally board 
ownership do not affect the post-acquisition performance of acquirers. 
Third, I investigate the post-acquisition stock market performance for both 
public acquirers taking the IPO and subsequent acquisition route and private 
acquirers taking the RT route. I focus on acquiring firms’ long-run performance 
for two reasons. First, the long-run study extends the acquisition 
announcement study in Hsieh et al. (2011). Hsieh et al. (2011) propose a 
theoretical model suggesting that an IPO can reduce the valuation uncertainty 
and leasd to a more efficient acquisition strategy. Hsieh et al. (2011) focus on 
the announcement returns of acquisition, while I focus on the long-run stock 




after the integration, while the acquirer’s stock market movement around the 
announcement shows investors’ expectation of potential acquisition outcome.  
Fourth, to the best of my knowledge, the RT literature has focused 
predominantly on its public listing feature (Gleason et al., 2005; Appadu et al., 
2014; Brown et al., 2010; Sjostrom, 2007; Makamson, 2010; Asquith and Rock, 
2011). My study fills the gap by investigating RTs from a conventional M&A 
perspective and exploring factors that influence the choice between two routes 
and post-acquisition performance. Makamson (2010) argues that a RT has 
strategic benefits beyond the financial motive to get listed, as it can help a 
private firm to enter a new market or rebrand its business by acquiring another 
firm and help a public firm to exit existing business by selling it to a private firm. 
Gleason et al. (2005) state seven motivations cited for the RT in proxy 
statements, including capitalizing on the strength of the private firm, growth, 
expanding into complementary lines of business, taking advantage of 
economies of scale, a desire on the part of the private firm to be publicly listed, 
diversifying the business, and more organizational depth.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 compares the 
regulatory framework of RTs and IPOs. Section 2.3 develops the hypothesis 
of post-acquisition performance.  Section 2.4 describes the sample selection 
and data collection. Section 2.5 describes the models and variable 
measurements. Section 2.6 provides descriptive statistics and tests the 
hypothesis. Section 2.7 concludes.  
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2.2 Regulatory Framework and Background Information 
In this section, I present the regulatory requirements of listing and acquisition 
transactions. Generally, in the U.K., firms opting for RTs or IPOs are under the 
same listing and trading scrutiny, and, after deal completion, these firms are 
required to follow the same reporting requirements. A RT transaction is similar 
to a regular acquisition in terms of the announcement, circular, shareholder 
approval, and required documentation (e.g. prospectus). I also compare the 
regulatory differences of RTs in the U.K. and the U.S.  
2.2.1 Regulatory Definition of RTs 
In the U.K., Listing Rule 10.4 (d) defines a RT as “a transaction consisting of 
an acquisition by a listed company of a business, an unlisted company or 
assets where any percentage ratio is 100% or more or which would result in a 
fundamental change in the business or a change in board or voting control of 
the listed company” (FSA, 2004).3 By contrast, the U.S. listing rules have no 
formal definition of a RT. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
explains the RT transaction process: 
“Typically, the shareholders of the private operating company 
exchange their shares for a large majority of the shares of the public 
company. Although the public shell company survives the merger, 
the private operating company’s shareholders gain a controlling 
interest in the voting power and outstanding shares of stock of the 
public shell company. Also typically, the private operating 
                                                          





company’s management takes over the board of directors and 
management of the public shell company. The assets and business 
operations of the post-merger surviving public company are 
primarily, if not solely, those of the former private operating 
company” (SEC, 2011,p.1).  
These shell RTs only provide private firms a public listing status, without any 
M&A growth opportunity built in (Floros and Sapp, 2011; Jambal et al., 2012; 
Feldman, 2006; Feldman, 2010). Lee et al. (2014) make an analogy that shell 
companies are traded much like website domain names. As trading shell 
companies can help to meet the minimum shareholder threshold, they can 
facilitate exchange listing (Floros and Sapp, 2011). Floros and Sapp (2011) 
find that shell RTs constituted 89% of 236 RTs in the U.S. market in 2008. The 
popularity of shell RTs partially explains the listing mechanism of RTs viewed 
by financial consultants and academics. Due to data availability, I focus on RTs 
involving operational firms. Further discussions of my operational RT sample 
and shell RTs appears in Section 2.4.  
2.2.2 Listing process and admission to trading of IPOs and RTs 
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Handbook describes an IPO as the 
process by which a company obtains a first listing or admission to trading of its 
securities on a stock market and offers transferable securities to the public for 
the first time (FCA, 2001). A firm obtains public listing status, and its securities 
can be traded after the completion of the IPO process. Private firms conducting 
a RT are required to apply for a re-admission to get the listing status. Listing 
Rule 14 suggests that a RT triggers a re-admission (FSA, 2004). Listing Rule 
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10.2.10R states that the enlarged entity emerging from the RT is effectively a 
different business and is treated as a new applicant for listing (FSA, 2004). 
Thus, to obtain public listing status and ask for admission to trade on a 
regulated market, private firms opting for RTs must comply with exactly the 
same entry requirements as any other companies applying for admission for 
the first time. Both RTs and IPOs need to provide prospectuses approved by 
the FCA.  
Unlike the U.S., where shell firms are traded either on the OTC Bulletin Board 
(OTCBB) or through Pink Sheets, U.K. RTs can occur on the two London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) markets, the Official List (OL) and the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) (Floros and Sapp, 2011; Appadu et al., 2014). Therefore, after 
listing, both RT and IPO firms are subject to the same public disclosure regime 
of the U.K. markets.   
2.2.3 Acquisition process of RTs  
As presented in Section 2.2.1, both the U.S. SEC and the U.K. FSA emphasize 
the fundamental change in control of the surviving company. Similarly, an 
acquisition transaction passes the control of a target firm to an acquirer. The 
UKLA requires that a RT transaction be conditional on the consent of 
shareholder approval (FSA, 2004). In RTs and regular acquisitions which 
trigger a change of control, firms are required to disclose this (including 
announcement and circular), and shareholder approval is needed (FSA, 2004). 
Generally, in the U.S., shareholder approval is required in a RT, with the 




owned subsidiary that merges into the private company (Floros and Sapp, 
2011). 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
The hypothesis of this paper is based on Hsieh et al.’s (2011) conjecture that 
an IPO leads to a more efficient acquisition strategy, and therefore enhancing 
firm value compared to RT. This conjecture is based on the information 
asymmetry theory that an IPO reduces valuation uncertainty. Hsieh et al. (2011) 
assume that in the absence of market valuation, firms learn their valuation from 
the capital market and managers adjust their valuation of the firm following the 
market response.4  An IPO facilitates subsequent stock-financed M&As by 
reducing information asymmetry of the firm value and that of potential synergy 
value between investors (Hsieh et al., 2011).  
When exercising the option to acquire another business, a public firm is able 
to evaluate the takeover gain resulting from a potential acquisition more 
precisely than a similar private firm. A public acquirer is able to exercise its 
acquisition option optimally, while a private acquirer is more likely to pursue a 
suboptimal acquisition policy.  Not knowing the precise value of a private 
acquirer, the private firm and potential targets are more likely to make 
suboptimal acquisitions (Hsieh et al., 2011). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) suggest that overvalued acquirers can increase firm value by using their 
stock as currency to purchases less overvalued firms. Thus, a public acquirer 
                                                          




may be more likely to conduct value-enhancing acquisitions than a private 
acquirer.  
Alternatively, RTs may outperform acquisitions conducted by recently listed 
IPO firms as private acquirers suffer less from problems of overvalued synergy 
and agency problems compared to public acquirers. Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) suggest that when the market is overvalued, acquirers 
and target firms are more likely to overestimate the synergy value. Since a 
private acquirer could not take advantage of overvalued stock price as a public 
acquirer does, it is less likely to conduct acquisitions with overvalued synergy. 
Fu et al. (2013) observe that acquisitions driven by stock overvaluation do not 
lead to synergy gains. As private acquirers cannot get valuation from the 
market before the RTs, acquisition-driven IPOs are more prone to the problem 
of overvalued synergy compared to private acquirers conducting RTs.  
In addition, previous studies suggest that a private acquirer is subject to a 
lower extent of agency problems due to a more concentrated ownership than 
a public firm (Gao et al., 2013; Asker et al., 2011; Bhide, 1993). Agency theory 
suggests that firms with a higher level of agency problems are more likely to 
conduct ill-conceived M&As, which harm firm value (Jensen, 1986 and 2004; 
Moeller et al., 2005). As private acquirers involved in RTs are not required to 
issue shares to the public, RTs are more likely to have a higher insider 
ownership than that of IPOs. If having a more concentrated insider owenrship, 
private acquirers in RTs are less likely to be prone to agency problems 




and lower level of agency problems are more likely to conduct well-conceived 
acquisitions and outperform acquisitions conducted by recently listed IPO firms. 
The above arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2-1: Acquisitions conducted by recently listed IPO 
firms outperform acquisitions conducted by private firms in a 
RT. 
2.4 Sample Selection and Data Collection  
In this section, I outline the sample selection procedure and describe the data 
sources. My initial sample consists of IPOs, RTs and M&As on the LSE from 
the Thomson ONE Securities Data Company (SDC). The sample period is 
between 1 January 1995, and 31 December 2012.  I collect IPO and RT 
prospectuses from the Perfect Information (PI) Navigator database. The 
prospectuses include board ownership information before and immediately 
after listing. The pre-listing financial information of private firms is obtained 
from Datastream and the prospectuses. The deal-specific information is 
collected mainly from the SDC database and supplemented with information 
from the prospectuses. The post-deal stock market and financial performance 
data are collected from Datastream. Data from prospectuses are manually 
collected.  
My sample period starts from 1995, when the AIM was launched, and ends in 
2012, which allows the investigation of performance for two years after the RTs. 
I drop incomplete RTs, IPOs, and M&As for three reasons. First, the complete 
IPOs and RTs ensure private firms obtain their public listings. Second, I 
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investigate whether the board of directors’ (BOD) ownership structures 
influence the choice of listing routes and post-acquisition performance. 5 
Ownership structure change is only expected to occur in complete RTs. Third, 
completed RTs and M&As generate combined new entities, of whose post-
acquisition performance I can examine.  
[Insert Table 2-1 here6] 
Table 2-1 Panel A describes the filters used to construct the sample of RTs. 
RTs are identified by the variable “Reverse Takeover flag” in the SDC M&A 
database. The Reverse Takeover flag “indicates a merger in which the 
acquiring company offers more than 50% of its equity as consideration offered 
to the target company resulting in the target company becoming the majority 
owner of the new company” (SDC, 2014, p.257). The initial sample includes 
238 RTs completed during 1995-2012. I eliminate RTs without a public 
acquirer and a private target. I narrow the sample to 135 RTs which follow the 
definition in the prior literature, that a private firm inherits the public listing 
status after being acquired by a public firm in a RT (Gleason et al., 2005; Lee 
et al., 2014). The filter of public status ensures that the private firm has no 
access to the general market before and obtains the public listing after the RT 
transaction. When a public firm purchases more than one private firm at the 
same time, the SDC database recognises it as multiple RTs with distinct SDC 
                                                          
5 I check four other databases, FAME, Osiris, Orbis and Thomson One, as supplementary resources to 
collect financial and ownership information. Unfortunately, these supplementary databases do not 
provide additional benefit to my data collection. 




Deal Numbers.7 I verify these multiple target RTs from prospectuses, and each 
RT prospectus is identified as one RT transaction. The private firm which 
obtains more than 50% shares post-RT is identified as the private target in 
multiple target RTs. Based on these criteria, I have 128 RTs left in my sample. 
In Section 2.2.1, I discuss shell-RTs. A shell-RT followed by a regular 
acquisition also fits the listing-and-acquisition desire of a private firm. Floros 
and Sapp (2011) suggest that RTs identified by the SDC M&A database 
generally involve operating public firms. Floros and Shatri (2009) suggest that 
the SDC database fails to identify shell-RTs. I checked the SIC codes of my 
238 RTs, and none of the public firms had codes 6770 and 9995, which 
represent blank checks and non-operating establishments, respectively, in 
Aydogdu et al. (2007). The shell-RT route is similar to an IPO route, which 
could provide a public listing status to facilitate subsequent M&As.  
Appadu et al. (2014) observe 118 shell-RTs and 125 RTs between operational 
public and private firms in the same type of business during 1995-2012 on the 
LSE. Appadu et al. (2014) find that 41 shell-RTs conducted subsequent M&As 
within one year of listing. If the shell-RT sample is available, additional 
analyses could be conducted to test the springboard effect of shell-RTs on 
subsequent acquisitions.  
In my study, shell-RTs are not included in my sample as the SDC database do 
not include shell-RTs. However, even if I got information of the sample shell-
RT in Appadu et al. (2014), the sample of 41 private firms opting for the shell-
                                                          
7 The SDC M&A defines SDC Deal Number as a “Unique nine digit number assigned by Thomson 
Reuters to each individual transaction” (SDC, 2014). 
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RT-and-acquisition route is much smaller than my sample of 513 private firms 
opting for the IPO-and-acquisition route and the 128 private firms opting for 
the RT route. This difference in transaction numbers suggests that private 
firms are more likely to use the IPO and RT routes to conduct listing and 
acquisition transactions.  
Table 2-1 Panels B and C describe the filters used to construct the sample of 
acquisition-motived IPOs. My initial sample of 3,204 IPOs comes from the SDC 
New Issue database, and the sample of 22,136 M&As comes from the SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. Following Derrien and Kecskés (2007), I 
exclude 252 cross-listing firms already listed elsewhere. Unlike original IPOs, 
cross-listed issuers are listed or publicly traded in their domestic stock markets, 
where public funding can be provided to facilitate subsequent M&As (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002). The remaining observations contain 2,952 original IPOs 
in my sample.  
As my study focuses on acquirers who control the combined firm after deal 
completion, I track all M&A activities for the 2,952 original IPO sample firms 
over the sample period.  Seventy-six leveraged buyout (LBO) and/or 
management buyout (MBO) transactions are excluded from the initial M&A 
sample of 22,136 (see Table 2-1 Panel C). In such transactions, the acquirer 
only provides its management’s expertise to targets and contributes no 
physical capital of its own (Hsieh et al., 2011). I match IPOs and subsequent 
M&As using the SDC 6-digit CUSIP Number8 and cross-check the acquirer’s 
                                                          
8 To match IPOs with their subsequent M&As, I use eleven firm identifiers provided by the SDC 
database. The identifiers are SDC 6-digit CUSIP Number, SDC 8-digit CUSIP Number, SDC 9-digit 




and IPO firms’ names in the M&A prospectus provided by the PI Navigator 
database to confirm that the M&A is conducted by an IPO firm listed during 
1995-2012. If the sample IPO firm conducts subsequent M&As, the IPO firm 
and the M&A acquirer will have the same SDC 6-digit CUSIP Number and 
same company name. I also exclude nine IPOs which conduct 61 M&As before 
listing. Based on these criteria, I am left with 1,088 IPO firms that conducted 
4,027 M&As over the sample period.  
Following Hovakimian and Hutton (2010) and Hsieh et al. (2011), I restrict the 
M&A sample to transactions in which at least 50% of the target’s shares were 
acquired by the IPO firms. These IPO firms can provide consolidated financial 
statements on the post-acquisition entity, which is the same as acquirers in 
RTs. I exclude 99 M&A observations with missing information on the 
percentage of the target’s shares acquired in the transaction, and 617 M&As 
with less than 50% of the target’s shares acquired (see Table 2-1 Panel C). 
Based on these criteria, I have a sample of 949 IPO firms which acquire control 
of targets in 3,311 M&As (see Table 2-1 Panels B and C).  
To make the acquisition-driven IPOs more comparable to RTs, I construct a 
sample of IPOs which acquire another firm within 12 months of the initial public 
offering process.  I follow Brau et al. (2012) to apply a 12-month period 
between IPOs and subsequent acquisitions. Brau et al. (2012) show that IPOs 
that acquire within a year of going public significantly underperform for 1- 
through 5-year holding periods following the first year, whereas non-acquiring 
                                                          
Permanent ID, 12-digit ISIN(International Securities Identification Number), Thomson Ticker Symbol, 
Datastream Code, and Company Name. The 6-digit CUSIP Number provides the best matching result 
as other identifiers have more missing observations than the 6-digit CUSIP Number. 
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IPOs do not significantly underperform over these time frames. The financial 
characteristics of a listed-within-12-months public acquirer are more 
comparable to RT private “acquirer” than a mature public firm. This restriction 
helps to better capture private firms’ choice of RTs versus IPOs followed by 
acquisitions. Based on these criteria, I have a sample of 513 IPOs, which 
acquire 948 firms within 12 months after IPOs (see Table 2-1 Panels B and C).  
[Insert Table 2-2 here] 
There are 128 RTs and 513 acquisition-motived IPOs that meet my sample 
selection criteria. In Table 2-2 Panel A, I exclude 50 RTs without prospectuses. 
The remaining 78 RTs have post-deal board ownership information, and 24 of 
them have pre-deal board ownership information. I supplement the 
prospectuses with annual reports from the PI Navigator for private firms’ pre-
RT last-twelve-month (LTM) financial information. After eliminating seven 
private firms without consolidated financial information and five firms without 
LTM financial information in the prospectuses and adding back four private 
firms with LTM consolidated financial information in financial statements, I 
obtain my final RT sample of 70 observations (55% of my sample) with both 
ownership and LTM financial information. 
Table 2-2 Panels B and C describe criteria applied to IPOs. I collect private 
firms’ pre-IPO financial information from the Datastream database and IPO 
prospectuses. Among the 513 acquisition-driven IPOs, 493 IPO firms can be 
matched to Datastream, and 223 out of 493 firms have LTM pre-IPO financial 




resource to collect the financial information for the 20 IPO firms that cannot be 
matched to Datastream and the 270 IPO firms for which pre-deal LTM financial 
information cannot be found from Datastream. Among the 290 IPO firms 
without financial information from Datastream, 64 have LTM financial 
information in the IPO prospectuses. Merging LTM financial information from 
Datastream and prospectuses, I have a sample of 287 IPO firms that have the 
LTM financial information. Eliminating 98 IPOs with missing board ownership 
information results in a final sample of 189 acquisition-motived IPOs (37% of 
my sample), with both LTM financial statement information of private firm and 
post-deal Board of Directors’ holdings information. Table 2-2 Panel C 
sequentially excludes IPO firms without board ownership information and pre-
listing financial information, resulting in the same final sample of 189 IPOs. 
 [Insert Table 2-3 here] 
Table 2-3 Panels A to E describe the pre- and post-listing board ownership 
and pre-listing financial information that I obtained for the final sample of 70 
RTs and 189 acquisition-motived IPOs. All financial information is inflation-
adjusted following Bargeron et al. (2008). The inflation rates are obtained from 
Datastream, and the base rate is set to 100 in 1995. All financial figures are 
exchanged to U.S. dollars, and exchange rates are obtained from Datastream. 
I collect the post-listing market performance data and post-acquisition financial 
report information from Datastream. Among the final sample of 70 RTs, 66 
have total return index (RI) data. Among the final sample of 189 acquisition-
motived IPOs, 179 IPOs conducted acquisitions that have RI data.  
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2.5 Model Design and Variable Measurement 
This section presents the empirical model design and describes the 
measurement of variables. I also motivate the use of each variable and how it 
affects the post-acquisition performance.  
2.5.1 Self-selection of listing routes  
Feldman (2005), a U.S. RT legal advisor, suggests that a RT listing is faster 
and cheaper than an IPO listing, especially for small firms who may not be able 
to afford an IPO. Feldman (2005) suggests that for most RTs it takes two to 
three months to complete the due diligence and negotiation of documents, 
even if contemporaneous financing was taking place, while a typical IPO 
usually takes nine to twelve months to complete. Floros and Shatri (2009) find 
that the median duration of RTs, between the first announcement date and the 
completion date, is 51 days, while that of a penny stock IPO is 83 days. 
Gleason et al. (2005) show that the combined fees to the target and the 
acquirer on average are 2.72% of the transaction value, while Chen and Ritter 
(2000) suggest that the floatation cost of an IPO can be 7% of the transaction 
value. Thus, private firms who are not able to afford the cost and duration of 
an IPO listing may prefer to conduct a RT listing.  
Previous RT studies in the U.S. show that smaller, younger, and less profitable 
private firms appear to opt for a RT (Adjei et al., 2008; Semenenko, 2011). As 
the pre-listing private firms’ financial information is often subject to limited 
availability, some researchers investigate the financial information of combined 
firms in the first post-listing financial report and they find that firms opting for a 




liquid (cash holding) than IPO counterparts of comparable size and industry 
(Pavkov, 2006; Sjostrom, 2007; Adjei et al., 2008; Floros and Shatri, 2009; 
Jindra, 2012). In the U.S., private firms appear to self-select a RT or an IPO 
listing based on their financial characteristics.  
IPO literature shows that the insider ownership structure influences the 
decision of going public (Pagano and Roell, 1998; Mello and Parsons, 1998; 
Brau et al., 2003). Pagano and Roell (1998) suggest that insiders face a trade-
off between external funding and concentrated control. Brau et al. (2003) 
observe that the level of post-deal insider ownership tends to be higher for IPO 
firms than for private firms choosing to be acquired by another firm. As 
mentioned in Section 2.1, in the U.S., insiders who prefer to retain a more 
concentrated control appear to opt for an IPO listing and hold more shares 
after an IPO than a RT.  
The stock market condition is also a consideration when private firms go public 
(Ritter, 1984). Floros and Sapp (2011) observe that during 1990-2000, the 
number of RTs was lower than 20 transactions per year, while the number of 
IPOs peaked at around 800 in 1996. Gleason et al. (2005) suggest that RTs 
are more certain than IPOs as RTs only involve two parties and do not depend 
on the general market reaction to public offerings. However, if managers of 
IPO firms take advantage of equity mispricing, there is no reason why reverse 
takeover firms should follow a different strategy. Floros and Sapp (2011) 
observe that the number of RTs increases and RTs have the same wave as 
IPOs during 2000-2008. In addition, Semenenko (2011) observes that RT 
waves are highly correlated with conventional M&A waves, with a 0.82 
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correlation when measured on an annual basis. RT private firms try to time the 
market by acquiring financially distressed firms (or shell firms) when market 
conditions are unfavourable and acquiring operating firms pro-cyclically 
(Semenenko, 2011). These U.S. studies show that the RT private firms’ market 
timing behavior changes over time.  
In the U.K., Derrien and Kecskés (2007) show that introduction firms, which 
are listed without issuing equity and then issue equity shortly thereafter, time 
the market both when they list and when they issue equity. These introduction 
firms are similar to RT firms in terms of capital raising activity, as RTs are not 
required to issue capital at the time of listing. Similarly, RT firms have the same 
opportunity to time the market by separating listing and issuing. Thus, RTs are 
less likely to be as sensitive as IPOs to the market condition.  
These RT empirical studies indicate the self-selection issue. A private firm 
could consider its financial characteristics, its expected insider ownership 
structure, the general market condition before listing and its cash needs, and 
self-select a listing-and-acquisition method that meets its constraints and 
desire of listing and acquisition.  
2.5.2 Model Design 
If one believes that the choice of listing-and-acquisition routes is induced by or 
reflects private information, then the consistent estimation of the parameters 
in the cross-sectional regression requires the appropriate control for self-
selection (Prabhala, 2008). I use a logit regression model to test whether 




investigate the determinants of route choice. If a self-selection issue exists, I 
use the instrumental variable (IV) approach to correct the issue and examine 
whether an IPO helps enhance acquirers’ firm value in the long-run.  
To address the self-selection issue, I examine the following regression: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙: 𝑇𝑖(𝐼𝑃𝑂 = 1| 𝑅𝑇 = 0) = 𝛼𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑍𝑖+ 𝑖            (1) 
Where 𝑋𝑖 stands for private firms’ financial characteristics and post-deal board 
ownership structure characteristics, 𝑍𝑖 stands for the firm’s listing proceed and 
the market condition before the acquisition, and 𝑖 is the error term. 
Following Derrien and Kecskés (2007), if the self-selection issue exists, I 
examine the post-acquisition performance in the following regression: 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙: 𝑌𝑖(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)
= 𝛾𝑖𝑇𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑋𝑖+𝛿𝑖𝑊𝑖+ 𝑖 (2) 
Where 𝑇𝑖 is the choice of treatment, which is the outcome of an unobserved 
latent variable in regression (1), 𝑋𝑖  stands for private firms’ financial 
characteristics and post-deal board ownership structures characteristics, 𝑊𝑖 
stands for acquisition deal-specific characteristics, and 𝑖 is the error term. 
The IVs should influence the choice of listing-and-acquisition at the first stage, 
but not influence acquiring firms’ post-acquisition performance at the second 
stage (Heckman and Robb, 1985). I use two IVs: Listing Proceed and Market 
Condition. Listing Proceed measures the amount of proceeds issued in the 
LSE market, in millions of U.S. dollars of common stock issues proceeds. For 
RT transactions, the listing proceed can be zero, as RTs are not required to 
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issue new capital at the time of listing. IPO firms tend to raise more listing 
proceeds than RTs, but more proceeds may not necessarily lead to better 
performance after acquisition. Table 2-4 shows that the correlation between 
the Listing Proceed and the choice of listing-and-acquisition is 0.071, while the 
correlation between the Listing Proceed and acquirers’ post-acquisition 
performance is 0.047. Neither correlation coefficients are significant at the 10% 
level. The correlation in the first stage shows that the Listing Proceed does not 
influence the choice heavily. Therefore, I use the Listing Proceed as the 
second IV.  
[Insert Table 2-4 here] 
Listing Market Condition is generated as the log performance of the FTSE All 
Share cumulative market return three months before the listing transaction of 
RTs or IPOs (Cumming et al., 2014). As discussed in Section 2.5.1, an IPO 
listing is more likely to have a higher correlation with the market condition than 
a RT listing, but theoretically, the pre-listing market condition is uncorrelated 
with acquiring firms’ post-acquisition performance. The acquiring firms 
consider the general market condition before the acquisitions and time the 
market by conducting M&As with over-valued stocks (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). Duchin and Schmidt (2013) show that the 
three-year post-M&A performance of in-wave acquirers’ cumulative BHAR is 
10% to 15% lower than out-wave acquirers. By contrast, Maksimovic et al. 
(2013) find that in-wave M&As create about 2% bigger efficiency gains.9  
                                                          




These empirical studies suggest that market conditions around M&As 
influence acquirers’ post-acquisition performance in the long-run. In my study, 
the duration between IPOs and subsequent acquisitions is one year or less, 
and some acquisition-IPOs occur days before the acquisitions. Therefore, the 
three-month pre-listing windows could overlap with pre-acquisition windows 
and using market condition as an IV could create a theoretical problem in that 
the Listing Market Condition might influence the post-acquisition performance. 
Empirically, the Listing Market Condition is a proper IV, as it is 0.152 correlated 
with the choice of listing-and-acquisition (significant at the 1% level), and 0.016 
correlated with the post-acquisition stock market performance (not significant 
at the 10% level) (Table 2-4).  Therefore, the Listing Market Condition is not 
highly correlated with the post-acquisition performance and can serve as an 
IV.  
I use maximum likelihood (ML) to estimate the treatment effects model:  
𝑀𝐿 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙: 𝑌𝑖(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)
= 𝑎𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑍𝑖+𝛿𝑖𝑊𝑖+ 𝑖            (3) 
Where 𝑋𝑖 stands for private firms’ financial characteristics and post-deal board 
ownership structures characteristics, 𝑍𝑖  stands for the firm’s listing proceed 
and the market condition before the acquisition, 𝑊𝑖 stands for acquisition deal-
specific characteristics and 𝑖 is error term. 
[Insert Table 2-5 here] 
Table 2-5 Panel A describes the measurement of the dependent variables in 
regressions (1), (2) and (3). The descriptive statistics for these dependent 
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variables are given in Table 2-6 Panel A. To test the hypothesis, I use the event 
study approach to examine the market-based abnormal returns to 
shareholders in the acquiring firm for two years after the completion of the 
acquisition. I generate firm 𝑖’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and buy-and-
hold abnormal return (BHAR) across ten event windows: (+2, +5), (+2, +10), 
(+2, +15), (+2, +20), (+2, +40), (+2, +60), (+2, +127), (+2, +254), (+2, +381), 
and (+2, +508). These windows cover short-run and long-run effects and range 
from one week to two years after the acquisition. For the final sample of 70 
RTs and 189 IPOs conducting acquisitions within one year of listing, a sub-
sample of 65 RTs and 179 IPOs have two years of post-acquisition stock 
market information in Datastream. 10  I examine the post-acquisition 
performance within the sub-sample. The results of alternative measures are 
presented in Section 2.6.3. 
[Insert Table 2-6 here] 
2.5.3 Dependent Variable Measurement and Motivation 
Table 2-5 Panels B, C, and D describe the independent variables in the models, 
which are the financial characteristics of private firms opting for each listing-
and-acquisition route, the board ownership structure immediately after the 
admission of the listing, and the listing and acquisition deal-specific 
characteristics. The descriptive statistics for these variables are given in Table 
2-6 Panels C to F. 
                                                          
10 66 RTs and 179 IPOs have post-acquisition RIs in Datastream. I exclude one IPO, which was delisted 




LogTA is the logarithm of the book value of total assets twelve months before 
listing. LogTA is a firm size proxy that provides an indication of the private 
firm’s ability to successfully compete as an independent publicly traded firm 
(Brau et al., 2003). Brau et al. (2003) show that the average value of total 
assets is $268 million for IPO firms and $111 million for firms choosing to be 
acquired by public firms; the difference is significant at the 1% level. As IPOs 
involve considerable transaction costs, small firms may not be equipped to 
operate as successfully as stand-alone public firms (Pagano and Roell, 1998; 
Coelho, 2015; Beaumont, 2015). In this study, private firms opting for each 
route operate as stand-alone public firms. I expect smaller firms opt for a RT 
as it is generally cheaper and quicker than an IPO.  
LogSALE equals the logarithm of the one plus the sales revenue value. As 
some private firms in RT and IPO transactions have a sale value of zero, the 
log(1+Sale) ensures the firm size is a positive figure. Derrien and Kecskés 
(2007) proxy firm size with sales revenue. I expect a positive relationship 
between LogSALE and the choice of an IPO. 
Leverage equals a private firm’s book value of total debts twelve months 
before the listing, divided by the contemporaneous book value of total assets. 
Theoretically, the leverage ratio should range from zero to one. In practice, 
some private firms have negative equity due to write-down goodwill or 
cumulated loss larger than the book value of equity, and their leverage ratios 
are larger than one. I set the leverage to be one if the firm has negative equity. 
Several U.S. studies investigate the first post-listing financial reports and 
observe that RT firms have higher leverage and smaller size than IPO 
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counterparts of comparable size and industry (Gleason et al., 2005; Floros and 
Shatri, 2009; Jindra, 2012). The negative correlation between firm size and 
leverage is consistent with international findings in Rajan and Zingales (1995).  
Profit ratio equals a private firm’s book value of net income twelve months 
before the listing divided by the contemporaneous book value of total assets. 
The profit ratio is negative if the firm generates a loss and positive if the firm 
generates a profit. According to previous U.S. RT studies, less profitable 
private firms opt for a RT (Adjei et al., 2008; Semenenko, 2011). Previous 
research suggests that private firms are likely to conduct an IPO when firms 
expect an increase in profitability, and investors appear to value listing firms 
based on the pre-IPO profit margins (net income divided by sales) (Poulsen 
and Stegemoller, 2008; Mikkelson et al., 1997; Jain and Kini, 1994).  
Liquidity equals a private firm’s book value of cash and cash equivalent twelve 
months before the listing divided by the contemporaneous book value of total 
assets. It ranges from zero to one. Denis and Sibilkov (2009) suggest that cash 
holdings are more valuable for financially constrained small firms than large 
firms. Small private firms opting for a RT are more likely to have a higher 
liquidity ratio than IPO firms. As RTs are not required to raise capital at the 
time of listing, private firms opting for a RT are less likely to have a cash need 
compared to IPO firms.  
Asset Turnover equals a private firm’s book value of sales revenue twelve 




assets. Asset turnover measures the firm’s ability to generate revenue from its 
assets. I use asset turnover as a control of firm financial characteristics. 
Board Ownership is the collective proportion of common shares owned 
directly or indirectly by the board immediately following the admission of the 
acquisition.11  As discussed in Section 2.1, whether post-acquisition board 
ownership in RTs and IPOs is different is an empirical issue. 
I examine the post-listing board ownership structure for two reasons. First, 
board members in private firms make their decisions of whether to stay or 
leave after the IPO and the RT, and those who stay in the new board control 
the firm and supervise its performance. The post-listing board has more 
influence on the post-listing-and-acquisition performance than the pre-RT 
board. For example, in a private firm, if a pre-listing board member resigns and 
sells out his holding, he or she may not have any interest in the post-deal entity 
and his or her pre-deal position may have less influence on the listing-and-
acquisition; if a pre-listing board member resigns from the board but keeps his 
holding, he or she can only enjoy the cash interest of the firm without direct 
influence in the firm. If a new member is introduced to the board immediately 
after listing, he or she is likely to be involved in the listing process, and his or 
her common shareholding is likely to be negotiated before the completion of 
the listing. 
                                                          
11 Direct holding measures shares held by board members and indirect holding is shares held by board 
members’ immediate families. The board ownership measure excludes options held by the board, 
following Brennan and Franks (1997), Mikkelson et al. (1997), Himmelberg et al. (1999), Morck et al. 
(1988), McKnight and Weir (2009), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Cho (1998), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991), and Lewellen et al. (1985).  
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Second, post-IPO board ownership is the pre-acquisition ownership, which 
reflects the agency cost arising from the separation of ownership and control. 
For RTs, I use post-RT board ownership as a proxy for pre-acquisition board 
ownership as pre-acquisition board ownership is only available for 24 RT 
private firms.  
CEO/MD Ownership is the proportion of common shares owned directly or 
indirectly by the chief executive officer (CEO) or managing director (MD) 
immediately following the admission of the acquisition. Executive officers are 
called managing directors in some U.K. firms. In this study, I investigate 
whether CEOs and MDs choose different listing routes based on their control 
preference.  
I use Board Size (Singh and Davidson, 2003; Fu et al., 2013) and NED/BOARD 
(McKnight and Weir, 2009) to control for the post-listing firms’ corporate 
governance. Board Size may influence the impact of insiders on corporate 
performance by acting as either a complement or substitute for ownership 
structure (Singh and Davidson, 2003). Previous studies find mixed evidence 
on the relation between board size and firm performance (Pearce and Zahra, 
1992; Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998, 
among others). Empirical studies suggest that boards dominated by NEDs are 
more likely to have better governance and act in the best interest of 
shareholders (Borokhovich et al., 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988).  
I also control acquisition deal-specific variables which are Listing Exchange, 




Transaction, Acquisition Payment Method, Friendly Acquisition, Cross-Border 
Acquisition, and Synergy Acquisition. Table 2-5 Panel D discuss the 
measurements of these variables. I control for listing exchange with the AIM 
dummy which equals 1 if a firm is listed on the AlM, and zero if listed on the 
London Main Market. I classify an acquisition as synergy acquisition if the 
target and acquirer have the same 2-digit SIC. 
Derrien and Kecskés (2007) suggest that AIM is the preferred exchange for 
smaller firms. Tolmunen and Torstila (2005) find that acquisitions with larger 
transaction values are more likely to use stock payment (Jensen, 1986; 
Agrawal et al., 1992). Previous studies find that cash acquirers outperform 
stock acquirers in long-run stock price performance (Loughran and Ritter, 
1997). Ghosh (2001) and Linn and Switzer (2001) find the same relationship 
for acquirers’ long-run operating performance. Prior research finds that friendly 
acquirers underperform hostile acquirers in the long-run (Agrawal et al., 1992; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1997). Danbolt and Maciver (2012) find that acquirers 
gain significantly more in cross-border than in comparable domestic 
acquisitions, since cross-border transactions may bring additional benefits of 
international diversification and access to new markets, and may transfer 
higher corporate governance standards from acquirers to targets. Acquirers 





2.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, I compare private firms opting for the RT route and IPO-and-
acquisition route and provide the descriptive statistics in Table 2-6 Panels A to 
G. Panel A of Table 2-6 and Figure 2-1 present the annual distribution of the 
initial sample of 128 RTs and 513 IPO transactions. During 1995 to 2012, RTs 
and IPOs have a similar trend that peaks around 2000 and 2005, and bottoms 
around 2009 and 2012. The annual frequency distribution suggests that the 
market condition may influence both RTs’ and IPOs’ volumes. Panel B 
presents industry distributions of acquirers and targets in RTs and acquisitions 
conducted by IPO firms. Both RTs and acquisitions are clustered in 
manufacturing, transportation and public utilities, finance, insurance and real 
estate, and services industries.  
The average leverage ratio in RT private firms is 32.7% higher than private 
firms opting for an IPO, and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. A high leverage ratio suggests a high risk of financial distress and 
potentially high financing costs (Opler and Titman, 1994; Myers and Majluf, 
1984). The higher financial risk and financing costs make a RT private firm 
appears to be less attractive than IPO firms for private firms at the listing issue. 
Private firms opting for IPOs hold 4.5% higher cash than RT private firms, and 
the difference is significant at the 10% level. Private firms opting for RTs and 





Figure 2-1. The RTs and IPOs Annual Distribution. The sample comprises 128 RTs and 
513 acquisition-motived IPOs listed on the London Stock Exchanges between 1 January 
1995 and 31 December 2012.  
 
Panel D presents the post-listing board ownership structure in the public firms. 
Generally, firms opting for a RT or IPO route have comparable post-listing 
ownership structure. IPO firms have a slightly larger board with a mean 
(median) of 6 (15) members, while post-RT combined public firms have a mean 
(median) of 5.5 (9) members. IPO firms are much larger than RT private firms, 
and their larger scope and greater complexity of operations seem to require 
larger boards (Boone et al., 2007). Firms using both types of listing have 
around three executives, and 40% of the board are made up of non-executives, 
which is consistent with the U.K. combined code of best practice 
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third of the board; the percentage of NEDs has increased since the Cadbury 
report in 1992 (McKnight and Weir, 2009; Dahya et al., 2002). Previous U.S. 
studies by Floros and Shastri (2008, 2009) suggest that insiders, including the 
board, managers and block holders, tend to retain higher holdings in an IPO 
firm than a RT firm. By contrast, Panel D shows that the board members in my 
sample of U.K. IPOs tends to hold 1.7% less than RT firms, with a mean of 
34.4% versus 36.1%, respectively, and the 1.7% difference is not significant at 
the 10% level. The 1.7% higher board ownership in RT firms is held by NEDs, 
and executives in both types of listing hold 29% on average. Previous research 
suggests that the CEO is generally regarded as the most powerful 
organizational member and can significantly influence firm strategic decisions, 
such as listing and acquisitions (Daily and Johnson, 1997; Malmendier and 
Tate, 2008; Harford and Li, 2007). My sample shows that CEOs tend to hold 
4% higher ownership in IPO firms than RT firms, but the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
Panels E and F of Table 2-6 present the listing and acquisition deal-specific 
characteristics. Private firms tend to opt for an IPO when the stock market 
generates positive returns and choose a RT when the market is cold. The 
average value of three-month pre-listing market returns is 3% higher in IPOs 
than RTs, and the difference is significant at the 1% level. IPO firms raise more 
capital than RT firms, with a mean (median) of $124 million ($9.8 billion) versus 
$8 million ($65 million). Acquisitions conducted by IPO firms have a mean 
(median) transaction value of $248 million ($37.4 billion), which is around 




smaller in size, and 68% of RT firms list on the AIM. In my sample, 55% of IPO 
firms list on the AIM. In the listing prospectuses, 12 IPO firms and 18 RTs 
stated that the use of listing proceed is on “acquisitions” or “future acquisitions” 
(M&A motive). The untabulated results present that the correlation coefficient 
between the listing proceed and the value of acquisition transaction is 0.948 in 
my sample of 65 RTs and 155 IPOs, 0.094 in the sample of 30 firms that state 
that listing proceeds are used for acquisition purposes, and 0.950 in the 
sample of 190 firms that do not state the use of listing proceed on acquisitions. 
These high correlations suggest that even if firms do not use the listing 
proceeds directly on subsequent or simultaneous acquisitions, the size of the 
listing proceed influences the size of acquisitions. The SDC M&A database 
clarifies all except one RT as friendly acquisitions, and the majority of 
acquisitions are domestic acquisitions. IPO firms make 57% of acquisitions 
within the same 2-digit SIC industries, while 65% of RTs are diversification 
deals. Both RTs and IPO acquisitions tend to prefer stock and mixed payment, 
and 1 RT and 45 acquisitions conducted by IPO firms are paid fully in cash.  
Panel G of Table 2-6 presents the equally weighted average of CAR and BHAR 
from the first week to two years post acquisition, excluding the initial return. 
Figure 2-2 illustrates that the average of CARs (CAARs) and the average of 
BHARs (BHAARs) decrease, and after two years, investors on average 
experience a loss of 35% (18%) and 45% (14%) in acquisitions conducted by 
IPO firms and RTs respectively, with the CAR (BHAR) measure.  
Acquisitions conducted by IPO firms experience 2% to 5% better performance 
than RTs in the short run. The differences in post-acquisition performance are 
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statistically significant at the 5% level during the first month after the acquisition. 
The short-run post-acquisition performance is partially consistent with the 
conjecture in Hsieh et al. (2011) that an IPO facilitates subsequent M&As as 
an option and that an IPO creates firm value. However, the springboard effect 
is unstable in the long-run. Acquisitions conducted by IPO firms can 
outperform and underperform RTs, and the two-month to two-year 
performance differences are not statistically significant.  
A possible explanation is that the valuation surprise discussed in Hsieh et al. 
(2011) may be over-estimated at the time of listing. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
suggest that exchanging overvalued stocks to less overvalued target firms 
enhances, or at least cushions the collapse of, the long-run value of acquirers. 
In a long-run time period post-acquisition, the overvalued stocks of acquirers 
could tend to decrease to the fair value. Furthermore, Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) suggest that when acquirers and targets are overvalued, 
the synergy is also likely to be overestimated. When the overvalued synergy 
is not realised post-acquisition, the market will adjust the price of acquirers to 
a fair-value. Therefore, the significant IPO spring-board effect exists in the 
short-run and disappears in the long-run. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2-6 Panel G suggest that private firms opting 
for either a RT or an IPO-M&A listing and acquisition route have similar stock 
returns within two years post-acquisition. I control for the firm-specific and 
deal-specific characteristics in Section 2.6.3, and examine the spring-board 




Overall, Table 2-6 suggests that a private firm tends to self-select into an IPO 
listing-and-acquisition route or a RT route based on its financial characteristics 
that reflect its capacity to afford the time and cost of an IPO. Board members 
do not show different control preference in firms deciding between the two 
listing-and-acquisition routes. IPO firms tend to prefer hot pre-listing market 
conditions, while the RTs are conducted in a cold market. Although in the short 
run IPOs bring a springboard effect to subsequent acquisitions which 
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Figure 2-2. The post-acquisition performance of acquiring firms under the market-
adjusted model. The sample comprises 65 RTs and 155 acquisitions conducted by IPOs 
within 12 months of listing between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 2012. Figures 2-2a and 
2-2b show the average of CARs and BHARs, respectively, with different event windows. 
 
2.6.2 Testing for the Self-Selection  
When testing the hypothesis that IPOs provide springboard effects on 
subsequent acquisitions and these IPO firms generate better post-acquisition 
performance than RTs, I must account for the self-selection of the choice of 
the two listing-and-acquisition routes. Table 2-7 Panels A and B present the 
results of self-selection based on financial characteristics, board ownership 
structure, and listing and acquisition deal-specific characteristics. The p-values 
of Chi-square tests suggest that the models in Table 2-7 Panel A Columns (2) 
and (3) do not observe self-selection issues with regard to board members’ 
and executives’ control preference. Financial characteristics (Table 2-7 Panel 
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specific characteristics in listing and acquisition transactions (Table 2-7 Panel 
A Columns 5 and 6), and the combinations of these factors (Table 2-7 Panel 
B) are statistically significant determinants of the choice between the two 
listing-and-acquisition routes.  
[Insert Table 2-7 here] 
My results show that, on average, private firms with large assets, low leverage 
ratio and low liquidity ratios tend to opt for an IPO listing (Table 2-7 Panel A 
Column 1 and Table 2-7 Panel B Columns 1 to 6). These results are consistent 
with the findings in previous literature that large private firms are more likely to 
be able to bear the IPO transaction costs than small private firms (Brau et al., 
2003; Pagano and Roell, 1998; Coelho, 2015; Beaumont, 2015). Previous U.S. 
studies of RTs generally find that RT firms have higher leverage than IPO 
counterparts of comparable size and industry, as public firms are more likely 
and find it easier to issue debt than RT private firms (Gleason et al., 2005; 
Floros and Shatri, 2009; Jindra, 2012). As IPO firms can raise capital at the 
time of listing, private firms opting for an IPO are less likely to have a higher 
liquidity ratio (cash holding ratio) than private firms opting for a RT (Denis and 
Sibilkov, 2009).  
I also find that firms with high CEO and MD control preference and large board 
sizes tend to opt for an IPO listing (Table 2-7 Panel A Column 4). In addition, 
private firms tend to opt for the IPO listing-and-acquisition route under 
favourable market conditions and use the favourable market condition to raise 
capital (Table 2-7 Panel A Column 4). This result is consistent with the 
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transaction frequency in Table 2-6 Panel A. However, after controlling for the 
firm-specific financial characteristics, board structure and deal-specific 
characteristics, the CEO/MD ownership, board size and listing market 
condition do not tend to affect the choice of IPO versus RT route (Table 2-7 
Panel B).  
I find that acquisitions conducted by IPO firms are more likely to be paid in 
cash and are less likely to state the M&A motive of listing proceed (Table 2-7 
Panel A Column 6 and Table 2-7 Panel B). As I discussed in Section 2.6.1, 
although IPO firms appear to not state that listing proceeds are used for 
acquisition purposes (M&A motive), the value of acquisition transaction and 
the listing proceed are highly correlated (correlation is 0.9483). On the contrary, 
RT firms tend to state the acquisition purpose of listing proceed. 
2.6.3 Testing the hypothesis of performance 
Table 2-8 investigates whether acquisitions conducted by recently listed IPO 
firms outperform acquisitions conducted by private firms in a RT. To control for 
the self-selection issue of private firms’ listing-and-acquisition route, I apply the 
maximum likelihood treatment estimations in Table 2-8 (the detail of treatment 
model is discussed in Section 2.5.2 model (2)).  
Table 2-8 Panel A shows that total asset and liquidity significantly influence 
the post-acquisition two-year CAR at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The 
coefficients in Columns (1) to (4) of Table 2-8 Panel A show that private firms 
with larger total assets and lower liquidity ratios are more likely to have better 




to successfully compete as an independent publicly traded firm (Brau et al., 
2003). A high liquidity ratio indicates the firms’ higher cost of external financing, 
and the U.S. evidence suggests that there is a negative relation between 
returns and liquidity (Kim et al., 1998; Opler and Titman, 1994). After 
accounting for self-selection, financial characteristics, and board ownership 
structures, a RT outperforms an IPO by 13% to 27% within two years post-
acquisition, but the difference is not statistically significant (Table 2-8 Panel A 
Columns1-4).  
Table 2-8 Panel A Columns 3 and 4 also show that executive ownership and 
CEO/MD ownership significantly positively influence the post-acquisition two-
year CAR at the 1% levels, which support the agency cost hypothesis that a 
higher percentage of executive and CEO/MD ownership improves firm 
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1979; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Ang 
et al., 2000).  
As the correlation coefficients of control variables in Table 2-8 Panel B are 
generally consistent with the findings in Table 2-8 Panel A, I simply show the 
regression coefficients for the IPO dummy on the BHAR in the following panels. 
The full table is available upon request. Table 2-8 Panel B Columns 1-4 shows 
that IPOs have a negative springboard effect and significantly underperform 
by 82% to 98% compared to RTs after controlling for self-selection, financial 
characteristics, and board ownership structures.  
 [Insert Table 2-8 here] 
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The regression coefficients in Table 2-8 Panels A and B Columns 5 to 7 need 
to be interpreted with caution, since the p-values of the maximum likelihood 
treatment model are larger than the conventional 10% level. As a robustness 
check of the self-selection issue in the maximum likelihood treatment model, I 
use an OLS estimation to investigate the IPO spring-board effect on the post-
acquisition performance of acquirers. The full table is available upon request. 
Generally, Table 2-9 results are consistent with the finding in Table 2-8 that 
acquisitions conducted by recently listed firms do not tend to outperform RTs. 
In the long-run, acquirers opting for the IPO-and-acquisition route 
underperform by 2% to 9% compared to RT acquirers, and the IPO dummy is 
not significant at the 10% level (Table 2-9 Panel A).   
[Insert Table 2-9 here] 
My test results in this section fail to support the hypothesis that acquisitions 
conducted by recently listed IPO firms outperform RT. An IPO brings negative 
springboard effects on the performance of acquiring firms and does not 
enhance acquiring firms’ value in the long-run.  
2.6.4 Testing the hypothesis of performance in stock payment acquisitions and 
synergy acquisitions 
As discussed in Section 2.3, overvalued stocks and synergy valuation can 
influence firms’ post-acquisition performance. I examine the influence of these 
factors and present the post-acquisition performance of sub-samples of stock 
payment acquisitions and synergy acquisitions in Table 2-10.  




Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that stock acquisitions serve the interest 
of long-run shareholders of the acquirers, even with a negative return. 
Acquiring firms’ claim on capital is enhanced with the stock payment and 
thereby cushions the collapse of the long-run value (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
Table 2-10 shows that IPO firms’ stock acquisitions outperform stock RTs in 
1-year, 18-month, and 2-year post-acquisition periods by 21% (24%), 33% 
(30%), and 29% (23%) in CAARs (BHAARs). The outperformance differences 
are economically considerable but not statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Panels A and B of Table 2-11 present the OLS regression on a sub-sample of 
stock payment deals.12 After controlling the financial characteristics, board 
ownership, and deal-specific characteristics, stock payment IPO acquirers 
underperform RTs by 12.3% to 22.1% in terms of CARs and 1.6% to 20.4% in 
terms of BHARs (not significant at the 10% level).13 Thus, in stock acquisitions, 
IPO acquirers’ outperformance is not explained by the market valuation. This 
evidence fails to support Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) expectation.  
[Insert Table 2-11 here] 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) suggest that when acquirers and 
targets are overvalued, the synergy is also likely to be overestimated. The 
acquirer is a private firm in a RT and a public firm in an acquisition conducted 
by IPO firms. A public acquirer is more likely to be overvalued and have 
overvalued synergy. Thus, public acquirers are not more likely to outperform 
                                                          
12 The full tables are available upon request. 
13 As there are only 42 stock payment deals analysed in Table 2-11 regressions, I apply the OLS 
estimation instead of the maximum likelihood treatment model. The small F statistic of the OLS 
model may be affected by the small sample size. 
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RTs if synergy values are overestimated. I investigate the performance of 
acquirers in synergy acquisitions, which are acquisitions conducted by 
acquirers and target firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry. Acquirers are less 
likely to overestimate synergy values in diversified acquisitions compared to 
that in synergy acquisitions. 
Table 2-10 shows that, on average, synergy acquisitions conducted by IPO 
firms outperform synergy RT deals by 9% in the second week after the 
acquisition, and the outperformance increases to 14% in the second month. 
The outperformance is statistically significant at the 1% level. The post-
acquisition two-year performance shows that, in synergy deals, IPO acquirers 
significantly outperform RTs by 43% at the 5% level, in terms of CAARs. 
Panels C and D of Table 2-11 present the OLS regression on a sub-sample of 
synergy deals. After controlling the financial characteristics, board ownership, 
and deal-specific characteristics, synergy IPO acquirers outperform RTs by 
28.8% to 37.3% in terms of two-year CARs and 10.9% to 15.9% in terms of 
two-year BHARs. However, this outperformance is not statistically significant 
at the 10% level. This evidence tends to support Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan’s (2004) expectation that public acquirers tend to suffer the costs 
of overvalued synergy.  
As discussed in Section 2.3, acquirers with a higher level of insider ownership 
are more likely to conduct well-conceived acquisitions that enhance firm value. 
I investigate the impact of insider ownership on acquirers’ post-acquisition 
performance. Table 2-12 presents the CAARs and BHAARs above and below 




ownership. In the sample of all firms, acquirers with above-median ownership 
outperform lower ownership acquirers by 26.6% in terms of BHAARs, which is 
significant at the 5% level. This result is consistent with the un-tabulated 
regression coefficients in Table 2-8 Panel B, which shows that a one 
percentage increase in the acquirers’ executive ownership (CEO/MD 
ownership) increases the BHARs by 0.8% (1.3%) at the 1% level. In the sub-
sample of RT acquirers, below- and above-median ownership groups 
experience no difference in post-acquisition performance. Therefore, public 
acquirers with lower ownership are more likely to suffer agency problems and 
experience underperformance, which supports Jensen’s (1986 and 2004) 
hypothesis that acquirers with a higher level of agency problems are more 
likely to conduct ill-conceived M&As which harm the long-run firm value. 
2.7 Conclusion  
This chapter seeks to establish if there is a preferable listing-and-acquisition 
route for private firms to conduct value-enhancing acquisitions. I investigate 
two listing-and-acquisitions routes for private firms that desire a public listing 
status and to take over another business, examine the U.K. RT long-run 
performance, and test Hsieh et al.’s (2011) conjecture that an IPO enhances 
the value of the acquiring firm with an optimal exercise of M&A activities.  
First, I find that a private firm self-selects a listing-and-acquisition route 
according to its pre-listing financial characteristics. IPO firms are less 
leveraged and hold less cash in proportion to their total assets than RT firms. 
Firms opting for an IPO are more likely to use cash payment, and the 
acquisition size is highly correlated to the size of listing proceed. These results 
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are consistent with previous literature that IPOs involve considerable process 
time and transaction costs, and that smaller firms are more likely to opt for 
quicker and cheaper RTs (Chen and Ritter, 2000; Brau et al., 2003). 
Second, contrary to the conjecture in Hsieh et al. (2011), I find no evidence of 
significant difference in terms of long-run post-acquisition cumulative abnormal 
returns between acquirers opting for RT or IPO routes. Controlling for self-
selection and firm- and deal-specific characteristics, I find an IPO brings a 
negative springboard effect. The U.K. evidence fails to support the hypothesis, 
as agency problems and overvaluation in acquirers influence post-acquisition 
performance.  
Hsieh et al. (2011) assume there is no misvaluation in the market and the 
valuation surprise, which is the difference between pre- and post-listing firm 
value, influences acquirers’ M&A activities. Whether defined as overvaluation 
or valuation surprise, it has different influences on the value of acquiring firms 
and the value of the synergy. Exchanging overvalued stocks to a less 
overvalued target firm enhances long-run value, and over-estimation of 
synergy harms the long-run value of acquiring firms. Thus, an IPO may benefit 
acquirers’ post-acquisition performance if the positive effect of stock 
overvaluation outweighs the negative effect of synergy overvaluation. 
Finally, efficient and effective corporate governance helps to reduce agency 
costs and enhance long-run performance by conducting well-conceived M&As. 
My study suggests that shareholdings may not serve as an effective control 




acquirers with above- or- below median insider ownership experience no 
significant difference in their post-acquisition performance. Board ownership 
and executive ownership do not affect the post-acquisition performance of 
acquirers. However, acquirers with a higher CEO/MD ownership tends to 
generate higher BHARs, which indicates that aligning the interest of CEO/MD 









Table 2-1 Panel A 
Summary of RT sample selection processes 
This panel describes the sample selection of RT transactions.  
RM firms on the LSE during 1995-2012 identified by “Reverse Takeover flag” 
in the SDC M&A database 
 238 
Less: RTs with private target and private acquirer -2 236 
Less: RTs with subsidiary target and private acquirer 
 
-1 235 
Less: RTs with a public target and a private acquirer -0 235 
Less: RTs with a subsidiary target and a public acquirer -47 188 
Less: RTs with a public target and a public acquirer -45 143 
Less: RTs with a joint venture target and a public acquirer -4 139 
Less: RTs with a government owned target and a public acquirer -0 139 
Less: RTs with missing values of target firms’ shares acquired at the deal -3 136 
Less: Joint venture transaction misidentified as a RT -1 135 
Less: RTs with multiple private targets in a single deal/multiple RTs (each private 
firm gets a distinct SDC Deal Number) 
-7 128 
Equals: RTs with at least one private target and a public acquirer  =128 
 
Table 2-1 Panel B 
Summary of acquisition-motived IPO sample selection processes 
This panel describes the sample selection of acquisition-motived IPOs that conduct acquisitions 
within 12 months after listing.  
IPO firms on the LSE during 1995-2012  3,204 
Less: cross-listing issues -252 2,952 
Less: IPO firms that did not acquire another firm  -1,855 1,097 
Less: IPO firms with M&As conducted before IPO -9 1,088 
Less: IPO firms that acquire less than 50% and have missing values of the 
percentage of target firms’ shares 
-139 949 
Less: IPO firms that take control of another firm within 12 months of the IPO -436 513 
Equals: IPO firms conducting M&As within 12 months of IPO   =513 
 
 
Table 2-1 Panel C 
Summary of recently listed firms’ acquisitions sample selection processes 
This panel describes the sample selection of acquisitions conducted by IPO firms within 12 months 
of listing.  
M&A transactions announced and completed on the LSE during 1995-2012  22,136 
Less: LBO and MBO/ buyout transactions -76 22,060 
Less: M&A firms not acquired by an IPO firm in my initial IPO sample -17,972 4,088 
Less: M&As announced before IPO issue date -61 4,027 
Less: M&As with missing value of the percentage of target’s shares acquired in 
the transaction 
-99 3,928 
Less: M&As where less than 50% of target’s shares are acquired in the 
transaction 
-617 3,311 
Less: M&As conducted by acquirers within 12 months post-IPO -2,363 948 






Table 2-2 Panel A 
Final sample of RTs with Post-RT board ownership information and pre-IPO financial 
information  
This panel describes the RT sample selection and the data collection of pre-listing consolidated 
financial information twelve months before the listing and immediate post-listing board ownership 
structures.  
RT firms that conduct M&As within 12 months after RT  128 
Less: firms without RT prospectuses in the PI database -50 78 
Less: RT private firms that have no consolidated financial information in the RT 
prospectuses 
-7 71 
Less: RT private firms that have no LTM financial information in the RT 
prospectuses 
-5 66 
Add: RT private firms which have LTM financial information in the financial 
reports 
+4 70 
Equals: RT private firms that have both LTM financial and Board of 




Table 2-2 Panel B 
Final sample of acquisition-motived IPOs with both ownership and financial information 
This panel describes the sample selection process of the acquisition-motived IPOs and the data 
collection of pre-listing consolidated financial information twelve-month before the listing and 
immediate post-listing board ownership structures.  
IPO firms that conduct M&As within 12 months after IPO  513 
Less: IPO firms that cannot be matched to Datastream -20 493 
Less: IPO firms without last-twelve-month (LTM) financial information in 
Datastream 
-270 223 
Add: IPO firms with LTM financial information from the IPO prospectuses +64 287 
Less: IPO firms without ownership data in the prospectuses -98 189 
Equals: IPO firms that have both rational LTM financial and Board of 
Directors’ post-IPO holding information 
 =189 
 
Table 2-2 Panel C 
Final sample of acquisition-motived IPOs with both ownership and financial information 
This panel describes the sample selection process of the acquisition-motived IPOs and the data 
collection of pre-listing consolidated financial information twelve-month before the listing and 
immediate post-listing board ownership structures.  
IPO firms that conduct M&As within 12 months after IPO  513 
Less: firms without IPO prospectus in the PI database -26 487 
Less: firms without Board of Directors’ holdings of common shares immediately 
after the IPO in the IPO prospectuses 
-188 299 
Less: IPO firms without LTM financial information from Datastream (these 
firms’ financial data are collected from IPO prospectuses) 
-174 125 
Add: IPO firms with LTM financial information from IPO prospectuses +64 189 
Equals: IPO firms that have both LTM financial and Board of Directors’ 








Table 2-3 Panel A 
Descriptions of board ownership, stock market performance and financial Information 
The immediate post-listing board ownership information is manually collected from IPO and RT prospectuses. The pre-listing financial information is manually 
collected from prospectuses for RT firms. For IPO firms, I collect financial information mainly from Datastream and use IPO prospectuses and IPO firms’ financial 
reports as supplementary resource. Post-listing financial information, exchange rates, and inflation rates are collected from Datastream. 
Data Item Description 
Post-listing board holding The proportion of common shares directly or indirectly owned by each board member following admission of the RT/IPO 
Pre-listing board member 
holding in the private firm 
The proportion of common shares directly or indirectly owned by each board member in the private firm before the RT/IPO 
Board position of each 
member 
For example, Chief Executive Director (CEO), non-executive director (NED), executive director (includes CEO, chief finance 
director, chief technology director, and so on), chair, vice-chair 
Directorship category of 
each member 
Three directorship categories: retained or proposed by pre-deal public firm’s board, retained or proposed by pre-deal private firm’s 
board, and proposed by outside parties if the board member holds no directorship in either public or private firms at the time of the 
deal 
Age The age of each board director 
TA The book value of total assets 
TD The book value of total debt 
CASH The cash and cash equivalent 
SALE The sales revenue 
NI The net income after tax 
Total Return Index (RI) A return index (RI) shows a theoretical growth in value of a shareholding over a specified period, assuming that dividends are re-
invested to purchase additional units of an equity or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date.  




except when t = ex-date of the dividend payment date, then: 





𝑃𝑡= price on ex-date 
𝑃𝑡−1= price on previous day 




Table 2-3 Panel B 
IPO/RT/Acquisition deal-specific information 
The deal-specific information is mainly collected from the SDC New Issue database and the SDC M&A database. The listing proceeds and use of proceeds 
information are collected from IPO and RT prospectuses. 
Item Description 
Issue Date Issue Date/Offer Date/Placement Date: For equity, equity-related, and debt issues, the pricing date of the issue. For syndicated 
loans, the announcement date of the transaction. 
Listing Date Date offering was listed. 
IPO proceed Proceeds amount ($, this market): The tranche amount in U.S. dollars. 
Use of proceed Purpose for which the funds received from the offering will be used. For example, Acquisition Finance, Future Acquisitions, 
General Corporate Purpose, Reduce Indebtedness, Investment, Working Capital, Capital Expenditures, etc. 
CUSIP Number of the target/ 
acquirer/issuer 
A 6-character, unique identifier for each company. Every U.S. company with publicly traded securities is listed in Standard & 
Poor’s CUSIP directory. If a CUSIP has not been assigned, TF will estimate one according to the rules specified by Standard & 
Poors. 
Stock exchange code and 
name of the 
target/acquirer/issuer 
Code indicating primary stock exchange on which issuer's/borrower's common stock trades (e.g. N). 
Primary exchange listing name for target/ acquiring company. 
Target/acquirer/issuer 
company Name 
Firm name of the target/ acquirer/ issuer. 
Primary SIC Code of the 
target/ acquirer/issuer 
The SIC code of the target/ acquirer/issuer company's primary line of business. 
Nation of the target/ 
acquirer/issuer 
Nation in which target/ acquirer/issuer’s primary business or division was located at the time of the transaction. 
Acquisition announcement 
date 
The date one or more parties involved in the transaction makes the first public disclosure of common or unilateral intent to pursue 
the transaction (no formal agreement is required).  Among other things, acquisition announcement date is determined by the 
disclosure of discussions between parties, disclosure of a unilateral approach made by a potential bidder, and the disclosure of a 
signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or other agreement. 
Acquisition effective date Date when the entire transaction is completed and effective. In a two-step transaction this is the date when the second-step merger 
is completed. See also DUNCON (Date Unconditional) when searching targets headquartered in the United Kingdom, Australia, 
and New Zealand. 
Datastream Code of the 
target/ acquirer 





Deal attitude Four categories: friendly, hostile, unknown, non-applicable. 
Acquisition technique Acquisition technique code number, e.g. 8 (Divestiture) For example, reverse takeover, stock swap, financial acquirer, property 
acquisition, tender offer, scheme of arrangement, etc. 
Transaction size for 
acquisitions 
The value of the transaction in millions of U.S. dollars 
Payment Method Four categories: cash, stock, other, unknown. 
Payment percentage The percentage of value paid in cash/stock/other/unknown in a deal. 
Cross-boarder Dummy of cross-border M&As. 
Percentage of shares acquired Number of common shares acquired in the transaction divided by the total number of shares outstanding. 
Percent owned by acquirer 
post-merger 
The percentage of a company held by the acquirer upon completion of a merger. it is the number of common shares acquired in the 
transaction plus any shares previously owned by the acquirer divided by the total number of shares outstanding. 
This data item will be populated if the merger results in the formation of a new company and the percentages held by former target 
and acquirer shareholders have been disclosed, or in reverse takeovers. In reverse takeovers, if the post-merger percentage owned 
is not disclosed, Thomson Reuters will calculate the percentage if the number of shares issued and current number of shares 
outstanding is publicly available. 
Percent owned by target post-
merger 
The percentage of a company held by the target upon completion of a merger. This data item will be populated if the merger 
results in the formation of a new company and the percentages held by former target and acquirer shareholders have been 
disclosed, or in reverse takeovers. In reverse takeovers, if the post-merger percentage owned is not disclosed, Thomson Reuters 




Table 2-4 Correlation Matrix 
The table presents pairwise correlations of the variables (Golubov et al., 2012). The sample consists of the U.K. private firms listed in the LSE and acquiring another 
business. The acquisitions are completed deals announced during the period 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2012. All variables are defined in Table 2-3. ***, **, * 











Turnover Profit Ratio 
Liquidity 
Ratio 
BHAR_MAR 0.008 1        
CAR_MAR 0.008 1 1       
LogTA 0.277*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 1      
LogSALE 0.254*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.762*** 1     
Leverage Ratio -0.423*** 0.024 0.024 -0.144 -0.107 1    
Asset Turnover 0 -0.025 -0.025 -0.143 0.205*** -0.026 1   
Profit Ratio 0.067 0.093* 0.093* 0.275*** 0.301*** -0.194*** 0.091 1  
Liquidity Ratio -0.102** -0.165*** -0.165*** -0.192*** -0.18*** -0.183*** 0.075 0.043 1 
Board Size 0.037 -0.018 -0.018 0.302*** 0.218*** -0.063 -0.019 0.022 0.041 
Board Ownership -0.088* 0.013 0.013 -0.181 0.023 0.047 0.224*** 0.059 -0.062 
NED/BOARD 0.116 -0.039 -0.039 0.101 0.024 -0.176*** -0.095 0.008 0.063 
Number of Executives -0.05 0.023 0.023 0.091 0.132 0.096 0.099 0.005 -0.01 
Executive Ownership -0.043 0.061 0.061 -0.137 0.091 0.004 0.222*** 0.059 -0.069 
CEO/MD Ownership 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.143*** 0.065 -0.149 0.193 0.092 -0.039 
Listing Proceed 0.071* 0.047 0.047 0.377*** 0.293*** -0.012 -0.011 0.04 -0.034 
Listing Market Condition 0.152*** 0.016 0.016 0.129** 0.104** -0.087 -0.041 0.064 -0.084 
Value of Acquisition 
Transaction 
0.017 0.014 0.014 0.225*** 0.18*** 0.01 0.003 0.011 -0.039 
AIM dummy -0.014 -0.088** -0.088** -0.387*** -0.27*** -0.075 0.097** -0.067 0.069 
Acquisition Motive -0.146*** -0.074* -0.074* 0.049 0.058 0.033 0.072 0.034 -0.003 
Friendly Acquisition 0.01 -0.004 -0.004 -0.122* -0.099* -0.021 0.022 -0.006 0.039 
Cross-Border Acquisition 0.265*** 0.011 0.011 0.121* 0.016 -0.138** -0.076 0.029 0.065 
Synergy Acquisition 0.138*** -0.025 -0.025 0.016 0.01 -0.158** 0.043 -0.036 -0.021 























Acquisition Cash Payment 
AIM dummy -0.082 1      
Acquisition Motive -0.012 0.052 1     
Friendly Acquisition -0.024 0.032 -0.061 1    
Cross-Border Acquisition -0.017 -0.019 0.007 -0.004 1   
Synergy Acquisition -0.041 0.03 -0.013 0.072* 0.075 1  
Cash Payment -0.025 -0.061 0.057 0.049 0.117*** 0.03 1 
Table 2-4 continued 











Board Ownership -0.032 1        
NED/BOARD 0.145*** -0.222*** 1       
Number of Executives 0.601*** 0.183*** -0.648*** 1      
Executive Ownership -0.058 0.887*** -0.326*** 0.241*** 1     
CEO/MD Ownership -0.219*** 0.643*** -0.177*** -0.021 0.768*** 1    
Listing Proceed 0.013 -0.107** -0.031 -0.073 -0.086** -0.144** 1   
Listing Market Condition 0.008 -0.063 0.009 0.03 -0.056 -0.04 0.003 1 
Value of Acquisition 
Transaction -0.126** -0.048 -0.112** -0.084 -0.032 -0.121 0.91*** -0.04 
AIM dummy -0.216*** 0.082 0.032 -0.174 0.062 0.041 -0.193*** -0.093** 
Acquisition Motive -0.025 -0.09 0.041* -0.05 -0.038 0.08 -0.01 -0.029 
Friendly Acquisition -0.016 0.094* -0.14** 0.115** 0.087*     . -0.04 -0.005 
Cross-Border Acquisition 0.079 -0.171*** 0.235*** -0.155*** -0.123** -0.05 0.076* 0.039 
Synergy Acquisition 0.075 0.081 0.142** -0.022 0.071 0.035 -0.055 -0.01 
Cash Payment 0.104** 0.036 -0.07 0.131** 0.106** 0.057 0.026 0.084** 
72 
 
Table 2-5 Panel A 
The choice of listing-and-acquisition routes and the post-deal performance of firms 
This panel describes the independent variables in regressions (1) and (2). The data are collected from Datastream.  
Item Description and Calculation N  N  
IPO dummy Y=1 if a private firm opts for an IPO listing and conducts subsequent acquisitions; 





abnormal returns  




Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return of firm 𝑖, 





𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1




Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is firm 𝑖’s daily stock return, 
𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑡  is the contemporaneous holding period return on the benchmark, 
𝑡 = 0 is the effective day of acquisitions and RTs, 
𝑇 is the event window applied to cumulative abnormal returns. 






𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is firm 𝑖’s daily stock return, 
𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the contemporaneous daily return on the FTSE All Share Index, 
𝑡 = 0 is the effective day of acquisitions and RTs. 






The four-factor model is as follows:  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  +ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
The abnormal return is:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) − 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡− ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡 
Where  𝑅𝑖𝑡 is daily return of the listing firm,  
𝑅𝑓𝑡  is the daily risk free rate, which is calculated using one month return on Treasury Bills, 
𝑅𝑚𝑡  is the daily market return, which is calculated using the total return index on the FTSE All Share Index, 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios,  






 𝑼𝑴𝑫𝒕 is the difference in the returns of value-weighted portfolios of firms with high and low prior momentum, 
𝜺𝒕 is the error term of estimation. 




in Control Firm 
Approach  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑐𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is firm 𝑖’s daily stock return, 
𝑅𝑐𝑡 is the contemporaneous daily stock return of the individually matched control firm 𝑐. 
See Lyon et al. (1999) for details on control firm approach. They claim that the control firm approach is free of the new-
listing and rebalancing bias and propose drawing statistical evidence applying a bootstrapped version of the skewness-
adjusted t-test. However, they cast doubt over whether this approach yields well-specified test statistics in non-random 
samples. 




Table 2-5 Panel B 
 The LTM pre-deal financial information of private firms 
This panel describes the pre-listing financial information of private firms. The financial information is collected from IPO and RT prospectuses, financial statements, 
and Datastream database. 
Item Description N N 
Leverage Ratio The value of total debt divided by total assets. 70 189 
Profit Ratio The net income divided by total assets. 70 189 
Liquidity Ratio The cash divided by total assets. 70 189 
Asset Turnover The sales revenue divided by total assets. 69 188 
LogTA Log(TA) equals the logarithm of the book value of total assets. 70 189 
LogSALE Log(SALE+1) equals the logarithm of the one plus the sales revenue. As some private firms in RTs and IPOs 




                                                          




Table 2-5 Panel C 
Board Ownership Variables 
This panel describes the immediate post-listing board ownership information collected from IPO and RT prospectuses. 
Item Description N N 
Board Ownership The collective proportion of ordinary shares owned by the board following admission of the deal 70 189 
Board Size The number of directors in the firm post-admission 70 189 
Executive Ownership The collective proportion of ordinary shares owned by executive directors following admission of the deal 70 189 
Executive Size The number of executive directors in the firm post-admission 70 189 
CEO/MD ownership The proportion of ordinary shares owned by chief executive directors or managing directors following 
admission of the deal 
62 183 
Executive Number The number of executive directors in the firm post-admission 70 189 
NED/BOD The percentage of non-executive directors to total board of directors of the firm 70 189 
Private BOD/Board Size The percentage of private firms’ BOD to total number of board members post-admission 62 189 
Pre-deal private board 
ownership 
The collective proportion of ordinary shares owned by the board in the private firm before admission of 
the deal 
26 188 
Private firm’s Board Size The number of directors in the private firm before listing 26 188 
Ownership per member The average ownership per board member 70 189 
Ownership per private 
member 
The average ownership per private BOD 26 188 
Average Age The average age of board members 60 181 






Table 2-5 Panel D 
Listing and acquisition deal-specific characteristics 
This panel describes the listing and acquisition deal-specific information collected from the IPO and RT prospectuses, the SDC New Issue database, and Datastream. 
Item Description N N 
AIM dummy Listing Exchange is a dummy variable. AIM = 1 if a firm is listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM); 




The market return three months before the listing transaction of RTs or IPOs. 
Following Cumming et al. (2014), I use the log performance of the equally weighted FTSE All Share for the 
three months before listing. The FTSE All Share index is collected from Datastream with Total Return Index.  
70 189 
Listing Proceed This variable measures the proceeds amount of issue in the LSE market, in millions of U.S. dollars on common 
stock issues proceeds amount equals principal amount. (SDC New Issue Item Code: PROCDS) 
For RT transactions, the listing proceed can be zero, as RTs are not required to issue new capital at the time of 
listing.  
70 189 
Acquisition Motive  
(or M&A motive) 
Acquisition Motive = 1 if the “Use of proceed” includes “Acquisition Finance” or “Future Acquisitions, and 0 
otherwise.  
65 155 
Value of Acquisition 
Transaction 
Value of Acquisition Transaction measures the value of the acquisition transaction in millions of U.S. dollars. 65 155 
Friendly Acquisition  Friendly Acquisition = 1 if the acquisition is a friendly deal, and 0 otherwise.  65 155 
Cross-Border 
Acquisition 
Cross-Border Acquisition = 1 if the acquisition is identified as a cross-border deal in the SDC M&A database, 
and 0 otherwise. 
65 155 
Synergy Acquisition Synergy Acquisition = 1 if the 2-digit SIC codes of targets and acquirers are the same, and 0 otherwise. 65 155 
Cash Payment Cash payment = 1 if the deal is fully paid in cash, and 0 otherwise. 65 155 
Acquisition Payment 
Method  
Acquisition Payment Method is a categorical variable. Acquisition Payment=0 if payment is fully in cash, =1 if 







Table 2-6 Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for reverse takeover (RT) and acquisition-motived IPO 
transactions. For the self-selection regression, the sample comprises 70 RTs and 189 IPOs on the 
London Stock Exchange markets in the United Kingdom from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2012. 
For the performance testing regression, the sample comprises 65 RTs and 155 IPOs on the London 
Stock Exchange markets in the United Kingdom from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2012. A RT is a 
particular M&A where a private firm is acquired by a public firm, and the private firm controls the 
combined public entity after deal completion. An acquisition-motived IPO is an IPO which conducts 
acquisition within 12 months of the listing and controls the target after the acquisition. Panels A presents 
statistics on annual frequency distribution of 128 RTs and 513 acquisitions conducted by IPO firms. 
and B presents statistics on industry frequency distribution of 78 RTs and 513 acquisitions conducted 
by IPO firms. Panels C to F present the descriptive statistics on pre-listing financial characteristics, post-
listing board ownership structure, and deal-specific information of listings and acquisitions for the final 
sample. Panel G presents the post-acquisition abnormal returns in terms of cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) and buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) across ten event windows, which are (+2, +5), (+2, 
+10), (+2, +15), (+2, +20), (+2, +40), (+2, +60), (+2, +127), (+2, +254), (+2, +381), and (+2, +508). 
These windows cover short-run and long-run effects and range from one week to two years after the 
acquisition.  
Panel A. Annual frequency distribution of private firms opting for RT and IPO listing routes 
 RTs   IPOs  
1995 2 1.56%  9 1.75% 
1996 3 2.34%  38 7.41% 
1997 6 4.69%  35 6.82% 
1998 7 5.47%  15 2.92% 
1999 9 7.03%  19 3.70% 
2000 11 8.59%  62 12.09% 
2001 14 10.94%  24 4.68% 
2002 8 6.25%  15 2.92% 
2003 6 4.69%  23 4.48% 
2004 4 3.13%  63 12.28% 
2005 20 15.63%  53 10.33% 
2006 15 11.72%  69 13.45% 
2007 5 3.91%  47 9.16% 
2008 7 5.47%  8 1.56% 
2009 4 3.13%  4 0.78% 
2010 6 4.69%  11 2.14% 
2011 1 0.78%  15 2.92% 
2012 0 0.00%  3 0.58% 








Table 2-6 Panel B 
Frequency distribution by industry 




























0 0 4 6 
 
0.00 0.00 0.78 1.17 
Public Administration  10-14  0 0 0 1  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 
Mining 15-17  2 3 36 37  2.56 3.85 7.02 7.21 
Construction 20-39  1 3 12 11  1.28 3.85 2.34 2.14 
Manufacturing 40-49  12 13 69 64  15.38 16.67 13.45 12.48 
Transportation & Public 
Utilities 50-51 
 
6 8 47 38 
 
7.69 10.26 9.16 7.41 
Wholesale Trade 52-59  2 1 15 25  2.56 1.28 2.92 4.87 
Retail Trade 60-67  1 4 20 22  1.28 5.13 3.90 4.29 
Finance, Insurance, Real 
Estate 70-89 
 
26 12 119 97 
 
33.33 15.38 23.20 18.91 
Services 91-97  28 34 191 212  35.90 43.59 37.23 41.33 




Table 2-6 Panel C 
Pre-deal financial characteristics of private firms opting for RTs and IPOs 
***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Mean     Median     
All Firms RTs IPOs Difference 
 
All Firms RTs IPOs Difference 
Variables N=259 N=70 N=189 t-test 
 
N=259 N=70 N=189 Median 
Total Asset  293,324 21,383 394,043 -372,660 
 
54,640,000 437,695 54,640,000 -54,202,305 
Total Debt  164,795 17,771 219,249 -201,477 
 
30,830,000 378,572 30,830,000 -30,451,428 
Cash  9,350 1,931 12,098 -10,166 
 
749,949 30,957 749,949 -718,992 
Sales Revenue  460,592 21,390 623,260 -601,870 
 
100,800,000 159,209 100,800,000 -100,640,791 
Net Income  11,316 -359 15,640 -15,998 
 
1,400,000 6,767 1,400,000 -1,393,233 
Total Debt/Total Asset 0.809 1.310 0.624 0.686**  0.998 0.998 0.961 0.037 
Asset Turnover 1.554 1.572 1.546 0.025  1.272 1.148 1.413 -0.265 
Profit Ratio -0.269 -0.459 -0.198 -0.261  2.657 0.519 2.657 -2 
Liquidity Ratio 0.141 0.129 0.174 -0.045*  0.064 0.073 0.062 0.100 
Leverage Ratio 0.514 0.753 0.426 0.327**   1 1 1 0 
 
Table 2-6 Panel D 
Post-listing board ownership structure of firms opting for RTs and IPOs 
***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Variables All Firms  RTs  IPOs  Difference 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median  Mean  Median 
NED/BOARD 259 0.415 0.875  70 0.392 0.875  189 0.423 0.818  -0.031   0.057 
Board Size 259 5.834 15  70 5.429 9  189 5.984 15  -0.556** 
 
-6 
Board Ownership 259 34.890 99.9  70 36.148 89.19  189 34.421 99.9  1.727 
 
-10.71 
Executive Number 259 3.324 8  70 3.214 7  189 3.365 8  -0.151 
 
-1 
Executive Ownership 259 29.170 94.72  70 29.329 88.21  189 29.107 94.72  0.222 
 
-6.51 
CEO/MD Ownership 245 17.450 94.72  62 14.524 85.24  183 18.448 94.72  -3.924 
 
-9.48 




Table 2-6 Panel E 
Listing-and-acquisition deal-specific characteristics 
***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Variables All Firms  RTs  IPOs  Difference 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median  Mean  Median 
Listing Market 
Condition 
259 0.020 0.156  70 -0.002 0.150  189 0.028 0.156  -0.030*** 
  
-0.006 
Log(Listing Proceed) 235 2.526 9.186  46 1.656 4.189  189 2.738 9.186  -1.083*** 
 
-4.997 






234 1.866 10.530  69 2.912 5.593  165 1.429 10.530  1.482*** 
 
-4.937 
Value of Acquisition 
Transaction 




Table 2-6 Panel F 
Frequency and percentage table of dummy variables on listing and acquisition deal-specific characteristics  














































 Number of transactions  Cross-Border Acquisition Dummy  Synergy Dummy 
 








 Synergy Diversify  Cash Deal Stock and Mixed 
Deal 
RTs 65  0 65  23 42  1 64 
   (0) (100)  (35.38) (64.62)  (1.538) (98.46) 
IPOMAs 155  44 111  89 66  45 110 




Table 2-6 Panel G 
Post-acquisition abnormal returns under the market-adjusted models 
***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Mean     Median     
All Firms RTs Acquisition Difference 
 
All Firms RTs Acquisition Difference 
Variables N=245 N=66 N=179 
  
N=245 N=66 N=179 
 
CAAR 1st week 0.004 -0.015 0.011 -0.027*  -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 
BHAAR 1st week 0.006 -0.018 0.008 -0.026**  -0.003 -0.010 -0.001 -0.009 
CAAR 2 weeks -0.010 -0.045** 0.006 -0.051***  -0.012 -0.022 -0.010 -0.012** 
BHAAR 2 weeks -0.002 -0.039** 0.012 -0.051***  -0.008 -0.030 -0.005 -0.025** 
CAAR 3 weeks -0.010 -0.047** 0.003 -0.050***  -0.013 -0.020 -0.012 -0.008 
BHAAR 3 weeks -0.008 -0.044 0.006 -0.050***  -0.012 -0.030 -0.008 -0.022** 
CAAR 1st month -0.014 -0.049** -0.002 -0.047**  -0.015 -0.019 -0.013 -0.006 
BHAAR 1st month -0.018 -0.054 -0.005 -0.049**  -0.016 -0.024 -0.012 -0.012** 
CAAR 2 months -0.015 -0.042 -0.005 -0.037 
 
-0.024 -0.047 -0.019 -0.028 
BHAAR 2 months -0.005 -0.026 0.003 -0.029 
 
-0.027 -0.058 -0.021 -0.037** 
CAAR 3 months -0.030 -0.036 -0.028 -0.008 
 
-0.027 -0.017 -0.030 0.013 
BHAAR 3 months -0.019 -0.034 -0.014 -0.020 
 
-0.036 -0.034 -0.037 0.003 
CAAR 6 months -0.082*** -0.064 -0.089*** 0.025 
 
-0.049 -0.093 -0.044 -0.049 
BHAAR 6 months -0.043 -0.025 -0.050 0.025 
 
-0.075 -0.117 -0.071 -0.046 
CAAR 12 months -0.187*** -0.171 -0.193*** 0.022 
 
-0.164 -0.164 -0.160 -0.004 
BHAAR 12 months -0.071 -0.027 -0.088 0.061 
 
-0.190 -0.232 -0.187 -0.045 
CAAR 18 months -0.296*** -0.306** -0.293*** -0.014 
 
-0.256 -0.223 -0.270 0.047 
BHAAR 18 months -0.091 -0.022 -0.117 0.095 
 
-0.336 -0.328 -0.339 0.011 
CAAR 24 months -0.381*** -0.455*** -0.354*** -0.101 
 
-0.291 -0.355 -0.276 -0.079 





Table 2-7 Panel A The choice of listing and acquisition route 
This panel presents private firms’ choice of listing and acquisition routes, using a sample of 70 RTs and 189 acquisition-motived IPOs. Columns (1) to (6) examines 
whether a private self-selects into a RT or an IPO listing-and-acquisition routes according to its board ownership and deal-specific information. Logit regressions are 
applied to identify the self-selection issue. Independent variable Y=1 if IPO, Y=0 if RT. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 






















 (0.094)  (0.006)  (0.964)  (0.102)  (2.381)  (0.000) 
Leverage 






















 (0.109)  (0.853)  (0.140)  (0.010)  (0.328)  (0.328) 
Profit 
Ratio -0.118 Constant -0.157       
Cash 
Payment 3.507** 
 (0.089)  (0.607)        (1.042) 
Liquidity 
Ratio -2.104**           
 (0.836)           
Constant 0.586 Constant -0.157 Constant -0.701 Constant -0.812 Constant 0.161 Constant 0.281 
 (0.990)  (0.607)  (0.796)  (0.664)  (0.313)  (0.225) 
N 259 N 259 N 259 N 245 N 259 N 234 
𝐶ℎ𝑖2 68.01 Chi2 5.667 Chi2 5.083 Chi2 9.716 Chi2 38.59 Chi2 57.57 
p-value 0 p-value 0.129 p-value 0.166 p-value 0.0211 p-value 0.000 p-value 0 
Pseudo 
𝑅2 0.225 Pseudo R2 0.0187 Pseudo R2 0.0168 Pseudo R2 0.0351 Pseudo R2 0.128 Pseudo R2 0.203 
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Table 2-7 Panel B 
The choice of listing and acquisition route 
This panel presents private firms’ choice of listing and acquisition routes, using a sample of 70 RTs 
and 189 acquisition-motived IPOs. Column (1) examines whether a private firm self-selects into a 
RT or an IPO listing-and-acquisition routes according to firm-specific financial characteristics. 
Columns (2) to (4) present the self-selection according to a combination of financial and board 
information.  Columns (2) to (4) present the self-selection according to a combination of financial 
(fina.), board information, and deal-specific information. Logit regressions are applied to identify the 
self-selection issue. Y=1 if IPO, Y=0 if RT.   Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * 
stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















logTA 0.243** 0.251*** 0.227 0.085 0.084 0.081 
 (0.096) (0.094) (0.107) (0.140) (0.140) (0.152) 
Leverage Ratio -3.635*** -3.638*** -3.569*** -3.544*** -3.557*** -3.686*** 
 (0.583) (0.584) (0.615) (0.692) (0.690) (0.769) 
Asset Turnover 0.126 0.120 0.076 0.208 0.205 0.142 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.119) (0.135) (0.134) (0.140) 
Profit Ratio -0.105 -0.107 -0.102 -0.061 -0.060 -0.071 
 (0.089) (0.090) (0.092) (0.184) (0.181) (0.183) 
Liquidity Ratio -2.314*** -2.275*** -2.608*** -2.640*** -2.644*** -3.147*** 
 (0.854) (0.852) (0.876) (1.021) (1.015) (1.079) 
Board Ownership 0.000   -0.001   
 (0.007)   (0.009)   
Board Size 0.207  0.245 0.046  0.043 
 (0.117)  (0.132) (0.140)  (0.162) 
NED/BOARD -0.409 1.294 -0.477 -0.521 -0.052 -0.718 
 (0.979) (1.138) (1.034) (1.214) (1.462) (1.326) 
Executive Ownership  0.001   -0.001  
  (0.008)   (0.009)  
Number of 
Executives  0.324   0.103  
  (0.176)   (0.214)  
CEO/MD Ownership   0.013   0.020 
   (0.011)   (0.013) 
Listing Market 
Condition       4.611 4.579 6.059 
        (2.945) (2.955) (3.264) 
Listing Proceed       0.044*** 0.044*** 0.054*** 
        (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) 
List in AIM    0.254 0.253 0.508 
    (0.441) (0.440) (0.461) 
M&A motive    -2.476*** -2.468*** -2.973*** 
    (0.618) (0.616) (0.681) 
Synergy Acquisition    0.571 0.565 0.487 
    (0.415) (0.416) (0.446) 
Cash Payment    3.130*** 3.135*** 2.632*** 
    (1.084) (1.085) (1.068) 
Constant 0.102 -0.566 0.029 1.357 1.115 1.356 
 (1.149) (1.268) (1.246) (1.576) (1.717) (1.712) 
N 259 259 245 259 259 245 
𝐶ℎ𝑖2 71.27 71.55 66.43 130.5 130.6 125.8 
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 





Table 2-8 Panel A 
Treatment regression on post-acquisition performance of acquiring firms 
This panel presents the difference in post-acquisition two-year abnormal returns between acquirers 
opting for RT or acquisition-motived IPO routes. Columns (1) to (8) examine whether an IPO 
provides a springboard effect to acquiring firms’ long-term performance after controlling financial 
characteristics (fina.), board ownership structure, and listing-and-acquisition deal-specific 
characteristics, and accounting for self-selection issue. This panel presents the maximum likelihood 
treatment estimations of CARs (dependent variable Y=CAR_MM_2yr). The sample comprises 65 
RTs and 179 acquisition-motived IPOs. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand 
for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 















IPO dummy -0.271 -0.264 -0.242 -0.132 -0.228 -0.163 -0.021 
 (0.388) (0.392) (0.388) (0.375) (0.385) (0.372) (0.340) 
LogTA 0.084** 0.088** 0.085** 0.098** 0.097** 0.081** 0.096** 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.041) (0.040) (0.036) (0.041) 
Leverage Ratio -0.032 -0.049 -0.022 0.005 0.005 0.032 0.075 
 (0.274) (0.276) (0.274) (0.265) (0.250) (0.251) (0.240) 
Asset Turnover -0.029 -0.038 -0.046 -0.033 -0.038 -0.048 -0.036 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) 
Profit Ratio 0.026 0.023 0.024 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.020 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) 
Liquidity Ratio -0.621* -0.594* -0.576* -0.509 -0.553* -0.551* -0.464 
 (0.341) (0.344) (0.342) (0.351) (0.334) (0.333) (0.337) 
Board 
Ownership  0.002   0.002   
  (0.003)   (0.003)   
Board Size  0.005  0.005 -0.001  0.005 
  (0.036)  (0.038) (0.036)  (0.038) 
NED/BOARD  -0.257 0.031 -0.212 -0.304 -0.010 -0.256 
  (0.359) (0.427) (0.371) (0.367) (0.433) (0.377) 
Executive 
Ownership   0.004***   0.004***  
   (0.003)   (0.003)  
Number of 
Executives   0.046   0.043  
   (0.058)   (0.057)  
CEO/MD 
Ownership    0.003***   0.003*** 
    (0.003)   (0.003) 
List in AIM     -0.019 -0.029 -0.019 
     (0.131) (0.129) (0.131) 
M&A Motive     -0.141 -0.108 -0.094 
     (0.211) (0.206) (0.214) 
Synergy 
Acquisition     0.056 0.041 0.047 
     (0.126) (0.125) (0.127) 
Cash Payment     -0.065 -0.103 -0.133 
     (0.176) (0.175) (0.170) 
Constant -0.793** -0.814** -1.083** -1.063** -0.879* -1.078** -1.133** 
 (0.408) (0.453) (0.477) (0.464) (0.501) (0.532) (0.498) 
N 245 245 245 232 245 245 232 
chi2 15.44 16.69 18.50 17.12 18.50 19.62 18.36 




Table 2-8 Panel B Treatment regression on post-acquisition performance of acquiring firms 
This panel presents the difference in post-acquisition two-year abnormal returns between acquirers 
opting for RT or acquisition-motived IPO routes. Columns (1) to (8) examine whether an IPO 
provides a springboard effect to acquiring firms’ long-term performance after controlling financial 
characteristics (fina.), board ownership structure, and listing-and-acquisition deal-specific 
characteristics, and accounting for self-selection issue. This panel presents the maximum likelihood 
treatment estimations of BHARs (dependent variable Y= BHAR_MM_2yr). The sample comprises 
65 RTs and 179 acquisition-motived IPOs. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * 
stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 















IPO dummy -0.982*** -0.895*** -0.921*** -0.817** -0.560 -0.640 -0.403 
 (0.282) (0.316) (0.313) (0.362) (0.462) (0.415) (0.508) 
Constant -0.023 -0.273 -0.601 -0.528 -0.568 -0.713 -0.879 
 (0.402) (0.461) (0.496) (0.484) (0.537) (0.560) (0.554) 
N 245 245 245 232 245 245 232 
chi2 18.52 18.77 23.65 23.31 15.34 19.40 21.75 






Table 2-9 Panel A OLS regression on post-acquisition performance of acquiring firms 
This panel presents the difference in post-acquisition two-year abnormal returns between acquirers 
opting for RT or acquisition-motived IPO routes. Columns (1) to (8) examine whether an IPO 
provides a springboard effect to acquiring firms’ long-term performance after controlling for 
financial characteristics (fina.), board ownership structure, and listing-and-acquisition deal-specific 
characteristics. Dependent variable is CAR_MM_2yr. The sample comprises 65 RTs and 179 
acquisition-motived IPOs. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 















IPO dummy -0.092 -0.058 -0.075 0.020 -0.049 -0.056 0.076 
 (0.143) (0.144) (0.145) (0.152) (0.162) (0.166) (0.174) 
Constant -0.540 -0.553 -0.806* -0.604 -0.483 -0.758 -0.733 
 (0.344) (0.400) (0.443) (0.422) (0.482) (0.537) (0.519) 
N 244 248 248 231 221 220 208 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.0523 0.0382 0.0430 0.0443 0.0365 0.0369 0.0331 
F 3.236 2.091 2.233 2.186 1.596 1.599 1.506 
p 0.0045 0.0311 0.0207 0.0240 0.0825 0.0816 0.112 
 
 
Table 2-9 Panel B OLS regression on post-acquisition performance of acquiring firms 
This panel presents the difference in post-acquisition two-year abnormal returns between acquirers 
opting for RT or acquisition-motived IPO routes. Columns (1) to (8) examine whether an IPO 
provides a springboard effect to acquiring firms’ long-term performance after controlling for 
financial characteristics (fina.), board ownership structure, and listing-and-acquisition deal-specific 
characteristics. Dependent variable is BHAR_MM_2yr. The sample comprises 65 RTs and 179 
acquisition-motived IPOs. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
















dummy -0.032 -0.014 -0.010 0.031 -0.025 -0.033 0.056 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.096) (0.111) (0.112) (0.114) 
Constant -0.658*** -0.628** -0.851*** -0.659** -0.904*** -1.059*** -0.901*** 
 (0.224) (0.260) (0.281) (0.268) (0.321) (0.357) (0.339) 
N 244 248 249 231 221 221 208 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.0299 0.0182 0.0144 0.0207 0.0014 0.0043 0.0069 
F 2.247 1.508 1.403 1.541 1.022 1.069 1.102 




Table 2-10  
Post-acquisition abnormal returns under the market-adjusted models 
This panel presents the post-acquisition performance on a sub-sample of acquisitions fully paid in stocks and synergy deals, respectively. ***, **, * stand for the 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Mean of stock payment deals  Mean of synergy deals  
All Firms RTs Acquisition Difference 
 
All Firms RTs Acquisition Difference 
Variables N=42 N=7 N=35 t-test 
 
N=126 N=23 N=103 t-test 
CAAR 1st week -0.028 0.012 -0.035 0.047  0.009 -0.032 0.019 -0.051** 
BHAAR 1st week -0.012 0.030 -0.020 0.050  0.006 -0.027 0.013 -0.040* 
CAAR 2 weeks -0.053 -0.008 -0.062 0.053  -0.001 -0.070 0.020 -0.090*** 
BHAAR 2 weeks -0.042 -0.007 -0.048 0.041  0.010 -0.069 0.027 -0.096*** 
CAAR 3 weeks -0.041 0.020 -0.053 0.073  0.000 -0.058 0.017 -0.076** 
BHAAR 3 weeks -0.044 0.022 -0.057 0.078  0.004 -0.064 0.019 -0.083*** 
CAAR 1st month -0.052 0.034 -0.069 0.104  -0.008 -0.070 0.012 -0.082** 
BHAAR 1st month -0.049 0.014 -0.061 0.076  0.000 -0.059 0.013 -0.072*** 
CAAR 2 months -0.082 -0.044 -0.090 0.046  -0.003 -0.117 0.024 -0.141*** 
BHAAR 2 months -0.083 -0.029 -0.094 0.065  0.005 -0.108 0.030 -0.138*** 
CAAR 3 months -0.093 -0.093 -0.093 -0.001  -0.009 -0.102 0.013 -0.115** 
BHAAR 3 months -0.089 -0.074 -0.092 0.017  -0.001 -0.095 0.020 -0.115** 
CAAR 6 months -0.170 -0.173 -0.169 -0.004  -0.047 -0.140 -0.044 -0.096 
BHAAR 6 months -0.150 -0.198 -0.141 -0.057  -0.029 -0.109 -0.011 -0.098 
CAAR 12 months -0.324 -0.504 -0.288 -0.215  -0.158 -0.316 -0.141 -0.175 
BHAAR 12 
months 
-0.217 -0.422 -0.176 -0.246  -0.053 -0.193 -0.022 -0.171 
CAAR 18 months -0.474 -0.751 -0.419 -0.332  -0.278 -0.508 -0.227 -0.281 
BHAAR 18 
months 
-0.196 -0.448 -0.145 -0.303  -0.080 -0.173 -0.059 -0.114 
CAAR 24 months -0.587 -0.831 -0.539 -0.292  -0.375 -0.727 -0.297 -0.430** 
BHAAR 24 
months 







Table 2-11 Panel A 
OLS regression on a sub-sample of stock payment, Y=CAR_MM_2yr 
This panel presents factors affecting post-acquisition two-year abnormal returns on a sub-sample of 
stock payment deals. Columns (1) to (8) examine whether an IPO provides a springboard effect to 
acquiring firms’ long-term performance after controlling for financial characteristics (fina.), board 
ownership structure, and listing-and-acquisition deal-specific characteristics. Dependent variable is 
CAR_MM_2yr. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables 















IPO dummy -0.189 -0.190 -0.221 -0.142 -0.123 -0.193 0.169 
 (0.456) (0.496) (0.503) (0.530) (0.481) (0.497) (0.492) 
Constant -0.544 0.080 0.200 -0.365 -0.759 -0.948 -0.944 
 (0.858) (1.211) (1.360) (1.416) (1.297) (1.565) (1.262) 
N 42 42 42 38 41 41 38 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.0698 0.0163 0.0132 0.0449 0.0633 0.0556 0.151 
F 1.513 0.927 0.941 0.823 1.208 1.181 1.507 
p 0.203 0.515 0.505 0.600 0.326 0.343 0.186 
  
Table 2-11 Panel B 
OLS regression on a sub-sample of stock payment, Y= BHAR_MM_2yr 
This panel presents factors affecting post-acquisition two-year abnormal returns on a sub-sample of 
stock payment deals. Columns (1) to (8) examine whether an IPO provides a springboard effect to 
acquiring firms’ long-term performance after controlling for financial characteristics (fina.), board 
ownership structure, and listing-and-acquisition deal-specific characteristics. Standard errors are 
presented in parenthesis. Dependent variable is BHAR_MM_2yr. ***, **, * stand for the significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables 















IPO dummy -0.153 -0.190 -0.174 -0.104 -0.170 -0.204 -0.016 
 (0.287) (0.308) (0.322) (0.326) (0.343) (0.344) (0.335) 
Constant -0.939* -0.931 -1.030 -1.286 -1.661* -1.771 -1.861** 
 (0.539) (0.752) (0.869) (0.871) (0.926) (1.082) (0.860) 
N 42 42 42 38 41 41 38 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.0837 0.114 0.0876 0.104 0.137 0.136 0.0559 
F 0.533 0.459 0.341 0.362 0.630 0.631 0.849 





Table 2-11 Panel C 
OLS regression on a sub-sample of synergy deals, Y=CAR_MM_2yr 
This panel presents factors affecting post-acquisition two-year abnormal returns on a sub-sample of 
synergy deals. Columns (1) to (8) examine whether an IPO provides a springboard effect to acquiring 
firms’ long-term performance after controlling for financial characteristics (fina.), board ownership 
structure, and listing-and-acquisition deal-specific characteristics. Standard errors are presented in 
parenthesis. Dependent variable is CAR_MM_2yr. ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 















IPO dummy 0.351 0.346 0.373 0.412* 0.292 0.315 0.347 
 (0.226) (0.231) (0.231) (0.241) (0.248) (0.248) (0.261) 
Constant 0.014 0.385 0.533 0.248 -0.082 -0.012 -0.268 
 (0.486) (0.603) (0.703) (0.593) (0.724) (0.833) (0.727) 
N 125 125 125 120 113 113 108 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.0396 0.0258 0.0292 0.0332 0.0195 0.0202 0.0214 
F 1.852 1.364 1.414 1.454 1.185 1.192 1.195 
p 0.0949 0.212 0.190 0.174 0.304 0.299 0.298 
 
 
Table 2-11 Panel D 
OLS regression on a sub-sample of synergy deals, Y=BHAR_MM_2yr 
This panel presents factors affecting post-acquisition two-year abnormal returns on a sub-sample of 
synergy deals. Columns (1) to (8) examine whether an IPO provides a springboard effect to acquiring 
firms’ long-term performance after controlling for financial characteristics (fina.), board ownership 
structure, and listing-and-acquisition deal-specific characteristics. Dependent variable is 
BHAR_MM_2yr. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables 















IPO dummy 0.152 0.127 0.138 0.184 0.109 0.121 0.159 
 (0.153) (0.157) (0.156) (0.161) (0.171) (0.171) (0.177) 
Constant -0.454 -0.222 -0.283 -0.437 -0.697 -0.770 -0.908 
 (0.329) (0.410) (0.476) (0.394) (0.500) (0.574) (0.495) 
N 125 125 125 120 113 113 108 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.0153 0.0354 0.0425 0.0376 0.0136 0.0194 0.0224 
F 0.689 0.529 0.438 0.520 0.875 0.823 0.805 








Breakdown of post-acquisition abnormal returns under the market-adjusted models by ownership 
This panel presents the two-year post-acquisition abnormal returns on the subgroups of board, executive, and CEO/MD ownership. I split the sample firms into two 
groups: ownership holdings above the median and below the median. ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  Board ownership  Executive ownership  CEO/MD ownership 
  <median >median Difference  <median >median Difference  <median >median Difference 
All Firms N 110 110    110 110    103 104   
 CAAR_MM_2yr -0.436 -0.349 -0.087  -0.461 -0.323 -0.138  -0.434 -0.401 -0.033 
 BHAAR_MM_2yr -0.280 -0.066 -0.215*   -0.306 -0.040 -0.266**   -0.285 -0.069 -0.215 
RM N 32 33   32 33   29 29  
 CAAR_MM_2yr -0.473 -0.443 -0.029  -0.428 -0.487 0.059  -0.486 -0.619 0.133 
 BHAAR_MM_2yr -0.212 -0.073 -0.139   -0.237 -0.049 -0.187   -0.204 -0.144 -0.060 
IPO N 77 78   77 78   73 76  
 CAAR_MM_2yr -0.434 -0.296 -0.137  -0.455 -0.275 -0.180  -0.434 -0.299 -0.135 








Chapter 3. Post-acquisition performance of target firm: 
The impact of management turnover 
3.1 Introduction  
I ask two questions in this paper: first, does the performance of target firms 
improve after acquisitions, and second, does a change of target firm top 
management team (TMT) impact on the performance of target firms post-
acquisition? After an acquisition, a target firm could stay as a separate taxable 
entity, be integrated into the acquirer’s business, or be closed. In this chapter, 
I focus on target firms which stay as individual taxable entities and provide 
separate financial statements of their operations.  
There are numerous studies (e.g., Jensen and Ruback, 1983) examining the 
efficiency of the market for corporate control from the perspective of 
announcement abnormal returns and long-run operational performance in the 
combined business. Few studies investigate the long-run performance of 
target firms, due to lack of data on the performance of target firms post-
acquisition separated from that of the parent companies. The post-acquisition 
consolidated performance of acquirers combines the performance of targets 
and the performance of the acquirers’ existing business. As the acquirer’s 
existing business does not usually experience a change of ownership and 
control after an acquisition, analysing the consolidated performance of 
acquirers would not pin down the impact of any restructuring post-acquisition. 
Furthermore, few studies investigate the impact on target performance from a 
change of management in M&As. Manne (1965) and Jensen and Ruback 
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(1983) proposed the “market discipline hypothesis” that in an efficient market 
for corporate control, acquisitions improve managerial efficiency by replacing 
less competent management teams with more competent ones. At the 
completion of an acquisition, the acquirer controls the majority of shares in 
targets and obtains the rights to retain or replace top-level managers and the 
board of directors in targets (Fama and Jensen, 1983a and 1983b).  
Whether, and to what extent, the disciplinary role of acquisitions leads to an 
improvement in target firm performance and creates value to target firms 
remains an open question. The post-acquisition performance of target firms is 
not only affected by the change of ownership but may also be affected by a 
change of management. As discussed further in Section 3.2.2, theoretically, 
target TMT can be viewed as a valuable source of private information in targets 
or as an inefficient control agent which should be removed (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). In this chapter, I aim to test whether 
the post-acquisition performance of target firms depends on whether TMT is 
replaced or maintained, which represent the expectations of the market 
discipline theory of acquisitions and the resource-based management theory, 
respectively. 
There are several important findings of my study. I find that, on average, the 
post-acquisition performance improves significantly in the unprofitable targets, 
but for profitable firms, there is no evidence of performance changes. For 
targets with non-positive return on assets (ROA) ratios, their peer-adjusted 
ROAs increase on average by 0.16 in the second year post-acquisition and by 




adjusted ROAs, and the improvements are statistically significant. For targets 
with positive pre-acquisition ROAs, their peer-adjusted ROAs drop 
insignificantly. The mean-reverting performance exists after I control for the 
performance of peer firms. Therefore, the mean reversion of peer-adjusted 
performance of targets could be the result of the change of ownership and 
control in target firms.  
I also find that acquirers replace a high proportion of target TMT in the first 
year post-acquisition. On average, acquirers tend to replace 29.6% of target 
TMT in unprofitable targets and 23.2% TMT in profitable targets within one 
year post-acquisition. The 6.4% difference in TMT turnovers between 
profitable and unprofitable targets is significant at the 5% level. The profitable 
target dummy is negatively correlated to the TMT turnover and the complete 
TMT turnover in target firms within one year post-acquisition, which supports 
the market discipline expectation to replace inefficient TMT in unprofitable 
target firms.  
However, neither the proportion of TMT turnover nor the complete TMT 
turnover in target firms tend to be significantly correlated to the performance 
changes of target firms within three years post-acquisition. These results fail 
to support the market discipline hypothesis expectation that disciplinary TMT 
turnovers improve the operation and performance of target firms.  
Furthermore, I find that the target TMT turnover does not appear to affect the 
changes of target post-acquisition performance after controlling for firm-
specific and deal-specific characteristics. The complete TMT turnover in target 
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firms, on the other hand, is harmful to the profits of acquirers, suggesting the 
knowledge transfer from target TMTs to acquirers may help to improve the 
operational efficiency of the combined entity. 
Although existing literature mainly focuses on the impact of target TMT 
turnovers on acquirers as the performance of targets separated from that of 
parent companies is limited (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Kennedy and 
Limmack, 1996; Krishnan et al., 1997; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Fich et al., 2016), 
acquirers’ consolidated performance is more likely to be affected by acquirers’ 
TMT instead of targets’ TMT. My regression results support this view and show 
that a 10% TMT turnover in acquirers within one-year post-acquisition reduces 
the acquirers’ ROA(-1 year, +1 year) ratio by 1.8% (significant at the 1% level); 
while target TMT turnover during the same time period (-1, +1) does not affect 
acquirers’ ROA. My results show that the 100% replacement of targets’ TMT 
in year +1 is, on average, associated with a drop in the acquirers’ ROA by 
about 3% within three years post-acquisition. Acquirers’ TMT turnovers have 
more significant impact, both economically and statistically, than targets’ 
complete TMT turnovers on the post-acquisition performance change of 
acquirers. 
My study extends the prior literature in three ways. First, the majority of existing 
studies on the post-acquisition performance restrict their analyses to acquirers’ 
post-acquisition performance, or to focus purely on public listed targets’ 
announcement returns (Martin and McConnell, 1991; Walsh and Kosnik, 1993; 
Franks and Mayer, 1996; Kennedy and Limmack 1996; Krishnan et al., 1997; 




performance (Maksimovic et al., 2001, 2011 and 2013; Erel et al., 2015; Jang 
and Reisel, 2015), my study adds to the literature by providing evidence on the 
post-acquisition efficiency of target firms.  
Little is known about performance changes in target firms, due to lack of 
accounting performance and stock price information for the target firms post-
acquisition separated from that of the parent companies (Cannella and 
Hambrick, 1993; Franks and Mayer, 1996). After an acquisition, a target firm 
becomes a subsidiary or a division of the acquirer’s business.  
However, unlike in the United States (U.S.) where there is no federal statutory 
requirement for unlisted subsidiaries to make their accounts public (FASB, 
2013), in the U.K., all registered limited companies, including subsidiaries, 
small and inactive companies, must file company registry information15, annual 
financial statements, information on appointment and termination of officers, 
and persons with significant control to the Companies House. These are all 
public records (GOV.UK, 2014). The accounting performance data for the U.K. 
target firms, separated from that of the parent companies, after acquisitions 
allows me to ascertain whether the change in ownership and any target TMT 
turnover following acquisitions leads to an improvement in the operating 
efficiency of the target firms or harm the valuable human resource transfer 
from targets to acquirers.  
Separating the post-acquisition performance of newly acquired targets’ assets 
from the performance of acquirers’ existing assets pins down the extent and 
                                                          
15 e.g., registered office address, company type and status, incorporation dates, annual return 
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direction of post-acquisition restructuring (Maksimovic et al., 2011). 
Maksimovic et al. (2011) use plant-level data of U.S. manufacturing target 
firms during 1997-2004 and find overall significant improvement in operating 
margin up to three years post-acquisitions. Jang and Reisel (2015) investigate 
accounting performance of E.U. private targets separated from that of the 
parent companies during 2000-2010 and find overall insignificant 
improvements in peer-adjusted profitability of targets. Maksimovic et al. (2011) 
and Jang and Reisel (2015) do not, however, address the source of 
performance change in target firms. My paper complements and extends 
Maksimovic et al. (2011) and Jang and Reisel’s (2015) work on the operating 
efficiency of targets by analysing the extent to which TMT replacement 
contributes to the value creation.  
Second, my work extends the literature on acquisitions by examining the 
impact of target TMT turnover on the operating efficiency of target firms post-
acquisition. Some studies provide acquirers’ views of post-acquisition target 
TMT turnovers and the changes of target operating performance (Cannella 
and Hambric, 1993; Zollo and Singh, 2004). Cannella and Hambric (1993) 
survey the perception (based on a 7-point scale) of target performance 
changes from the acquirers and Zollo and Singh (2004) survey the acquirers’ 
perceptions (based on a four-point scale) of target TMT turnovers. These 
survey studies do not provide a direct measure of the target performance or 
the impact of TMT turnover in target firms, and managers in different firms may 
have different views as to what constitutes “good M&A performance” and 




extends the survey studies by investigating the detailed TMT composition data 
and audited accounting performance of target businesses. 
Existing empirical studies support the prediction of the market discipline 
hypothesis that poorly performing targets are more likely to experience high 
TMT turnover than well-performing targets after M&As (e.g., Martin and 
McConnell, 1991; Jang and Reisel, 2015). However, they fail to fully support 
the second prediction of the market discipline hypothesis that removing TMT 
in such poorly performing firms creates value. The ownership of a target firm 
changes after an acquisition, but the management may stay the same if an 
acquirer views target TMT as a valuable source of private information and 
decides to retain the target’s management team. The TMT turnover in target 
firms is arguably much more complex than what is explained by the poor pre-
acquisition performance (Krug et al., 2015). 
Third, my paper adds to the literature on mergers and acquisitions of private 
and subsidiary firms. While private firms constitute a substantial part of M&As, 
the announcement returns of target firms show the market expectation of the 
future performance change of only public targets (Krug, Wright, and Kroll, 
2015). Zollo and Singh (2004) find that two-third of targets are private, or 
subsidiaries or divisions of other firms. However, due to lack of information on 
non-public targets, prior literature limits their research to public-to-public 
acquisitions and fails to explore the feature of acquisitions with private targets 
(Capron and Shen, 2007; Maksimovic et al., 2013). My study extends prior 
studies by investigating both public and private targets. 
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3.2 Analytical framework  
3.2.1 The efficiency of the acquisition market 
Previous literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) efficiency mainly 
focuses on the announcement returns of targets and the short-run and long-
run post-acquisition performance of acquirers. On the other hand, I focus on 
the long-run post-acquisition accounting performance of targets, for two 
reasons. First, the post-acquisition performance of acquirers, both stock 
market returns and accounting performance, is influenced by the performance 
of both the target’s business and acquirer’s existing business before the 
acquisition. Investigating the performance of targets helps to understand how 
acquisitions affect the business of target firms after acquisition and how value 
is created in the restructuring process. Second, since targets and acquirers 
are separate legal entities, an acquirer’s performance should arguably be more 
closely related to the acquirer’s TMT than that of the target’s. Therefore, I 
expect that the TMT in a target firm should be more responsible for the 
performance changes of the target instead of the performance changes of the 
whole group.   
There are a few studies investigating the post-acquisition operating 
performance of target firms in the U.S., U.K. and E.U. countries, and these 
studies find mixed evidence with regard to any performance improvement 
(Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Very et al., 1997; Conn, 1976; Maksimovic et 
al., 2011; Jang and Reisel, 2015). Cannella and Hambrick (1993) and Very et 
al. (1997) survey managers in targets and acquirers on their perception of the 




investigate 96 public-to-public acquisitions made during 1980-1984 in the U.S. 
For each acquisition, they select 6 executives from the acquirer and 6 security 
analysts who specialized in the acquirer’s securities and ask them to rate the 
profitability of the target at the deal time and four years later based on a 7-point 
scale, from “very poor” to “very good”. These people jointly overall suggest that 
the target profitability scale increase by 0.61 points (t-statistic=1.57) after 
acquisition (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993). 
Very et al. (1997) send surveys to 1,004 individuals in 346 large size targets 
(acquisition transaction value over $10 million) and generate survey responses 
from 180 French or British top managers in 106 targets. Very et al. (1997) ask 
managers to provide their perceptions of earnings, sales and market shares of 
the target based on 5-point scales, from “1” for greatly deteriorated to “5” for 
greatly improved. On average, top managers suggest that performance 
improves slightly with an average score of 3.44 (with a standard deviation of 
0.67) for the post-acquisition performance. However, the survey evidence from 
Cannella and Hambrick (1993) and Very et al. (1997) does not provide a clear 
picture of whether the target performance improves significantly after 
acquisitions. Also, the survey responses may suffer from an upward response 
biased as firms with poor post-acquisition performance might not like to 
disclosure their failures. 
Maksimovic et al. (2011), as discussed in Section 3.1, extend these prior 
studies based on survey responses by investigating the operating performance 
of U.S. manufacturing firms. Maksimovic et al. (2011) suggest that acquisitions 
generally improve the industry-adjusted performance of target plants. 
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Maksimovic et al. (2011) show that, on average, the plants kept by the acquirer 
tend to improve in performance with significant increases in productivity and 
operating margins, while the plants sold within three years after acquisition 
tends to have flat performance changes. The average change in operating 
margin for kept plants over the three-year window is 2.1%, while the average 
change in total factor productivity (TFP) is 6.3%, both significant at the 1% 
level. The average improvement in operating margin is 0.7% for sold plants, 
while the TFP change is about 2.7%, both marginally significant at the 10% 
level. The plants kept experience more improvement than the plants sold. 
The above studies provide evidence of performance improvement in target 
firms or acquired assets post-acquisition.  Therefore, if the U.K. acquisition 
market is efficient, I would expect to observe that the performances of targets 
improve after acquisitions. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3-1: Target firms improve performance post-
acquisition in comparison to peer firms.  
On the other hand, some studies fail to find evidence of performance 
improvements in target firms or target assets (Conn, 1976; Jang and Reisel, 
2015). Conn (1976) examines 28 European Union (EU) conglomerate mergers 
during 1964-1968 and states that only 7 targets improve the net income/total 
assets ratio after merger. The mean profit rate declines from 6.7% in the pre-
merger period to 4.2% in the post-merger period, and the difference is 
significant at the 1% level (t=2.694). The mean of the industry-adjusted profit 




(1976) does not find industry-adjusted improvements in the targets’ 
performance. Similarly, Jang and Reisel (2015) investigate the profitability (the 
EBIT/Total Asset ratio and the Cash Flow/Total Assets ratio) of 5,707 private 
targets in the E.U. during 2000-2010, and the peer-adjusted performance 
shows insignificant improvements (p-value is 0.43) after acquisition.  
The discussion above shows that there is no conclusive evidence of 
performance improvements in target firms post-acquisition. Furthermore, prior 
studies have limitations. While the survey evidences from Cannella and 
Hambrick (1993) and Very et al. (1997) provide indication of a small 
improvement of target performance, the economical and statistical significance 
of performance changes are not known. The small sample size of 28 
acquisitions limits the study of Conn (1976). The focus of manufacturing firms 
in Maksimovic et al. (2011) makes it hard to apply the results on targets to 
other industries. My study extends prior literature with analysis of audited post-
acquisition operating performance of a large sample of target firms in multiple 
industries. 
3.2.2 TMT turnover theories 
Economic theory has suggested many sources of value creation in M&As.  
First, efficiency-related sources often involve “synergies”. Synergies could be 
created by redeploying the combined assets toward higher-valued uses 
(Bradley et al., 1988; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Erel et al., 2015). M&As 
could also create cost synergies, such as the reduction in production or 
distribution costs, by the realization of economies of scales, adjustment to 
capital structure, and adoption of more efficient production or organizational 
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technology (Eckbo and Langohr, 1989; Campa and Hernando, 2004; Andrade 
et al., 2004; Bena and Li, 2014).  Second, takeovers could increase acquirer 
firms’ market power in product markets to generate sales synergy, perhaps by 
forming monopolies or oligopolies (Gugler et al., 2003; Maksimovic et al., 
2011). 
Third, takeovers create value by facilitating change to the new environment 
such as taking advantage of opportunities for diversification (Mitchell and 
Mulherin, 1996; Andrade et al., 2001; Harford, 2005). Fourth, acquirers can 
take advantage of overvaluation and exchange their stock for real assets (Fu 
et al., 2013; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Fifth, M&As can also reduce agency 
costs by bringing organization-specific assets under common ownership and 
improve the corporate governance in target firms (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 
1988; Conn and Connell, 1990; Holmen and Knopf, 2004; Cai and Vijh, 2007; 
Danbolt and Maciver, 2012). Finally, the market discipline can create value in 
M&As by eliminating inefficient target management, which is the main focus of 
my study. 
In this paper, I investigate how a change of TMT in target firms affect the post-
acquisition performance changes of target firms. When an acquirer takes over 
a target, the control rights to the target is transferred to the acquirer. While 
acquirers’ officers retain the top-level control rights, they normally delegate the 
rights to manage corporate resources to directors in targets (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983). The acquirer firm has to decide whether to retain or replace 
the directors in a target and recruit the most suitable officers to manage the 




acquisition performance changes in target firms. The market for corporate 
control theory predicts that TMT turnovers will be positively correlated to target 
performance improvements, as more efficient TMT replaces less efficient ones 
to improve firm efficiency. Alternatively, the resource-based management 
theory suggests that high TMT turnovers may be harmful to target performance 
improvements, as the target TMT has inside knowledge of their firm.  
3.2.2.1: Efficient market for corporate control: the market discipline hypothesis 
The market discipline hypothesis assumes that takeovers provide an efficient 
market for corporate control change and interprets the overall gain in M&As as 
the value added by the change of ownership, control and management 
competition (Fama and Jensen, 1983a and b; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
However, empirical studies of the market discipline hypothesis in M&As 
provide inconclusive results (Martin and McConnell, 1991; Kennedy and 
Limmack, 1996; Jang and Reisel, 2015; Walsh and Ellwood, 1991; Walsh and 
Kosnik, 1993; Franks and Mayers, 1996).  
Empirical studies on acquisitions support the market discipline hypothesis with 
the evidence that high post-acquisition TMT turnovers follow target under-
performance before acquisitions (Martin and McConnell, 1991; Fich et al., 
2016; Jang and Reisel, 2015). Martin and McConnell (1991) examine 253 
tender-offers for public targets during 1958-1984 in the U.S. and find that the 
pre-deal average industry-adjusted CAR (from 48 months before through 3 
months before the tender offer) is -21.29% for the 141 targets with post-
acquisition CEO change, which is significantly less than the +3.28% CAR of 
112 targets without CEO change (t = -3.36). However, Martin and McConnell 
104 
 
(1991) do not investigate the regression coefficient between the TMT turnover 
and pre-acquisition performance.  
With a sample of E.U. private targets, Jang and Reisel (2015) extend Martin 
and McConnell’s (1991) work by investigating the negative correlation between 
the TMT turnover and the pre-acquisition performance changes. For about 48% 
of private targets, more than half of the top executives are replaced within a 
three-year window, from the year before the acquisition to one year after 
acquisition (Jang and Reisel, 2015). Their regression results show that a one 
percentage point drop in the EBIT/Total Assets ratio increases the probability 
of TMT turnovers by 0.14%, significant at the 5% level.  
However, showing the negative correlation between the TMT turnover and the 
pre-acquisition performance may not be sufficient to prove the market 
discipline hypothesis. It is also necessary to show that replacing inefficient 
TMTs creates value. The TMT turnovers may not change the post-acquisition 
performance of the targets. Martin and McConnell (1991) investigate the CARs 
to acquirers and targets for the period from 20 trading days before, through to 
20 trading days after the tender offer announcement day and find that the 
targets’ and acquirers’ CARs are not significantly different between targets with 
CEO replacement and those that retain the CEO.  Although Jang and Reisel 
(2015) find that targets improve accounting profitability post-acquisition, they 





Two studies support the market discipline hypothesis with evidence that target 
CEO departure increases targets’ and acquirers’ post-acquisition stock returns 
(Kennedy and Limmack, 1996; Fich et al., 2016). Kennedy and Limmack (1996) 
examine 345 U.K. domestic public targets in acquisitions during the 1980-1989 
period and show that targets where the CEOs are replaced generate 13.07% 
higher CAR during the period from 3 months before to 4 months after 
acquisition announcement than targets retaining CEOs, with the difference in 
CAR significant at the 10% level. 
However, Kennedy and Limmack (1996) acknowledge that caution is required 
in drawing inferences. The higher gains to targets replacing CEOs are driven 
by the pre-bid announcement stock increases. In another estimation, from one 
to four months after the acquisition, the difference drops to 3.95% and it is no 
longer statistically significant. Kennedy and Limmack (1996) do not discuss 
why there may be limited differences in the stock performance after the 
acquisition announcement depending on whether the CEO is retained or 
replaced. Also, Kennedy and Limmack (1996) find no differences in the annual 
CAR before the acquisitions for targets replacing or retaining the CEO. When 
there is no underperformance in targets observed before acquisitions, it is hard 
to tell whether the target CEO is inefficient. Therefore, the replacement of 
CEOs could be driven by reasons other than the “disciplinary role of 
acquisitions”.  
More recently, Fich et al. (2016) examine 355 U.S. domestic M&As during 
1999-2008 and find that retaining a CEO in a target underperforming the 
industry median is associated with about a 2.7% lower (significant at the 1% 
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level) acquirer merger announcement returns. Interestingly, their regression 
analyses indicate that retaining higher-quality target CEOs does not affect the 
acquirers’ announcement returns or long-run operating performance (Fich et 
al., 2016).  
As I discussed in Section 3.1, the acquirer’s performance should be more 
related to the acquirer’s CEO rather than the target’s CEO. My work extends 
previous work with evidence of the target TMT turnover and the post-deal 
performance of the target separated from the acquirer’s consolidated 
performance. My study extends prior studies of the disciplinary role of 
acquisitions by examining (1) whether there is, as expected, a negative 
correlation between the TMT turnover and the pre-acquisition performance in 
targets, and (2) whether there is a correlation between TMT turnover and the 
post-acquisition performance of targets. 
In contrast to the theory of the market for corporate control, some studies 
suggest that M&As do not perform a disciplining function (Walsh and Ellwood, 
1991; Walsh and Kosnik, 1993; Franks and Mayer, 1996). Walsh and Ellwood 
(1991) examine 102 U.S. targets in 1979 and find that target firms generally 
outperform their competitors before the acquisition. The TMT turnovers in 
targets are not correlated with targets’ pre-acquisition performance and do not 
trigger higher announcement returns in targets. Walsh and Ellwood (1991) find 
the Pearson correlations between the pre-deal target CARs(-2 year, -1 year) 
and subsequent target TMT turnovers at each of 5 years after M&As range 
from -0.07 to +0.28 and are not significant at the 10% level. Also, Walsh and 




announcement-day CAR and cumulative rates of target TMT turnovers within 
5-year post-M&As; the coefficients range from -0.34 to -0.21 and are 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Two papers investigate hostile takeovers, the type of M&As which are claimed 
to perform a disciplining function and suggest that high TMT turnover does not 
derive from past managerial failure (Walsh and Kosnik, 1993; Franks and 
Mayer, 1996). Walsh and Kosnik (1993) investigate 59 U.S. firms that were 
challenged by one of eight notorious raiders between 1979 and 1983 and 
suggest that while poor performance is associated with higher post-acquisition 
TMT turnover, turnover is generally high in targets with both good and bad pre-
acquisition performance.  
Similarly, Franks and Mayer (1996) investigate 35 successful and 23 
unsuccessful hostile takeovers in the U.K. between 1985 and 1986 and find 
that non-merging firms record almost identical performance to successful 
hostile bids over the five years prior to a bid, although the 90% TMT turnover 
rate in successful bids are significantly higher than the 19% TMT turnover rate 
in non-merging firms (significant at the 1% level). In addition, Franks and 
Mayer (1996) find the bid premiums for targets with and without CEO or 
chairman turnovers are the same: 25.23% versus 25.25%, which suggests the 
market does not expect a premium due to change of the top executive in 
targets.   
Walsh and Ellwood (1991) and Walsh and Kosnik (1993) suggest that TMT 
may depart voluntarily, instead of being involuntarily “disciplinary” turnovers. 
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Therefore, the TMT turnovers may reflect TMT’s psychological attributes and 
their perceptions of the acquisition rather than the disciplining function of 
acquisitions (Krug et al., 2015). Factors such as cultural differences between 
acquirers and targets, the loss of executive power, alternative career 
opportunities and financial incentives such as golden parachutes are likely to 
influence voluntary post-acquisition turnover decisions by target firms’ 
executives (Walsh and Kosnik, 1993). Martin and McConnell (1991) find that 
only three TMT departures are “fired, poor performance cited” among 86 TMT 
departures. They find that 53% of TMT departures are due to “change in 
control”. “Normal retirement”, “accepted high-level position in acquirer”, “policy 
differences”, “early retirement”, “took similar position with another firm”, and 
“other personal or business interests” are also cited as TMT departure reasons.  
In summary, the literature on the market discipline role of takeovers is 
ambiguous in the correlations between TMT turnovers and pre- and post-
acquisition performance. If an acquisition is driven by the market discipline 
reason, targets with poor pre-acquisition performance would be expected to 
experience high TMT replacement and post-acquisition firm value increases. 
On the other hand, if TMT turnovers are triggered by reasons other than 
takeovers aimed at disciplining poorly performing TMT, the correlations of TMT 
turnovers and pre- or post-acquisition performance may be weak. This leads 
to the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3-2: Replacement of target TMT is negatively 




Hypothesis 3-3: Replacement of target TMT is positively 
related to post-acquisition performance improvement in 
targets. 
3.2.2.2 Resource-based management theory: managers with inside 
information of their firms 
The resource-based management theory views TMT as a valuable source of 
private information in their firms and predicts that retaining target TMT is value 
additive (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Penrose, 1995). Especially in private 
targets, the information asymmetry makes it difficult for acquirers to accurately 
estimate the value of targets (Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009). Several studies 
support the resource-based management theory with the evidence that TMT 
departures lead to lower post-acquisition performance in targets and acquirers 
(Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Krishnan et al., 1997; Zollo and Singh, 2004).  
Cannella and Hambrick (1993), as discussed in Section 3.2.1, argue that the 
acquisitions disrupt targets operations and the replacements from outside 
executives could incur heavy start-up costs as they are not familiar with their 
new positions and new networks of contacts. Retaining targets’ TMT could 
prevent the loss of firm-specific knowledge and skills and the continuity of 
targets’ TMT could preserve strategic continuity and operating stability 
(Cannella and Hambrick, 1993).  
Cannella and Hambrick (1993) find that, on average, around 49% of the 
members of the target management team are replaced within 2 years after 
acquisition, and that targets’ pre-acquisition return on equity ratio (ROE) is 
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significantly positively correlated to TMT departure. The regression results 
show that a 10% increase of TMT turnover in targets decreases the post-
acquisition target performance scale by 0.14-0.15.16 Cannella and Hambrick 
(1993) show that acquirers view executive departure as having a significantly 
negative impact on post-acquisition performance in targets. 
Krishnan et al. (1997) extend Cannella and Hambrick’s (1993) work by 
analysing the post-acquisition return on assets (ROA) of the consolidated 
acquiring firms. Krishnan et al. (1997) investigate 147 acquisitions between 
U.S. public firms during 1986-1988, and find that on average 47% of targets’ 
TMT depart within 3 years after acquisitions. The regression coefficient 
suggests that an acquirer replacing the whole target TMT within three years of 
acquisition generate 2.8% lower ROA than an acquirer retaining all of the 
target TMT, and the difference is significant at the 5% level.  
Furthermore, Krishnan et al. (1997) show that complementary TMT, defined 
as differences in functional backgrounds between the acquirers’ and targets’ 
top managers, reduces target TMT turnovers and has a positive impact on 
post-acquisition consolidated performance of acquirers, which supports the 
resource-based management theory. The evidence from these studies 
indicates that in practice, acquirers tend to retain targets’ managers who have 
different knowledge and skills to acquirers’ managers and that retaining such 
targets’ managers creates value to the acquirers.  
                                                          
16 The performance change in targets are rated by acquirers’ executives and security analysts based on 





Similarly, using a sample of 228 acquisitions in the U.S. banking industry, Zollo 
and Singh (2004) suggest that retaining executives contribute knowledge to 
the acquirer and minimizes “organizational disruption”. As private target banks 
do not disclose the TMT replacement information to the public, Zollo and Singh 
(2004) require top executives in acquirers to classify the level of target TMT 
replacement with a four-point scale of ‘0’ (no substantial change), ‘1’ (some 
changes), ‘2’ (many changes), and ‘3’ (virtually all the top management team 
was changed). They find that the acquirers’ peer-adjusted ROA(-1 year, +3 
year) decreases 0.34 (significant at the 1% level) for one level increase in 
replacement degree.  
These resource-based studies also have limitations. Cannella and Hambrick 
(1993) do not provide a direct measure of post-deal target performance 
improvements and managers may have different views of “good M&A 
performance.” Zollo and Singh (2004) use acquirers’ view of the level of TMT 
replacement, which might be biased if acquirers have a different classification 
of the replacement level. Krishnan et al. (1997) and Zollo and Singh (2004) 
examine acquirer’s consolidated performance instead of the separate 
performance of the target from that of the parent company. Target firm TMT 
can be expected to have a greater impact on target than on acquiring firm 
performance; the performance of the bidder is arguably the responsibility of 
their own TMT than that of the target. I extend previous target TMT turnover 
research by investigating the level of turnover in targets and the impact of such 
changes on the accounting performance of target firms separated from the 
performance of parent companies.  
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The resource-based management view suggests that TMT turnover harms the 
profitability of acquisitions and disrupts the integration process. Target firms 
may suffer from operation disturbance and difficulty in realizing expected 
synergies. Prior studies suggest that high TMT turnover in targets could reduce 
the post-acquisition performance in targets and acquirers (Cannella and 
Hambrick, 1993; Krishnan et al., 1997; Zollo and Singh, 2004). Therefore, the 
resource-based view predicts that target TMT turnover could be negatively 
related to target post-acquisition performance, which is alternative to the 
expectation of the market discipline theory of acquisitions as stated in 
Hypothesis 3-3. Similarly, the resource-based view predicts that target TMT 
turnover could be negatively correlated to the acquirer’s post-acquisition 
performance. Therefore, the discussion of the resource-based management 
theory leads to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3-4: Replacement of target TMT is negatively 
related to post-acquisition performance improvement in 
acquirers. 
3.3 Sample and Data  
I obtain my sample of U.K. domestic acquisitions announced and completed 
between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 2014 from the SDC Mergers and 
Acquisitions database. In the U.S., there is no federal statutory requirement for 
unlisted subsidiaries to have their accounts audited or to make their accounts 
public (FASB, 2013). However, in the U.K., all registered limited companies, 
including subsidiaries, small and inactive companies, must file annual financial 




2014). I collect U.K. firms’ Companies House filings using FAME. Target 
companies are public, private, or subsidiaries which have separate financial 
statements from those of parent companies. Table 3-1 provides details on the 
sample selection of target companies.  
[Insert Table 3-1 here] 
I consider acquisitions in which the acquirer obtains at least 50% of the target’s 
shares in the acquisition and the acquirer fully owns the target after the 
acquisition. These criteria ensure that the control of the target firm is changed 
to the acquirer and that there is no minority interest in the post-acquisition 
target firm. The performance of target firms can be fully incorporated into the 
consolidated statement of the acquirers. I exclude reverse takeovers, 
leveraged buyouts, and management buyouts, where the acquirer is not the 
controlling entity of the combined business after the deal.  
I restrict the sample to acquisition transactions where the deal value is greater 
than or equal to one million pounds (£) to exclude small size acquisitions.17 
The focus on large targets increase the probability of financial statements 
existence, as small firms exemption allows smaller firms to provide 
abbreviated accounts (basically just a balance sheet) (GOV.UK, 2014). I 
exclude target companies which cannot be found in the FAME database, 
cannot be identified as a subsidiary of the acquirer at times years 0 and +1 
(where year 0 is the acquisition announcement year), do not have financial 
statements in years -1 and +1, or have a missing value for sales revenues or 
                                                          
17 For acquisitions missing transaction values, I restrict the value of targets’ total assets to be greater 
than or equal to one million pounds.  
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the return on assets (ROA) for years -1 or +1. I also collect longer term 
accounting performance data in years +2 and +3 if information is available.  
From the FAME database, I collect the information on officers in target 
companies, which includes dates of appointments and resignations, officer 
position, and the date of birth of officers.18 Following Kaplan (1994), the TMT 
includes all directors, managers and other officers as reported to the 
Companies House.19 The final sample consists of 498 target companies with 
financial variables and information about the target TMT available.  
3.4 Methodology 
This section presents the empirical model design and describes the 
measurement of variables. I also motivate the use of each variable and how it 
affects the TMT turnover after acquisition and the operating performance of 
target firms. Alternative variable measurements and models are discussed in 
Appendix 3-3. 
                                                          
18 The contractual terms of board members are not available from the Companies House, for either 
public or private firms. For firms that have staggered board, the anti-takeover defence “increases the 
difficulty of takeovers, because a hostile acquirer cannot replace an entire staggered board in a single 
proxy contest” (Thomson Reuters, 2017). In hostile takeovers, the staggered board could affect the TMT 
turnover post-acquisitions. My sample of takeovers are all friendly deals. Therefore, staggered boards 
are unlikely to be an issue in my study. 
19 The Companies House discloses information on all officers, both current and those that have resigned. 
For listed firms, the occupation may identify an officer as “independent director” or “non-executive 
director”. However, for private firms, such board composition and independency data are not disclosed 
to the Companies House. In addition, there are no requirements with regard to the number of 
independent directors for private firms. There is no statutory definition of an executive director or a 
non-executive director, so under the law there is no distinction between the role and responsibilities of 
a non-executive director and those of an executive director (GOV.UK, 2011). Both types of director are 




3.4.1 Post-acquisition performance changes of target firms 
To examine the efficiency of the market for corporate control in the U.K., I 
investigate whether the performance of target firms improve after acquisition, 
which is related to Hypothesis 3-1. I apply three measures of target 
performance as robustness tests, which are un-adjusted operating 
performance, peer-adjusted operating performance, and a profitable target 
dummy.  
Operating performance of target firms is measured as the profitability of firms 
using the return on total assets (ROA) ratio, which is the profit or loss before 
interest divided by total assets (Maksimovic et al., 2011; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1988; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1988). I apply three alternative 
profitability measures, which are NI/TA (profit after tax divided by total assets) 
following Dickerson et al. (1997) and Gugler et al. (2003), OP/TA (operating 
profit divided by total assets) following Maury (2006) and Mikkelson and Partch 
(1997), and EBITDA/TA (EBITDA divided by total assets) following Lin and 
Switzer (2001) and Ghosh (2001). Following Maksimovic et al. (2011), I 
measure changes in target operating performance using three windows, (−1, 
+1), (−1, +2), and (−1, +3), with year 0 being the acquisition announcement 
year.  
The change of operating performance in a target (-1 year, +i year)= target 




My study includes both accrual accounting and cash flow measurements of 
firm profitability. Previous research suggests that accrual accounting 
performance is subject to measurement problems, manipulative and 
discretionary choice of accounting rules, and the backward-looking 
perspective of accounting figures (Dickerson et al., 1997; Sudarsanam, 2003). 
The cash-flow measurements are expected to provide the more reliable 
performance of firms (Powell and Stark, 2005 among many others). Following 
Lin and Switzer (2001) and Ghosh (2001), I apply EBITDA/TA as a proxy for 
the operating cash flow measure. Appendix 3-2 provides more discussion 
about the choice of operating cash flow measures.  
Peer-adjusted performance: Following Powell and Stark (2005), I measure 
the peer-adjusted performance of targets and acquirers. I compare the 
performance of targets with peer firms not involved in M&As matched on the 
industry, firm size, pre-acquisition performance and public status at year t-1.20 
First, in the FAME database, I select peer firms from target industries with the 
same 2-digit U.S. SIC code.21 Second, following Powell and Stark (2005), the 
firm size filter is between 50% and 150% of target size, measured as target 
total assets at t-1. Third, the performance filter is between 50% and 150% of 
target ROA at year t-1 (Powell and Stark, 2005). Fourth, I select peer firms with 
                                                          
20 I match peer firms to sample targets based on financial position and performance in the fiscal year 
before acquisition announcement, which is year -1 and year 0 is the fiscal year of acquisition 
announcement. The FAME database selects peer firms and match their accounting position and 
performance based on fiscal year in the “Peer report” section for undissolved target firms. For dissolved 
target firms, I manually search the peer firm in the FAME database based on peer selection criteria. 
Following FAME, I match peer firms to dissolved sample targets in the same fiscal year. 
21 The 2-digit US SIC codes are provided by SDC database. Although all firms in my sample are U.K. 
firms, the SDC database does not provide the U.K. SIC codes. FAME includes both U.S. SIC and U.K. 




the same public status as the target firms. There are three classifications of 
public status of targets, which are public, private and subsidiary. From this list 
of potential matching firms, firms with the closest operating performance (ROA) 
of the target at t-1 and the same public status are selected as peers.22 If no 
match can be found after imposing these filters, I remove the public status filter 
and match the firm with the closest ROA of the target at t-1.  
The peer-adjusted operating performance of a target (-1 year, +i year) 
= (target operating performance in year +i – target operating performance 
at year -1) – (peer firm’s operating performance in year +i –peer firm’s 
operating performance in year -1) 
I also use a Profitable Target Dummy as an alternative measure of firm 
performance. The Profitable Target dummy equals 1 if the target reports profits 
in the year t-1, and 0 if it makes losses. Franks et al. (2001) suggest that a 
profitable dummy provides a clean measure of performance in the TMT 
replacement decisions. Franks et al. (2001) argue that managers tend to use 
hidden reserves to smooth earnings and hide earnings losses. Therefore, 
unprofitable targets are more likely to be firms with severe earning problems 
as even the management discretion cannot hide the earnings losses.  
3.4.2 Regression models 
I use regression Model 1 to test whether pre-acquisition performance affect 
the TMT replacement in target firms, which is related to Hypothesis 3-2. When 
the TMT turnover is the complete replacement of the TMT (a 0-1 dummy 
                                                          
22 The public status of target firms can be classified as public or private. In my study, I match a public target to a public listed 
peer firm, and a private target to a private peer firm. 
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variable) and the proportion of TMT turnover (a continuous and non-negative 
variable), Model 1 is estimated using logit regression and Tobit regression, 
respectively.23 I employ the OLS regression in Model 2 to test whether TMT 
replacement in target firms affect the post-acquisition performance in targets 
and acquirers, which is related to Hypotheses 3-3 and 3-4. Following previous 
literature, I control for the TMT characteristics, target characteristic and deal-
specific characteristics on the peer-adjusted performance changes of target 
firms and the TMT turnover. The variable measurements and motivations for 
these variables are discussed in Section 3.4.3. 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 1: 𝑇𝑀𝑇 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝑇𝑀𝑇 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡−1    
+ 𝛼3 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼4 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦                
+ 𝛼5 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +   
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 2: Δpeer adjusted Firm 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑡−1,𝑡+𝑝)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇𝑀𝑇 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1                           
+ 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑇𝑀𝑇 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡+𝑝                                                                               
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 ∗ Deal Characteristics𝑡  
+ 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +   
3.4.3 Variable measurements and motivation 
To examine the market discipline hypothesis, I first examine whether TMT 
turnovers are driven by the replacement of less efficient managers, and 
secondly investigate whether the market discipline hypothesis or resource-
                                                          





based management theory better explain the impact of TMT turnovers on the 
post-acquisition performance changes of targets and acquirers. The market 
discipline hypothesis is expected to be more likely to apply to targets that are 
unprofitable prior to the acquisition, as TMTs in unprofitable targets are more 
likely to experience a disciplinary TMT turnover than TMTs in profitable targets. 
By contrast, the resource-based management theory is expected to be more 
likely to apply to targets with profitable pre-acquisition performance. The 
profitable targets are more likely to have an efficient TMT than unprofitable 
targets. These efficient TMTs are expected to hold valuable inside information 
on firm operations. Therefore, I investigate TMT turnovers in targets with 
profitable and unprofitable pre-acquisition performance separately.  
The TMT turnover is measured as the annual percentage of officers replaced 
on the management board (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). Following Maury 
(2006), I measure the TMT turnover as the number of officers that leave the 
board between the acquisition announcement date (t) and one year after 
acquisition (t+1) divided by the number of officers on the board at year t+1.  
TMT turnover= (the number of directors resigned between t and t+1)/(the 
number of directors on the board at t+1) 
Complete TMT Turnover is an alternative TMT replacement variable. 
Following Morck et al. (1988) and Mikkelson and Partch (1997), I measure the 
complete change of target officers between the acquisition announcement 
date and five years after the acquisition. The dummy variable Complete 
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Turnover equals 1 if none of the officers in the fifth-year after the acquisition 
was also officers at the announcement, and 0 otherwise. 
Following previous literature, I control for factors expected to affect the TMT 
turnover and change of performance in target firms, which are TMT 
characteristics, pre-acquisition target characteristics, and deal-specific 
characteristics (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Boone, 2007; Maksimovic, 2011). The 
TMT characteristics include TMT size, age of TMT and the tenure of TMT. The 
target firm characteristics include pre-acquisition firm size and leverage. I also 
control for cash payment, the relative size of the deal and the related industry 
of targets and acquirers.  
TMT size: I measure the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition TMT size as the 
number of officers registered in the Companies House at year t-1 and t+1, 
respectively. Following Yermack (1996), I control for the impact of TMT size 
on the relationship between TMT turnover and pre-acquisition target 
performance as firms with smaller boards can be expected to have a stronger 
relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover than firms with larger 
boards (Yermack, 1996). 
TMT Age: I define the pre-acquisition TMT Age as the average age of officers 
at t-1 and the post-acquisition TMT Age as the average age of officers at t+1.  
The proportion of TMT over 65: as an alternative age measurement, I also 
measure the pre- (post-) acquisition proportion of TMT member over 65, which 




the number of officer at year -1 (year +1).24 Although default retirement age 
(formerly 65) has been phased out (GOV.UK, 2016), empirical studies adopt 
the 65 years age threshold (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Morck et al., 1988; 
Warner et al., 1988; Mikkelson and Partch, 1997; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003; Maury, 2006; Peters and Wagner, 2014). Previous studies suggest that 
officers who are over 65 are likely to be forced to retire due to lack of effort to 
monitor and advise the firm operation (Parrino, 1997; Peters and Wagner, 
2014). When officers with less monitoring attention are replaced, target firms 
are more likely to experience performance improvements. 
TMT Tenure: I measure the pre-and-post TMT Tenure as the pre-and-post 
average tenures of officers at year -1 and +1, respectively. The tenure is 
expected to negatively affect the TMT turnover as it could present the 
experience and knowledge of target firms. Peters and Wagner (2014) find that 
older CEOs and those with longer tenure are fired less often and they argue 
that these CEOs are experienced or more skilled than younger CEOs. 
Firm Size: I measure Firm Size as the natural log of the value of total assets 
of the target in the most recent financial reports before the acquisition 
announcement. Boone et al. (2007) suggest that target firm size indicates the 
scope and complexity of operations in targets and that it is likely to be positively 
related to the proportion of independent outsiders on the board. 
Leverage: Following Aivazian et al. (2005), I use two alternative measures of 
leverage. Leverage1 is the book value of current and long-term debt, divided 
                                                          




by the book value of total assets, while Leverage2 is long-term debt divided by 
total assets. These leverage ratios measure the pre-acquisition leverage in the 
most recent financial reports before the acquisition announcement. 
Renneboog (2000) suggests that high leverage is likely to be associated with 
a higher level of monitoring and more frequent interventions by creditors as 
the risk of financial distress increases. 
Cash Payment: The dummy of cash payment equals one if more than 50% of 
the deal is paid in cash. Previous studies find that cash acquirers outperform 
stock acquirers in long-run stock price performance (Loughran and Ritter, 
1997). Ghosh (2001) and Linn and Switzer (2001) find the same relationship 
for acquirers’ long-run operating performance.  
Furthermore, Maksimovic et al. (2011) suggest that the method of payment 
could affect the post-acquisition restructuring decision in target firms.  For 
example, stock financing is more likely to be used in acquisitions that require 
extensive restructuring of targets as these acquisitions involve more 
uncertainty about restructuring outcomes and more information asymmetry 
(Maksimovic et al., 2011). Cash payment is more likely to involve more “buy-
and-hold” type of acquisitions. Maksimovic et al. (2011) find that deals that 
involve cash as a method of payment are less likely to be sold and cash 
payment is more likely to positively affect the post-acquisition performance 
improvements.  
Relative Size of the acquisition: The relative size ratio is the natural log of 




of the target’s total assets in their most recent annual report before the 
acquisition announcement (at year t-1). Maksimovic et al. (2011) find that the 
relative size is positively related to improvement in target operating efficiency. 
By contrast, Beitel et al. (2004) find that deals with small relative size provide 
significantly higher announcement returns to the target.  
Related Industry: The related industry is a dummy variable which equals one 
if the target and the acquirer have the same 2-digit SIC code. Krishnan et al. 
(1997) suggest that a difference in functional backgrounds between acquirers’ 
and targets’ top managers, reduces target TMT turnovers. Acquirers may be 
more likely to retain targets’ managers who have different knowledge and skills 
to acquirers’ managers and retaining such targets’ managers creates value to 
the acquirers. Therefore, I expect the related industry has a positive impact on 
the TMT turnover of target firms.  
I control for general changes in the economy and industry by industry 
classifications (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Krug et al., 2015; Warner et al., 
1988). Firms in an industry which enjoys positive shock is likely to outperform 
firms in other industries. For example, when an industry or the overall economy 
performs poorly, it is sometimes efficient for the board to bring on a new CEO 
to respond to the new industry or market conditions (Kaplan and Minton, 2006). 
The industry is classified based on the 2-digit SIC codes. For peer-adjusted 
performance, the industry effect is controlled for in the peer selection process 
and I do not double-count the industry effect with the 2-digit SIC codes.  
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3.5 Results  
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3-2 Panel A provides the annual frequency of acquisitions in my final 
sample.  The number of M&As in my sample period reaches the bottom during 
the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 and 2009, and reaches the peak during the 
economic recovery period in 2012. 25  Table 3-2 Panel B provides the 
acquisition frequency breakdown by industry. As prior studies on M&As 
generally exclude financial firms (e.g., Bruner, 2002), I investigate whether 
targets in the “finance, insurance and real estate” industry experience different 
performance from targets in other industries. 
[Insert Table 3-2 here] 
Table 3-3 Panel A describes the financial characteristics and TMT 
characteristics of targets, acquirers and peer firms. Table 3 Panel A shows that 
targets and peer firms have similar total assets, leverage, and average TMT 
age before acquisitions. Targets have significantly larger TMT size and more 
officers over 65-year-old than peer firms before acquisitions. Targets on 
average experience a TMT turnover of 24% within one year after acquisition 
announcement, which is significantly higher than the 9% in peer firms and 12% 
in acquirers. Table 3 Panel A suggests that younger directors are brought into 
the post-acquisition board to replace older directors, as the average TMT age 
                                                          
25 The number of M&As in 2014 is limited by the data availability of financial information in years +1, 
+2 and +3. At the time of data collection in 2016, some target firms acquired in 2014 did not release the 




decreases significantly from 51 to 49 years and the average TMT size stays 
the same.  
Table 3 Panel B provides the TMT characteristics in subgroups of profitable 
and unprofitable targets. As predicted by the market discipline hypothesis of 
acquisitions, unprofitable targets experience higher TMT turnovers than 
profitable targets. On average, 29.6% of officers are replaced following the 
acquisition in unprofitable targets while 23.2% in profitable targets, and the 
difference is significant at the 5% level. Other TMT turnover measurements, 
such as the complete turnover, the pre-deal TMT turnover, and the TMT 
turnover adjusted for officer turnovers in the non-M&A period (adj. TMT 
turnover) provide consistent results. Consistent with Walsh and Kosnik (1993), 
the TMT turnovers are high in both profitable and unprofitable targets.  
[Insert Table 3-3 here] 
Table 3-4 provides information on the post-acquisition performance of targets 
and acquirers. Overall, U.K. acquisitions in my sample do not improve the 
performance of target firms or the consolidated performance of acquirers. The 
peer-adjusted target performance changes show that on average, unprofitable 
targets improve profitability significantly after acquisitions while profitable 
targets experience a deterioration in performance after the acquisition. The 
peer-adjusted performance of profitable targets decreases significantly in 
terms of both EBITDA/total assets and operating profit/total assets. 
On average, acquisitions improve the unprofitable targets’ peer-adjusted ROA 
by 3.2% over the period to year +1 (not statistically significantly different from 
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zero), 16.3% over a two-year period to year +2 (significant at the 5% level), 
and 25.5% over a three-year period to year +3 (significant at the 1% level). 
The unadjusted (non-peer adjusted) ROAs of target firms show consistent 
results that the unprofitable targets experience a significant improvement in 
ROA within three years following the acquisition. Similarly, the median value 
of post-acquisition peer-adjusted performance provide consistent result that 
unprofitable targets experience performance improvements post-acquisition. 
The post-acquisition performance in unprofitable targets support Hypothesis 
3-1 that the takeover market is generally efficient and improves the profitability 
of unprofitable targets. Therefore, acquirers can take over an unprofitable 
target and improve its efficiency and profitability.  
 [Insert Table 3-4 here] 
By contrast, the performance in profitable targets fail to support Hypothesis 3-
1. The unadjusted ROA of profitable targets decreases by 6.3% over the period 
to year +1 (significant at the 1% level), 4.2% over a two-year period to year +2 
(insignificant at the 10% level), and 7.7% over a three-year period to year +3 
(significant at the 1% level). After controlling for the performance of peer firms, 
the changes in net income/total assets and ROA show no improvements in the 
post-acquisition performance of profitable targets. The peer-adjusted post-
acquisition EBITDA/total assets and operating profit/total assets significantly 
deteriorate in profitable targets. On average, profitable targets’ EBITDA/total 
assets, the cash-flow measurement, decrease by 6% over the period to year 




(significant at the 5%), and 7.1% over a three-year period to year +3 in 
comparison to peer firms.  
The median value of post-acquisition peer-adjusted performance change is 
consistent with the mean value of performance. The ratios of net incomes/total 
assets, EBITDA/total assets and operating profits/total assets tend to decrease 
in both acquirers and target firms after acquisition. This evidence suggests that 
acquisitions tend not to increase the peer-adjusted performance of profitable 
targets within three years post-acquisitions. It is possible that the performance 
of profitable targets improves after three years post-acquisition, but as my 
study focuses on post-acquisition performance three years after acquisitions, 
the long-run performance of profitable targets is not investigated.  
The differences in the mean of post-acquisition performance changes show 
that unprofitable targets generate significantly higher peer-adjusted post-
acquisition performance changes than profitable targets. Table 3-4 shows that 
the peer-adjusted improvement in ROA of unprofitable targets, on average, 
outperform those of profitable targets by 6.3% over the period to year +1 
(insignificant at the 10% level), 17.3% over a two-year period to year +2 
(significant at the 1% level), and 29.8% over a three-year period to year +3 
(significant at the 1% level). The median of targets’ peer-adjusted post-
acquisition performance changes provide consistent results that unprofitable 
targets outperform profitable targets significantly, regardless of how 
performance change is measured. Similarly, the unadjusted performance 
changes also show that unprofitable targets tend to generate higher 
unadjusted ROA changes than profitable targets.  
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The significant improvement of post-acquisition performance in unprofitable 
target firms (in Table 3-4) and the higher post-acquisition TMT turnover in 
unprofitable targets compared to those in profitable targets (in Table 3-3 Panel 
B) indicate that unprofitable targets experience a higher post-acquisition TMT 
turnover and more performance improvements than profitable targets. This 
result seems in line with the view of market discipline hypothesis that the 
change of control reduces firm inefficiency and creates synergy values in 
unprofitable targets. As stated in the Section 3.2.2.1, to support the market 
discipline hypothesis, both negative correlation between the TMT turnover and 
the pre-acquisition performance and removing inefficient TMTs creating value 
need to be observed. I analyse the relation between the post-acquisition TMT 
turnover in targets and the pre- and post-acquisition performance of target 
firms in Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. 
The post-acquisition unadjusted ROAs decrease significantly in profitable firms, 
which is consistent with Conn’s (1976) finding that the unadjusted (not peer-
adjusted) ratio of net incomes/total assets declines significantly from 6.7% in 
year -1 to 4.2% over the period to year +1 and the difference is significant at 
the 1% level. After adjusting for the industry average performance change 
between year -1 and +1, Conn (1976) find an insignificantly negative industry-
adjusted net income/total assets change in target firms. Jang and Reisel (2015) 
also find that the industry-adjusted EBIT/total assets (adjusted for industry 
average EBIT/total assets) are not significantly different before and after 




Consistent with Conn (1976) and Jang and Reisel (2015), I find, as reported in 
Table 3-4, that the negative changes in peer-adjusted post-acquisition net 
income/total assets ratios and ROAs in target firms are generally not 
significantly different from zero. These insignificant decreases in peer-adjusted 
net income/total assets and ROAs may indicate that the TMTs and operation 
in profitable targets may be efficient and acquisitions may not be expected to 
significantly improve the post-deal profitability.  
As discussed in Appendix 3-2, if cash flow information provides a theoretically 
more reliable performance measure than accrual accounting data, the 
significant negative changes in EBITDA/total assets would suggest that the 
peer-adjusted cash flows of profitable targets decrease significant post-
acquisition. The decreasing ratio of operating profit/total assets also suggests 
that profitable targets experience significant negative profit changes before tax. 
There are at least two potential explanations of the significant decrease in 
performance of profitable targets post-acquisition. First, the profits of profitable 
targets could be transferred to acquirers, which leads to the negative change 
in performance. Second, the performance improvements in profitable targets 
could be observed in other performance measurements such as market 
expansion rather than in earnings during the three-year time period after the 
acquisition. 
Previous studies observe that after acquisitions, acquirers transfer funds and 
reallocate assets across targets and their existing business units (Erel et al., 
2015). Erel et al. (2015) suggest that after acquisitions, targets become a 
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subsidiary of a larger organization and do not need to hold more cash for future 
investments and that targets’ investment depend less on targets’ own financial 
resources as capital can be provided by the bigger acquirers. Erel et al. (2015) 
show that the fund transfer from acquirers to the targets. If the cash flows and 
profits are transferred from targets to acquirers, we would not be surprised to 
see the negative change in target performance.  
However, un-tabulated results of targets’ firm size growth show that profitable 
targets enjoy a higher growth rate of total assets comparing to unprofitable 
targets. On average, the firm size of profitable (unprofitable) targets grows 22% 
(2%) during (-1 year, +1 year), 39% (15%) during (-1 year, +2 year), and 53% 
(20%) during (-1 year, +3 year). Both profitable and unprofitable targets 
experience significant firm size growth post-acquisition (significant at the 1% 
level). The differences in firm size growth rates between profitable and 
unprofitable targets are significant at the 5% level. The growths of sales 
revenue provide consistent results. This evidence suggests that acquirers are 
in general not applying an asset-stripping strategy for the targets in my sample. 
Furthermore, although there are no significant improvements in post-
acquisition peer-adjusted profits, the performance improvements in profitable 
targets could be observed in other performance measurements such as 
expansion in organization (e.g., firm size growth) and market shares (e.g., 
sales growth). This evidence is consistent with Bruner’s (2004) suggestion that 
acquirers could be motived by a strategic purpose to obtain strategic resources 




opportunities. Although their profitability drops after acquisitions, these 
profitable targets enjoy a quicker expansion than unprofitable targets.  
In addition, Table 3-4 shows that the post-acquisition unadjusted performance 
changes of acquirers taking over profitable targets is not significantly different 
from those of acquirers taking over unprofitable targets (un-tabulated P-
value>0.5 at least). This evidence, combined with the evidence of an 
insignificant negative changes in the unadjusted ROA of acquirers after 
acquisition, suggests that the consolidated performance of acquirers appears 
not to be harmed by the decreasing performance of the profitable targets they 
bought.  
 [Insert Table 3-5 here] 
Table 3-5 presents the correlations between each variable. Table 3-5 shows 
that the acquirers’ ROA changes are not significantly correlated to the peer-
adjusted ROA changes of target firms post-acquisition, which is consistent with 
the results in Table 3-4 that post-acquisition unadjusted performance changes 
of acquirers taking over a profitable target is not significantly different from 
those of acquirers taking over an unprofitable target. Table 3-5 shows that, on 
average, the post-acquisition TMT turnovers (complete TMT turnover and TMT 
turnover) are in general not significantly correlated to the peer-adjusted 
performance changes of target firms post-acquisition.26  
                                                          
26  The various performance measures give consistent conclusions. The un-tabulated correlation 
coefficients between other performance measurements, such as NI/TA, EBITDA/TA and OP/TA and 
the TMT turnover variables shows that the acquirers’ ROAs are not significantly correlated to the peer-
adjusted ROA of target firms post-acquisition and that the TMT turnover variables are not correlated to 
the peer-adjusted performance of target firms post-acquisition, which is consistent with the correlation 
coefficients between ROAs and the TMT turnover variables. 
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Table 3-5 shows that Leverage1 ((long-term debt + current debt) / total assets) 
is significantly positively correlated to the peer-adjusted performance changes 
of target firms post-acquisition. The leverage ratio of a firm could affect the 
corporate governance and indirectly affect the operating performance. This 
result is consistent with Renneboog’s (2000) suggestion that high leverage is 
likely to be associated with a higher level of monitoring and more frequent 
interventions by creditors as the risk of financial distress increases. 
Table 3-5 also shows that whether target and acquirer are in the related 
industry appears to not affect the post-acquisition peer-adjusted performance 
changes of target firms and the unadjusted performance changes of acquirers. 
However, cash payment is significantly positively correlated to the peer-
adjusted performance changes of target firms over the period to year +1 
(significant at the 10% level). These results are consistent with the finding of 
Maksimovic et al. (2011) that deals that involve cash as a method of payment 
are less likely to be sold and cash payment is more likely to positively affect 
the post-acquisition performance changes. The relative size is in general 
positively correlated to post-acquisition peer-adjusted performance 
improvements of target firms, which is consistent with Maksimovic et al’s (2011) 
finding that deals with larger relative size provide significantly higher 
announcement returns to the target.  
3.5.2 Market Discipline Turnovers 
This section provides the regression results of factors affecting the TMT 
turnover post-acquisition. As I discussed in Section 3.2.2, the market 




more likely to be replaced than TMTs in well-performing target firms. This 
section discusses the analyses related to Hypothesis 3-2 that replacement of 
target TMT is negatively related to pre-acquisition performance in targets.  
Table 3-6 Panel A Columns 1 shows that ROA(-1) does not affect the TMT 
turnover. However, Table 3-6 Panel A Column 2 shows that profitable targets 
on average experience 10% lower TMT turnovers than unprofitable targets and 
that the regression coefficients are significant at the 5% level. As discussed in 
Section 3.4.3, the pre-acquisition profitable target dummy is argued to be a 
cleaner measure of performance in the TMT replacement decisions compared 
to the pre-acquisition ROA (Franks et al., 2001). Since managers tend to use 
hidden reserves to smooth earnings and hide losses, Franks et al. (2001) 
suggest that unprofitable targets are more likely to be firms with severe earning 
problems. Ball et al. (1997) also suggest that losses may be the most relevant 
signal of managerial failure.  
Consistent results are provided for the complete TMT turnover, showing that 
TMT replacement decisions tend to be affected by the profitable target dummy, 
but not by the level of pre-acquisition performance (Table 3-6 Panel A Columns 
3 and 4). Therefore, results for the profitable target dummy support Hypothesis 
3-2 that target TMT turnover is negatively related to the pre-acquisition 
performance of targets and in particular to whether or not the target firm is 
profitable (Table 3-6 Panel A Columns 2 and 4). 
To investigate the subsample of financial targets which are generally excluded 
from prior studies on M&As (e.g., Bruner, 2002), I examine factors affecting 
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the TMT turnover in a subsample of Finance, insurance and real estate target 
firms (2-digit SIC codes range from 60 to 70). Table 3-6 Panel A Columns 5 
and 6 provide consistent results that ROA(-1) does not affect the post-
acquisition TMT turnover. However, Table 3-6 Panel A Columns 7 and 8 show 
that the profitable target dummy does not affect the post-acquisition TMT 
turnover in the subsample of financial firms. Therefore, in financial firms, the 
pre-acquisition profitability of target firms appears to have no significant impact 
on the post-acquisition TMT turnover.  
[Insert Table 3-6 here] 
As I discussed in Section 3.2.2, the market discipline theory suggests that a 
firm with a poor pre-acquisition performance is more likely to experience a high 
TMT replacement than a well-performing firm, which indicates that unprofitable 
targets are more likely to experience a higher TMT turnover than profitable 
targets. On the other hand, a high TMT turnover is more likely to harm the 
post-acquisition performance improvements in profitable targets than in 
unprofitable targets, as replacement of TMTs who have private knowledge and 
information about the target disturbs the firm’s operations. Therefore, I 
investigate TMT turnovers in targets with profitable and unprofitable pre-
acquisition performance separately in Table 3-6 Panel B.  
Consistent to the results in Table 3-6 Panel A, Table 3-6 Panel B Columns 1-
4 show that the pre-acquisition performance ROA(-1) tends not to be 
significantly correlated to the post-acquisition TMT Turnover and the Complete 




Table 3-6 Panel B Columns 5-8 shows that ROA(-1) appears to affect the pre-
acquisition TMT Turnover during (-1, 0) and the adjusted TMT Turnover. In 
profitable targets, a high ROA(-1) appears to reduce the pre-deal TMT 
Turnover, which supports the resource-based management theory (Table 3-6 
Panel B Column 5). The replacement of TMT in target firms, especially 
profitable targets, appear to harm the future performance improvements of 
target firms. In unprofitable targets, firms with a larger loss experience a higher 
TMT replacement, which supports the market discipline theory (Table 3-6 
Panel B Column 6).  
These results show that the pre-deal performance appears to affect the pre-
deal TMT turnover during year (-1, 0) but not the post-deal TMT turnover (0, 
+1), which indicates that a poorly performing target TMT (measured by the pre-
deal performance of target firms) is more likely to be replaced in the pre-deal 
period and a well-performing TMT is more likely to continue work as a TMT. 
These results support Hypothesis 3-2 that a firm performing well before 
becoming a takeover target experience a lower TMT turnover around the 
acquisition announcement and poorly performed targets experience a higher 
TMT replacement. 
Table 3-6 Panel B Column 7 shows that in profitable targets, a higher pre-deal 
ROA is positively correlated to the adjusted TMT Turnover. This result 
suggests that after controlling for the average TMT turnovers during the non-
M&A period (-5, 0), well-performing target firms experience a higher proportion 
of TMT replacements within one year post-acquisition, which fails to support 
either the market discipline theory or the resource-based management theory. 
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The ROA(-1) appears to not affect the Adjusted TMT Turnover in unprofitable 
firms. Results of adjusted TMT Turnover are not consistent to results of pre- 
and post-deal TMT turnovers, and therefore, the interpretation of adjusted TMT 
Turnover requires caution. 
Table 3-6 Panel A also presents the impact of TMT characteristics and deal-
specific characteristics on the post-acquisition TMT turnover in target firms. 
Table 3-6 Panel A shows that the pre-acquisition TMT age does not affect the 
post-acquisition TMT turnover. Similarly, un-tabulated regression results show 
that the proportion of TMTs over 65 years old does not affect the post-
acquisition TMT turnover. These results indicate that retirement may not be 
the main concern of post-acquisition TMT turnover or that target TMT age is 
not a concern to acquirers. Table 3-6 Panels B in general provide consistent 
results, excepting for pre-deal TMT Turnover in unprofitable targets. Table 3-
6 Panel B Column 6 shows that pre-deal TMT age is positively correlated to 
the pre-deal TMT Turnover (significant at the 1% level), which indicates that 
target TMTs who want to retire may choose to leave the target board before 
the acquisition.  
Table 3-6 Panel A Columns 3 and 4 show that the pre-deal TMT size of target 
firms has a significantly negative impact on the complete TMT turnover in 
target firms post-acquisition (significant at the 1% level), which suggests that 
target firms with larger TMT size are less likely to experience a complete TMT 
turnover. However, the pre-deal TMT size does not affect the complete TMT 
turnover in financial firms (Table 3-6 Panel A Columns 7 and 8). The sub-




consistent results that in both profitable and unprofitable targets, pre-deal TMT 
size has a significantly negative impact on the complete TMT turnover post-
acquisition. The TMT size appears to not affect the TMT Turnover within one 
year post-acquisition (Table 3-6 Panel A Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, and Panel B 
Columns 3 and 4). On the other hand, a larger TMT size is more likely to 
experience a higher pre-acquisition TMT turnover in both profitable and 
unprofitable firms (Table 3-6 Panel B Columns 5 and 6). This result, consistent 
with the impact of pre-deal TMT age on TMT turnovers, indicates that the pre-
deal and post-deal TMT turnovers appear to be affected by different factors. 
These results suggest that in a target with large TMT size, TMTs are more 
likely to leave in the pre-acquisition period and acquirers are more likely to 
retain some TMTs post-acquisition when the target TMT is large than when it 
is small. As TMT size may be indicative of the complexity of the business, 
acquirers seem less likely to fully replace the target’s TMTs when targets 
business is complex.  
Furthermore, Table 3-6 Panel A Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 show that acquirers are 
more likely to completely replace target TMT when acquirers are in a related 
industry as targets’ and acquirers are more likely to have knowledge of the 
target’s business. When acquirers and targets are in different industries, 
acquirers are more likely to retain target TMTs, maybe because they have 
valuable information about the target’s business. Table 3-6 D provide 
consistent results in the subsample of financial targets. These results support 
the resource-based management theory with the positive coefficient of related 
industry on TMT turnovers. 
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Table 3-6 Panel B Columns 5 and 6 show that the pre-deal average tenure of 
target TMTs has a significant negative impact on the pre-deal TMT turnover 
(significant at the 1% level), which suggests that TMT with a longer working 
experience in targets are less likely to leave in the pre-acquisition period. This 
result is consistent with the finding in Peters and Wagner (2014) that TMTs 
with longer tenure are fired less often as these TMTs are argued to be more 
experienced or more skilled than TMTs with shorter tenure. However, Table 3-
6 Panel B Columns 7 shows that the pre-acquisition average tenure of target 
TMTs has a significant positive impact on the adjusted TMT turnover post-
acquisition (significant at the 1% level), which suggests that TMTs with a long 
tenure are more likely to leave in the post-acquisition period compared to pre-
acquisition period. Target TMTs with longer tenure may decide to stay in the 
target management team to facilitate the completion of acquisitions, but they 
are more likely to leave the firm within five years post-acquisition.  
3.5.3 Target performance improvements and mean-reversion effect 
This section provides the regression results of factors driving post-acquisition 
peer-adjusted performance changes of target firms. Section 3.5.3 discusses 
the analyses related to Hypothesis 3-3, which is whether TMT replacement is 
positively correlated to the target performance improvements. 
Table 3-7 Panel A shows that Target TMT turnovers do not affect the non-peer 
adjusted ROA change in targets within three years after acquisitions. 
Furthermore, Table 3-7 Panel A Columns 1-3 also show that the unadjusted 
ROA(-1) has a significant negative impact, ranging from -1.1 to -0.8, on the 




example, the target firms with a 10% ROA(-1) would experience a ROA change 
decrease by 8% over the period to year +1, 9% over a two year period to year 
+2, and 11% over a three year period to year+3. Therefore, the ROA appears 
to be mean-reverting: the performance of target firms with high ROA before 
the acquisition appears to revert after acquisition. Similarly, Table 3-7 Panel A 
Columns 4-6 show that profitable targets generate lower post-deal unadjusted 
ROA than unprofitable targets, which is consistent to the mean-reverting 
results of ROA(-1). 
[Insert Table 3-7 here] 
However, this mean-reversion of unadjusted ROA may be driven by the 
economic or industry trend of ROA changes or the firm-specific acquisition 
effect. Barber and Lyon (1996) suggest that the accounting-based measures 
of performance tends to be mean-reverting and recommend matching sample 
firms to control firms on the pre-event performance, for example, matching on 
industry, or industry and size could reduce the mean-reversion. To control for 
the economic and industry performance, I therefore use peer firms’ 
performance as a benchmark to evaluate post-acquisition performance of 
target firms.27 Following Healy et al. (1992), I focus on the peer-adjusted ROA 
changes in Table 3-7 Panel B and examine whether TMT turnover affects the 
post-acquisition performance changes. Table 3-7 Panel B shows that neither 
the post-acquisition TMT turnover nor the complete TMT turnover has a 
significant impact on the peer-adjusted ROA improvements in target firms 
                                                          
27 The peer firm sample selection process is discussed in Section 3.4.1. 
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post-acquisition. This result is consistent with the finding in Table 3-7 Panel A 
with the unadjusted ROA.  
As a robustness check of the analysis of the impact of TMT turnover on post-
acquisition peer-adjusted performance improvements of target firms, I 
examine factors affecting the post-acquisition peer-adjusted performance of 
target firms using alternative performance measures in terms of net 
income/total assets (NI/TA), EBITDA/total assets (EBITDA/TA), and operating 
profit/total assets (OP/TA), respectively. The un-tabulated regressions provide 
consistent result that the post-acquisition TMT turnover and the complete TMT 
turnover do not have a significant impact on the alternative post-acquisition 
peer-adjusted performance changes of target firms. These results fail to 
support Hypothesis 3-3 that replacement of target TMT is positively related to 
post-acquisition performance improvement in targets. In addition, these results 
fail to support the resource-based management theory that replacement of 
target TMT is negatively related to post-acquisition performance improvement 
in targets.  
Table 3-7 Panel B Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 also show that the profitable target 
dummy has a significant negative impact on the post-acquisition peer-adjusted 
ROA of target firms in years +2 and +3, which suggests that profitable targets 
appear to generate less peer-adjusted ROA improvements than unprofitable 
targets. This result is consistent with the finding in Table 3-4 that the post-
acquisition peer-adjusted performance improve significantly in unprofitable 
targets but deteriorates insignificantly in profitable targets. Un-tabulated 




that the profitable target dummy has a significant negative impact on different 
measurements of post-acquisition peer-adjusted performance changes of 
target firms (net income/total assets, EBITDA/total assets, and operating 
profit/total assets).  
Hypotheses 3-2 and 3-3 expect that target TMT turnover is negatively related 
to targets’ pre-acquisition performance and positively related to targets’ post-
acquisition performance improvement. Combing the two hypotheses, the 
market discipline theory of acquisitions suggests that the target TMT turnover 
is expected to have a larger impact on the post-acquisition performance 
improvements of target firms where the pre-acquisition performance was poor. 
In Table 3-8, I investigate the post-acquisition performance improvements in 
profitable and unprofitable targets and examine the impact of target TMT 
turnover on the post-acquisition performance improvements of profitable and 
unprofitable targets.  
[Insert Table 3-8 here] 
The sub-group regression results in Table 3-8 Panels A to D suggest that the 
TMT turnover during (0, +1 year) in targets does not affect the unadjusted and 
peer-adjusted ROA changes in target firms. These results fail to support 
Hypothesis 3-3 that target TMT turnover is positively related to targets’ post-
acquisition performance improvement. Although Table 3-8 Panels A and C 
Column 5 show that a complete TMT turnover has a negative impact on the 
ROA(-1, +2) in profitable targets, the general results fails to support the 
resource-based management view as there is no consistent pattern of the 
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significant impact of a complete TMT turnover on either unadjusted or peer-
adjusted target performance improvements within three years post-acquisition.  
The sub-group regression results in Table 3-8 Panels A to D also show that 
the pre-acquisition ROA has a significant negative impact on post-acquisition 
ROA improvements in both profitable and unprofitable targets. These 
regression results suggest that profitable targets appear to underperform 
unprofitable targets in terms of profitability after acquisitions. The regression 
results are consistent with the descriptive statistics in Table 3-4 that profitable 
targets experience lower performance improvements than unprofitable targets. 
As I control for the potential industry performance trends by using peer-
adjusted target performance, the additional mean-reversal in performance 
changes could be driven by the acquisition effect. As discussed in Section 
3.5.1, the acquisition motivations behind acquisitions of profitable and 
unprofitable targets may be different. The profitable targets do not experience 
higher profit growths, but they could enjoy a quicker expansion than 
unprofitable targets.  
Overall, the regression results fail to support Hypothesis 3-3 that replacement 
of target TMT is positively related to post-acquisition performance 
improvement in targets. My results suggest that neither the market discipline 
theory of acquisition nor the resource-based management appear to explain 





3.5.4 Target TMT turnover versus Acquirer Performance 
This section provides the regression results of factors driving post-acquisition 
performance of acquiring firms. Section 3.5.4 discusses the analyses related 
to Hypothesis 3-4, which is whether TMT replacement is negatively related to 
the post-acquisition performance changes of acquirers. 
As I stated in Section 3.1, targets are subsidiaries of acquirers and the TMT 
Turnovers in acquirers should be more important to acquirers than the 
subsidiaries’ TMT turnovers. In my sample, targets are small relatively to 
acquirers. The median of target’s total assets divided by acquirer’s total assets 
is 0.06 (un-tabulated). In Table 3-9, I investigate whether target TMT turnover 
or acquirer TMT turnover significantly affect the post-acquisition performance 
improvements of acquirers.  
[Insert Table 3-9 here] 
Table 3-9 Panel A shows that the target TMT turnover has a significant 
negative impact on ROA(-1, +2) of acquirers, which support Hypothesis 3-4 
and the resource based theory that target TMT turnover is negatively related 
to post-acquisition performance improvement in acquirers (Table 3-10 Panel 
A Columns 1-3 and 7-9). However, target TMT turnover does not affect the 
post-acquisition performance improvements of acquirers over the period to 
years +1 and +3. There is thus no consistent pattern of target TMT turnover’s 
impact on acquirers’ performance changes. Furthermore, Table 3-9 Panel B 
shows that acquirers with a complete TMT turnover in targets on average have 
lower ROAs over the three-year post-acquisition period by 3% to 4%, and the 
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coefficients are significant at the 5% level, which supports Hypothesis 3-4. 
Thus, while not unequivocal, the results provide some indication to suggest 
that the change of the TMT in profitable targets may not be beneficial for 
acquirers, and the replacement of the whole team may be harmful to the 
acquirer. 
Table 3-9 Panels A and B show that acquirers’ TMT turnover in the first year 
post-acquisition is negatively correlated to the acquirers’ ROA(-1, +1) and the 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level. A 10% increase in acquirer TMT 
turnovers is associated with a reduction in the ROA(-1, +1) of 1.8% to 1.9% 
and the coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The interpretation of the 
negative correlation between the acquirer TMT turnover and the post-
acquisition unadjusted performance improvements of acquirers requires 
caution. As discussed in Section 3.5.3, acquirers’ unadjusted performance 
changes post-acquisition appears to be mean-reverting. Table 3-9 Panels A 
and B show that Acquirer ROA(-1) has a significantly negative impact on the 
unadjusted performance improvements of acquirers post-acquisition 
(significant at the 1% level). 
Comparing the coefficients and their significance, the acquirers’ post-
acquisition unadjusted ROA improvements are more strongly correlated to 
acquirers’ TMT turnover than targets’ TMT turnover (Table 3-9 Panel A). 
Although the target complete TMT turnover is significantly correlated to 
acquirers’ post-acquisition ROA improvements from year +1 to year +3, its 
impact is less than that of acquirer TMT turnover (Table 3-9 Panel B). For 




year) is on average associated with a reduction in the ROA by 3% to 4%, while 
acquirers with a 30% TMT turnover over the same period is on average 
associated with a reduction in the ROA(-1, +1) of 5.5% to 5.7%. These results 
are consistent with my expectation that the acquirers’ post-acquisition 
performance improvement is more strongly correlated to changes in their own 
TMT than that of the target. 
As discussed in Section 3.4.3, the target pre-acquisition profitability could 
affect the post-acquisition TMT turnover. The market discipline hypothesis 
suggests that a firm with a poor performance are more likely to experience a 
high TMT replacement than a well-performing firm, which indicates that 
unprofitable targets are more likely to experience a higher TMT turnover than 
profitable targets. Furthermore, the resource-based management theory 
suggests that target TMTs have private knowledge and information about the 
target firm, and a high TMT turnover is more likely to disturb the firm operation 
and harm the post-acquisition performance improvements in profitable targets 
than in unprofitable targets. Therefore, I investigate whether target TMT 
turnover, combined with the impact of target profitability, affect acquirer’s post-
acquisition performance improvements in Table 3-10.  
[Insert Table 3-10 here] 
Table 3-10 Panel A controls for the interactions between TMT turnovers and 
pre-acquisition target profitability (the profitable target dummy), as unprofitable 
targets are more likely to experience a higher TMT turnover than profitable 
targets. Table 3-10 Panel A shows that target TMT turnover in unprofitable 
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targets are negatively correlated to acquirer’s unadjusted ROA(-1, +3), which 
supports the Hypothesis 3-4. However, target TMT turnover is not significantly 
correlated to acquirer’s performance changes over the periods to years +1 and 
+2. Therefore, there is no consistent pattern that the replacement of target 
TMTs is negatively correlated to the post-acquisition performance 
improvements in acquirers.  
In profitable targets, the correlation between target TMT turnover and 
acquirer’s ROAs combines the impact of target TMT turnover and the 
interaction term of target TMT turnover and profitable target dummy. Overall, 
the combined effects show that target TMT turnover is positively correlated to 
acquirers’ ROA(-1, +3). For example, Table 3-10 Panel A Column 6 shows that 
in profitable targets, the regression coefficient of target TMT turnover on 
acquirers’ ROA is +0.025 (-0.177+0.202), which is smaller than the -0.085 
coefficient of acquirer TMT turnover on acquirer’s ROA(-1, +3). These results 
are consistent with my finding in Table 3-9 that the acquirers’ post-acquisition 
performance is stronger correlated to TMT turnovers in acquirers than those 
in targets. 
Table 3-10 Panel B shows that after controlling for target profitability, Target 
Complete TMT Turnover overall has a negative impact on acquirer’s ROAs 
within three years post-acquisition, which is consistent to the findings in Table 
3-9 Panel B. To consider the whole impact of the complete TMT turnover in 
target firms, I combine the impact of complete TMT turnover and the interaction 
term of complete TMT turnover and profitable target dummy. For example, 




TMT turnover in target firms reduce acquirers’ ROA(-1, +1) by -0.025 (-
0.038+0.013), ROA(-1, +2) by -0.025 (-0.046+0.021), ROA(-1, +1) by -0.051 (-
0.017-0.034), which supports Hypothesis 3-4 that a complete TMT target in 
targets is harmful to acquirer’s performance post-acquisition. 
Consistent with the findings in Table 3-10 Panel A, the regression coefficients 
in Table 3-10 Panel B show that the acquirers’ post-acquisition performance 
improvement is stronger correlated to TMT turnovers in acquirers than those 
in targets. Table 3-10 Panels A and B Columns 4 also show that after 
controlling for the target profitability, acquirer’s TMT turnover within the first 
year post-acquisition is negatively correlated to the acquirers’ ROA(-1, +1) 
(significant at the 1% level), which is consistent with the results in Table 3-9 
Panels A and B.28  
Overall, results in Tables 3-9 and 3-10 show that although the replacement of 
target TMTs is significantly negatively correlated to acquirers’ ROA changes 
over a three-year period to year +3, irrespective of whether the target firm is 
profitable or loss-making, there is no consistent pattern in the coefficients of 
target TMT turnovers, which fails to support Hypothesis 3-4 that TMTs in 
profitable targets are a valuable source of inside information and that replacing 
target’s TMT could lead to the loss of the firm-specific knowledge and harm 
the profitability of the combined business post-acquisition. However, results in 
Tables 3-9 and 3-10 show that a complete TMT turnover in targets is negatively 
correlated to acquirer’s ROAs within three years post-acquisition, which 
                                                          
28 As a robustness check, I control for the cash payment and relative size of the acquisition. The un-




supports Hypothesis 3-4 that that replacement of target TMT is harmful to post-
acquisition performance improvements of acquirers. These results are 
consistent with the findings in previous studies (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; 
Krishnan et al., 1997; Zollo and Singh, 2004) and support the resource-based 
management theory with the evidence that a complete TMT replacement in 
target firms, especially profitable targets, lead to lower post-acquisition 
performance improvements in acquirers.  
3.6 Conclusion 
My results suggest that, on average, acquisitions significantly improve the 
peer-adjusted performance of unprofitable targets but leads to a small and 
insignificant deterioration in the performance of profitable targets. Unprofitable 
targets are more likely to experience “disciplinary top management team (TMT) 
turnovers,” but both profitable and unprofitable targets experience high TMT 
turnover post-acquisition. On average, the TMT turnovers do not improve the 
post-acquisition target performance.  
My results do not provide evidence to support the market discipline hypothesis 
expectation that disciplinary TMT turnovers improve the operation and 
performance of target firms. Instead, my results tend to support the resource-
based management theory, with some evidence to suggest that a complete 
change of the target TMT is harmful to the profits of acquirers.  
The reasons for TMT turnovers around acquisitions could be complex, and 
disciplinary TMT turnover does not appear to be the main reason for officer 




age of directors could also affect the TMT turnover in target firms. Other 
sources of value-creation, such as the increasing financing capacity provided 
by acquirers to targets, may explain the value creation in unprofitable targets.  
For profitable targets, generating superior profits appears not to be the main 
motive of the acquisitions, at least not within a three-year post-acquisition 
period as covered in this study. Profitable targets are more likely to grow faster 
in firm size and sales revenues than unprofitable firms, indicating that 
expansion may have been the main medium-term aim for targets post-
acquisition. The expansion could finally be converted into profits in the future. 
On average, acquirers experience significant negative changes in unadjusted 
performance post-acquisition, but target firm TMT post-acquisition does not 
appear to affect acquirer’s unadjusted ROA. The negative changes of 
acquirers’ ROA could be reduced if controls for the peer performance changes. 
Although TMTs in profitable targets are valuable resources of inside 
knowledge, the post-acquisition performance changes in acquirers are more 





Table 3-1  
Sample selection of target firms 
The sample includes 498 target firms acquired in the U.S. between 2006 and 2014. Financial statements information includes total assets, sales revenue, and return on 
assets (ROA).  ROA=Profit & Loss Before Interest/Total Assets (FAME, 2016). Sample sizes for alternative measurements of the profitability in targets are 413 for 
NI/TA=Profit and Loss after Tax/Total Assets, 411 for EBITDA/TA=EBITDA/Total Assets, and 496 for OP/TA=Operating Profit/Total Assets. N stands for number 
of observations. 
  N 
Completed U.K. domestic M&As during 2006-2014  15,332 
Less: deals with missing value for transaction size 9,396 5,936 
Plus: deals with missing value for transaction size but have value of target’s total assets one-year prior the acquisition ($m) 1,716 7,652 
Less: acquirers are government owned (20), investor owned (98), joint ventures (38), or mutually owned (3)  159 7,493 
Less: targets are government owned (6), joint ventures (79), investor owned or mutually owned (0)  85 7,408 
Less: deals with missing values for target percentage shares acquired in the deal 633 6,775 
Less: deals with missing values for target percentage shares owned by acquirers post-deal 0 6,775 
Less: acquirers obtain less than 50% of target shares in the transaction 557 6,218 
Less: acquirers own less than 100% of target shares after the deal 294 5,924 
Less: reverse takeovers (61), leveraged and/or management buyout (847) 908 5,016 
Less: transaction value less than £1 million 635 4,381 
Less: deals with missing value for transaction size and the value of target’s total assets is less than £1million 302 4,079 
Less: targets which cannot be found in FAME 792 3287 
Less: targets for which it is not possible to identify the parent-subsidiary relation from year +1 onwards 1,078 2209 
Less: deals with no balance sheets or profits & loss statements information in FAME for years -1 and +1 326 1883 
Less: targets which have missing values for pre-acquisition sales revenue  1,228 655 
Less: targets which have missing values for ROA at the year -1 and +1,  157 498 
Less: targets which have missing data for officer information 0 498 






Table 3-2 Frequency Distribution 
Panel A. Number of acquisitions describes the number of acquisition transactions in the final sample. 
The data comprise whole-firm acquisitions listed in the SDC M&A database for which the 
announcement date is between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 2014, the deal is complete, acquirers 
fully own the target after acquisition, and targets and acquirers are domestic U.K. firm which has 
financial reports at years -1 and +1, and years +2 and +3 if data available, where year 0 is the acquisition 
announcement year.  
















Table 3-2 Panel B. Industry Frequency 
Industry Frequency reports the industry distribution of targets and acquirers. The industry 2-digit SIC 
is from the SDC M&A database. 




Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 01-09 0 0 
Mining 10-14 3 1 
Construction 15-17 6 7 
Printing 18-19 15 16 
Manufacturing 20-39 0 0 
Transportation, Communications, 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary service 
40-49 92 92 
Wholesale Trade 50-51 35 43 
Retail Trade 52-59 30 19 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 60-67 116 168 
Services 70-89 198 151 
Public Administration 91-97 3 1 






Table 3-3 Panel A 
Target characteristics 
Panel A reports the average of selected financial characteristics for targets, peer firms and acquirers: firm size, leverage and firm performance before and after 
acquisition and the changes of performance. Panel A also reports the TMT turnovers around acquisitions. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
level. The unit of Total Assets is thousand GBP. The difference is the mean difference between target and peer (acquirer) and I provide the significance of t-test 
whether the difference is significantly different from zero. ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  Target    Peer   Target vs. Peer  Acquirer   Target vs. Acquirer  
VARIABLES Mean N Mean N  Difference Mean N  Difference 
Total Assets 57,418 498 63,825 498 -6,407 1,550,183 410 -1,502,424*** 
Leverage1 0.682 498 0.700 498 -0.018 0.595 410 0.099*** 
Leverage2 0.134 498 0.174 498 -0.040 0.194 410 -0.060*** 
Pre_deal TMT Age 51.000 498 51.240 489 -0.172 52.100 472 -1.130*** 
Post_deal TMT Age 49.110 497 50.620 490 -1.486*** 51.550 483 -2.436*** 
Pre_deal proportion of TMT over 65  0.484 498 0.341 498 0.143*** 0.567 476 -0.088*** 
Post_deal proportion of TMT over 65 0.390 498 0.437 497 -0.046 0.777 485 -0.388*** 
Pre-deal TMT size 7.480 498 4.958 498 2.522*** 7.105 486 0.381* 
Post-deal TMT size 7.460 498 4.904 498 2.556*** 7.449 486 0.051 
Post-deal New TMT No. 2.129 498 0.526 498 1.602*** 1.255 486 0.885*** 
TMT Turnover 0.244 498 0.092 497 0.152*** 0.120 485 0.123*** 
Complete Turnover 0.430 498 0.554 202 -0.079 0.376 101 0.376 
Pre-deal TMT Turnover 0.239 498 0.092 498 0.147*** 0.115 476 0.125*** 
NI/TA(-1) 0.052 413 0.061 407 -0.008 0.055 332 0.010 
ROA(-1) 0.089 498 0.095 496 -0.006 0.081 396 0.023* 
EBITDA/TA (-1) 0.117 412 0.102 407 0.016* 0.104 329 0.021 











Table 3-3 Panel B 
Breakdown of target characteristics and acquisition deal-specific characteristics by pre-
acquisition profitability 
Panel B reports the target pre-acquisition financial characteristics, pre-and-post acquisition TMT 
characteristics, deal characteristics, change of target and acquirer performance, and change of target 
performance adjusted for peer performance. Target firms are classified as profitable firms if they 
generate a positive ROA(-1) and as unprofitable firms if they generate a ROA(-1) smaller than or 
equal to zero. The peer firm is firstly matched to 2-digit SIC of target firms and then matched to the 
closest value of total assets and closest value of ROA in the most recent financial statements before 
the acquisition announcement. Private target firms are matched with private peer firms and public 
target firms are matched with public peer firms. Both target firms and peer firms are U.K. or Irish 
firms in the FAME database. All variables, if not specified, measure the target firms. The difference 
is the mean difference between unprofitable and profitable target and I provide the significance of t-
test whether the difference is significantly different from zero. ***, **, * stand for the significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Unprofitable Target Profitable Target t-test Difference 
VARIABLES  N Mean N Mean Mean 
Total Assets 92 37,339 406 61,968 -24,628 
Leverage1 92 0.927 406 0.626 0.300*** 
Leverage2 92 0.240 406 0.110 0.130*** 
Related Industry  92 0.511 406 0.480 0.031 
Relative Size 71 1.207 339 1.291 -0.084* 
Firm Age 92 18.731 406 22.424 -3.693 
Cash Payment  71 0.563 315 0.670 -0.107* 
Pre_deal Tenure 92 5.247 406 6.255 -1.001*** 
Post_deal Tenure 92 3.261 406 3.477 -0.216 
TMT Turnover 92 0.296 406 0.232 0.064** 
Complete _Turnover 92 0.500 406 0.414 0.086 
Pre-deal TMT Turnover 92 0.257 406 0.235 0.022 
Adjusted TMT Turnover 82 0.152 373 0.124 0.027 
Pre-deal TMT size 92 7.870 406 7.392 0.478 
Post-deal TMT size 92 7.576 406 7.433 0.143 
Pre-deal TMT Age 91 51.133 406 50.974 0.158 
Post-deal TMT Age 92 49.827 406 48.949 0.878* 
Pre-deal proportion of 
TMT over 65 
92 0.489 406 0.483 0.006 
Post-deal proportion of 
TMT over 65 





Breakdown of peer-adjusted performance after acquisitions by pre-acquisition target profitability 
This table reports the target post-acquisition performance in target firms and the performance is peer-adjusted.  Target firms are classified as profitable firms if they 
generate a positive ROA(-1) and as unprofitable firms if they generate a ROA(-1) smaller than or equal to zero. The peer firm is firstly matched to 2-digit SIC of target 
firms and then matched to the closest value of total assets and closest value of ROA in the most recent financial statements before the acquisition announcement. 
Private target firms are matched with private peer firms and public target firms are matched with public peer firms. Both target firms and peer firms are U.K. or Irish 
firms in the FAME database. All variables, if not specified, measure the target firms. I provide the t-test statistic of whether mean value is significantly different from 
zero. The t-test (ranksum test) difference is the mean (median) value of difference between unprofitable and profitable target and I provide the statistical significance 
of t-test (ranksum test) whether the difference is significantly different from zero. For acquirers’ ROA, the difference tests examine whether acquirers taking over 
profitable targets generate different ROAs to those taking over unprofitable targets. ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Full Sample  Unprofitable Target  Profitable Target  Difference 
VARIABLES N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median  Mean Median 
Difference NI/TA(-1, +1) 403 -0.029 -0.014  78 0.028 0.057  325 -0.043** -0.019  0.071 0.076** 
NI/TA(-1, +2) 319 0.032 0.014  62 0.212*** 0.136  257 -0.012 -0.001  0.225*** 0.137*** 
NI/TA(-1, +3) 244 0.019 0.016  46 0.276*** 0.145  198 -0.041 -0.005  0.317*** 0.150*** 
ROA(-1, +1)  494 -0.020 -0.009  91 0.032 0.041  403 -0.032 -0.015  0.063 0.056* 
ROA(-1, +2)  405 0.022 0.016  75 0.163** 0.101  330 -0.010 0.007  0.173*** 0.094*** 
ROA(-1, +3)  325 0.011 0.017  58 0.255*** 0.125  267 -0.042 0.004  0.298*** 0.121*** 
EBITDA/TA(-1,+1) 401 -0.057*** -0.030  78 -0.048 -0.026  323 -0.060*** -0.030  0.012 0.004 
EBITDA/TA(-1,+2) 314 -0.010 -0.006  61 0.115* 0.065  253 -0.040** -0.019  0.155*** 0.084*** 
EBITDA/TA(-1,+3) 237 -0.027 -0.017  45 0.163** 0.149  192 -0.071*** -0.037  0.234*** 0.186*** 
OP/TA(-1, +1) 492 -0.049*** -0.019  91 -0.032 0.034 
0.081 
 401 -0.053*** -0.028  0.020 0.062 
OP/TA(-1, +2) 399 -0.013 0.001  74 0.118**  325 -0.043** -0.014  0.161*** 0.095*** 
OP/TA(-1, +3) 319 -0.015 0.001  57 0.187* 0.124  262 -0.059*** -0.019  0.247*** 0.143*** 
Unadj. ROA(-1,+1) 498 -0.033** -0.017  92 0.100* 0.091  406 -0.063*** -0.031  0.163*** 0.122*** 
Unadj. ROA(-1,+2) 414 0.018 0.010  77 0.284*** 0.148  337 -0.042 -0.018  0.327*** 0.166*** 
Unadj. ROA(-1,+3) 333 -0.006 -0.002  62 0.304*** 0.211  271 -0.077*** -0.032  0.381*** 0.243*** 
Acq. ROA(-1,+1) 393 -0.011 -0.010  68 -0.012 -0.014  325 -0.011 -0.010  -0.002 -0.004 
Acq. ROA(-1,+2) 358 -0.018** -0.015  62 -0.031* -0.018  296 -0.015 -0.015  -0.015 -0.003 






Table 3-5 Correlation Matrix 
This table provides the pairwise correlation coefficients of target board characteristics, target financial characteristics, and deal-specific characteristics. All variables, 
if not specified, measure the target firms. I provide the significance of t-test whether the correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero. ***, **, * stand 



































(-1,+1) 0.08 0.04 -0.02          
 
Acq_ROA 
(-1,+2) 0.06 0.04 -0.07          
 
Acq_ROA 
(-1,+3) 0.08 0.06 -0.01          
 
TMT turnover -0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.09 -0.12** -0.09 1       
Complete 
TMT turnover 0 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.37*** 1     
 
Pre TMT size -0.03 0.05 0.13** -0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.23*** 1     
Post TMT size -0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.1* -0.07 -0.10 0.63*** 0.2*** 0.34*** 1    
Pre TMT age 0.03 -0.08 -0.04 -0.09* -0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.06 1   
Post TMT age 0 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.09** 0 0.06 0.69*** 1  
Post TMT 
tenure 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0 -0.03 0.03 0.2*** -0.07 -0.09* 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 1 
Pre TMT 
tenure 0.08* -0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.07 0.07 0.06 0.12** -0.24*** 0 0.42*** 0.25*** 0.64*** 
Ln(Total 
assets) 0.02 -0.05 0.12** -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.31*** 0.04 0.18*** 0.38*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.14*** 
leverage1 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.10 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.08* -0.14*** 
leverage2 0.09* 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.10** 0 0 -0.05 
Related 
industry 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.08* 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 
Cash payment 0.10* -0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.07 0.03 0 0.05 0.01 0.05 






 Table 3-5 Correlation Matrix continued 










Pre tenure 1       
Ln(Total assets) 0.04       
leverage1 -0.16*** -0.06 1     
leverage2 -0.09** 0.22*** 0.36*** 1    
Related industry 0 -0.09 0 0.06 1   
Cash payment 0.07 0.07 -0.2*** 0 0.06 1  







Table 3-6 Panel A Factors affecting the TMT Turnover and Complete Turnover 
This panel presents factors affect TMT turnovers. Column 1-4 are applied to the full sample of target firms. Column 5-8 is applied to the sub-sample of Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate target firms. The target firms in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate has the 2-digit SIC codes range from 60 to 67. The dependent variable 
for models in Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 is TMT Turnover and Tobit regressions are applied.  The dependent variable for models in Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 is Complete 
Turnover and logit regressions are applied as Complete Turnover is a dummy variable. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. I provide the 
significance of t-test whether the regression coefficient is significantly different from zero. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  

















ROA−1 -0.035  -0.436  0.003  -0.349  
 (0.064)  (0.413)  (0.101)  (0.741)  
Pre-deal TMT Age -0.003 -0.004 -0.011 -0.012 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.020) (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.042) 
Pre-deal TMT Tenure 0.007 0.008 0.049 0.055 0.000 0.001 0.100 0.108* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.034) (0.035) (0.008) (0.008) (0.064) (0.064) 
Pre-deal TMT size -0.001 -0.002 -0.183*** -0.186*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.044 -0.049 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.038) (0.038) (0.009) (0.009) (0.066) (0.066) 
Ln(Total Asset) 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.131** 0.136** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.026 0.034 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.063) (0.063) (0.016) (0.016) (0.114) (0.115) 
Leverage1 -0.047 -0.071* 0.186 0.140 -0.147 -0.164* 0.398 0.299 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.273) (0.269) (0.091) (0.092) (0.654) (0.666) 
Related Industry -0.011 -0.012 0.402** 0.395** -0.028 -0.021 0.770* 0.814** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.190) (0.191) (0.055) (0.054) (0.398) (0.403) 
Profitable Target Dummy  -0.106**  -0.464*  -0.072  -0.507 
  (0.039)  (0.257)  (0.070)  (0.508) 
Constant -0.260 -0.141 -0.181 0.170 -0.136 -0.087 -1.025 -0.725 
 (0.170) (0.171) (1.080) (1.107) (0.312) (0.314) (2.257) (2.284) 
N 498 498 498 498 116 116 116 116 
r2_a or r2_p (Pseudo R2) 0.100 0.114 0.0584 0.0616 0.186 0.196 0.0494 0.0542 
F or chi2  51.53 58.45 39.77 41.90 18.65 19.70 7.930 8.705 




Table 3-6 Panel B Factors affecting the TMT Turnover, Complete TMT Turnover, pre-deal TMT Turnover and adjusted TMT Turnover in profitable and 
unprofitable targets 
This panel describes factors affect different measurements of TMT turnover in subgroups of profitable and unprofitable targets. The dependent variable is the Complete 
TMT Turnover for Logit models in Columns 1 and 2, the TMT Turnover for Tobit models in Columns 3 and 4, the Pre-deal TMT Turnover during (-1, 0) for Tobit 
models in Columns 5 and 6, and the adjusted TMT Turnover for OLS models in Columns 7 and 8 as the adjusted TMT Turnover is between -1 and +1. Adjusted TMT 
Turnover is the TMT Turnover (0, +1) subtracting the average pre-deal TMT turnover during (-5, 0). The adjusted R square (r2_a) and Pseudo R square are for Tobit 
and Logit regressions respectively. The F statistics and Chi square are for Tobit (OLS) and Logit regressions respectively. All financial variables are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% level. This panel presents factors affect TMT turnovers. and OLS regressions are applied. I provide the significance of t-test whether the regression 
coefficient is significantly different from zero. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Profitable Unprofitable Profitable Unprofitable Profitable Unprofitable Profitable Unprofitabl
e ROA−1 -0.651 0.215 0.133 -0.050 -0.256*** 0.209* 0.176** 0.039 
 (0.742) (0.751) (0.111) (0.117) (0.094) (0.111) (0.081) (0.114) 
Pre-deal TMT Age -0.010 -0.044 -0.003 -0.008 0.001 0.021*** -0.001 -0.004 
   (0.022) (0.052) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) 
Pre-deal TMT Tenure 0.064* 0.028 0.010* 0.003 -0.027*** -0.037*** 0.019*** 0.020 
   (0.038) (0.089) (0.006) (0.015) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.012) 
Pre-deal TMT size -0.166*** -0.285*** -0.001 -0.006 0.046*** 0.046*** -0.000 -0.003 
   (0.042) (0.095) (0.006) (0.013) (0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) 
Ln(Total Asset) 0.086 0.288** 0.063*** 0.101*** -0.051*** -0.072*** 0.038*** 0.082*** 
 (0.073) (0.173) (0.011) (0.025) (0.009) (0.021) (0.008) (0.022) 
Leverage1 0.200 0.115 -0.018 -0.129* -0.028 -0.005 -0.029 -0.088 
 (0.368) (0.441) (0.058) (0.066) (0.047) (0.058) (0.040) (0.055) 
Related Industry 0.384* 0.271 0.002 -0.065 0.035 0.035 -0.009 -0.023 
 (0.212) (0.467) (0.032) (0.070) (0.027) (0.059) (0.023) (0.062) 
Constant -0.073 1.469 -0.350* -0.131 0.457*** -0.318 -0.317** -0.404 
 (1.268) (2.632) (0.197) (0.372) (0.163) (0.340) (0.144) (0.323) 
N 406 92 406 92 406 92 373 82 

















Table 3-7 Panel A 
Factors affecting unadjusted ROA in target firms post-acquisition (TMT Turnover) 
This panel presents factors affect target ROA post-acquisitions. The dependent variable Π(-i,+j) stands for the unadjusted (not peer-adjusted) target ROA performance 
change between year +j and –i. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. I provide the significance of t-test whether the regression coefficient 
is significantly different from zero. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) 
TMT Turnover -0.058 0.034 0.065 -0.038 0.022 0.059 
 (0.087) (0.080) (0.094) (0.099) (0.093) (0.113) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴−1 -0.823*** -0.894*** -1.079***    
 (0.068) (0.065) (0.078)    
Profitable Target Dummy    -0.135*** -0.280*** -0.350*** 
    (0.048) (0.046) (0.058) 
Post-deal TMT Size -0.008 0.001 -0.006 -0.011* -0.001 -0.011 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Post-deal TMT Age -0.007** -0.005 -0.007* -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Post-deal TMT Tenure 0.014** 0.005 -0.005 0.017** 0.008 0.001 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Ln(Total Asset) 0.001 -0.013 0.033*** 0.016 0.000 0.045*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) 
Leverage1 -0.012 0.060 -0.089* 0.128** 0.164*** 0.067 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.056) 
Related Industry 0.013 -0.043 -0.021 0.016 -0.045 -0.004 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.041) 
Constant 0.410** 0.395** 0.242 0.040 0.274 0.096 
 (0.192) (0.174) (0.207) (0.222) (0.208) (0.254) 
N 497 413 332 497 413 332 
r2_a 0.251 0.355 0.400 0.0389 0.137 0.144 
F 21.78 29.30 28.58 3.508 9.146 7.937 





Table 3-7 Panel B 
Factors affecting peer-adjusted ROA in target firms post-acquisition (TMT turnover and complete TMT turnover) 
This panel presents factors affect target peer-adjusted ROA post-acquisitions. The dependent variable Π(-i,+j) stands for the peer-adjusted target ROA performance 
change between year +j and –I, which is the target ROA performance change subtracted the matched firm’s ROA performance change. All financial variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. I provide the significance of t-test whether the regression coefficient is significantly different from zero. Standard errors are 
presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) 
TMT Turnover -0.062 0.020 0.013    
 (0.113) (0.108) (0.129)    
Complete Turnover    0.009 -0.048 -0.006 
    (0.042) (0.040) (0.048) 
Profitable Target Dummy -0.012 -0.132** -0.298*** -0.007 -0.136** -0.301*** 
 (0.055) (0.053) (0.068) (0.055) (0.052) (0.067) 
Post-deal TMT Size -0.010 0.005 -0.015* -0.013** 0.007 -0.014* 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Post-deal TMT Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Post-deal TMT Tenure 0.01* 0.003 -0.006 0.017* 0.003 -0.006 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
Ln(Total Asset) 0.019 -0.017 0.050*** 0.019 -0.017 0.050*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) 
Leverage1 0.206*** 0.136** -0.016 0.209*** 0.135** -0.017 
 (0.057) (0.055) (0.064) (0.057) (0.055) (0.064) 
Related Industry 0.036 -0.010 -0.017 0.036 -0.005 -0.016 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.047) (0.040) (0.039) (0.047) 
Constant -0.244 0.202 0.337 -0.251 0.231 0.338 
 (0.257) (0.245) (0.297) (0.259) (0.246) (0.297) 
N 493 404 324 493 404 324 
r2_a 0.0272 0.0312 0.0761 0.0267 0.0346 0.0761 
F 2.723 2.623 4.325 2.690 2.804 4.326 





Table 3-8 Panel A 
Factors affecting unadjusted ROA in profitable target firms post-acquisition 
This panel presents factors affect target unadjusted ROA post-acquisitions in profitable targets. ROA is the operating profits divided by total assets. The dependent 
variable Π(-i,+j) stands for the unadjusted target ROA performance change between year +j and –i. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. I 
provide the significance of t-test whether the regression coefficient is significantly different from zero. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand 
for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) 
TMT Turnover 0.054 0.007 0.088    
 (0.086) (0.090) (0.107)    
Complete Turnover    -0.014 -0.096*** -0.048 
    (0.031) (0.033) (0.040) 
ROA(-1) -0.772*** -0.719*** -0.993*** -0.778*** -0.756*** -1.011*** 
 (0.104) (0.129) (0.152) (0.104) (0.128) (0.152) 
Post-deal TMT Size -0.010 0.000 -0.008 -0.008* 0.004 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Post-deal TMT Age -0.004 -0.003 -0.009** -0.004 -0.004 -0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Post-deal TMT Tenure 0.010 0.011 -0.002 0.010 0.010 -0.001 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Ln(Total Asset) 0.009 -0.008 0.044*** 0.009 -0.011 0.044*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
Leverage1 -0.045 0.104* -0.068 -0.046 0.103* -0.070 
 (0.052) (0.059) (0.070) (0.052) (0.058) (0.070) 
Related Industry 0.041 -0.038 -0.027 0.042 -0.032 -0.023 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.039) (0.030) (0.032) (0.039) 
Constant 0.189 0.194 0.178 0.201 0.272 0.193 
 (0.192) (0.205) (0.247) (0.194) (0.204) (0.248) 
N 406 337 271 406 337 271 
r2_a 0.145 0.0892 0.212 0.145 0.112 0.215 
F 9.603 5.114 10.10 9.575 6.323 10.22 





Table 3-8 Panel B 
Factors affecting unadjusted ROA in unprofitable target firms post-acquisition 
This panel presents factors affect target unadjusted ROA post-acquisitions in unprofitable targets. ROA is the operating profits divided by total assets. The dependent 
variable Π(-i,+j) stands for the unadjusted target ROA performance change between year +j and –i. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. I 
provide the significance of t-test whether the regression coefficient is significantly different from zero. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand 
for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) 
TMT Turnover -0.067 0.164 0.031    
 (0.285) (0.192) (0.218)    
Complete Turnover    -0.004 -0.005 0.014 
    (0.107) (0.071) (0.078) 
ROA(-1) -1.061*** -1.077*** -1.022*** -1.062*** -1.071*** -1.022*** 
 (0.170) (0.104) (0.123) (0.170) (0.104) (0.122) 
Post-deal TMT Size -0.021 -0.002 0.007 -0.025 0.007 0.008 
 (0.023) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) 
Post-deal TMT Age -0.020 -0.012 0.004 -0.020 -0.012 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) 
Post-deal TMT Tenure 0.014 -0.037** -0.038* 0.014 -0.037** -0.038* 
  (0.025) (0.018) (0.020) (0.025) (0.018) (0.019) 
Ln(Total Asset) -0.002 -0.006 -0.029 -0.004 -0.003 -0.029 
 (0.038) (0.024) (0.030) (0.038) (0.024) (0.029) 
Leverage1 0.062 -0.025 -0.110 0.068 -0.039 -0.112* 
 (0.100) (0.063) (0.070) (0.097) (0.061) (0.065) 
Related Industry -0.079 -0.020 0.069 -0.079 -0.016 0.067 
 (0.104) (0.068) (0.075) (0.105) (0.069) (0.077) 
Constant 1.021 0.847** 0.269 1.042 0.814** 0.250 
 (0.631) (0.400) (0.439) (0.634) (0.405) (0.439) 
N 91 76 61 91 76 61 
r2_a 0.390 0.630 0.597 0.389 0.626 0.597 
F 8.185 16.97 12.12 8.173 16.70 12.13 






Table 3-8 Panel C 
Factors affecting peer-adjusted ROA in profitable target firms post-acquisition 
This panel presents factors affect target peer-adjusted ROA post-acquisitions in profitable targets. ROA is the operating profits divided by total assets. The dependent 
variable Π(-i,+j) stands for the peer-adjusted target ROA performance change between year +j and –i. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
I provide the significance of t-test whether the regression coefficient is significantly different from zero. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand 
for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) 
TMT Turnover 0.040 0.002 0.050    
 (0.106) (0.099) (0.123)    
Complete Turnover    0.005 -0.086** -0.036 
    (0.038) (0.036) (0.045) 
ROA(-1) -0.540*** -0.501*** -0.582*** -0.540*** -0.533*** -0.594*** 
 (0.128) (0.140) (0.173) (0.129) (0.139) (0.173) 
Post-deal TMT Size -0.010 0.008 -0.010 -0.009 0.011** -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Post-deal TMT Age 0.001 -0.001 -0.012** 0.001 -0.002 -0.012** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Post-deal TMT Tenure 0.016* 0.009 -0.005 0.016** 0.007 -0.005 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Ln(Total Asset) 0.010 -0.025** 0.048*** 0.011 -0.027** 0.048*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) 
Leverage1 0.158** 0.118* -0.077 0.158** 0.116* -0.079 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.079) (0.065) (0.063) (0.079) 
Related Industry 0.033 -0.048 -0.052 0.032 -0.041 -0.049 
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.045) (0.037) (0.035) (0.045) 
Constant -0.205 0.215 0.316 -0.209 0.281 0.329 
 (0.237) (0.223) (0.280) (0.239) (0.222) (0.280) 
N 403 330 267 403 330 267 
r2_a 0.0654 0.0376 0.100 0.0652 0.0542 0.102 
F 4.519 2.607 4.709 4.502 3.357 4.776 





Table 3-8 Panel D 
Factors affecting peer-adjusted ROA in unprofitable target firms post-acquisition 
This panel presents factors affect target peer-adjusted ROA post-acquisitions in unprofitable targets. ROA is the operating profits divided by total assets. The dependent 
variable Π(-i,+j) stands for the peer-adjusted target ROA performance change between year +j and –i. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
I provide the significance of t-test whether the regression coefficient is significantly different from zero. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand 
for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) 
TMT Turnover -0.290 0.162 -0.014    
 (0.372) (0.342) (0.432)    
Complete Turnover    -0.029 0.094 0.094 
    (0.139) (0.124) (0.152) 
ROA(-1) -0.845*** -1.091*** -0.806*** -0.848*** -1.091*** -0.791*** 
 (0.218) (0.180) (0.235) (0.219) (0.179) (0.233) 
Post-deal TMT Size -0.009 -0.002 -0.021 -0.023 0.001 -0.023 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024) 
Post-deal TMT Age -0.026 -0.008 0.001 -0.027 -0.006 0.003 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) 
Post-deal TMT Tenure -0.007 -0.063* -0.069* -0.006 -0.060* -0.070* 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) (0.033) (0.032) (0.038) 
Ln(Total Asset) 0.023 -0.016 0.006 0.017 -0.013 -0.002 
 (0.049) (0.042) (0.058) (0.049) (0.041) (0.055) 
Leverage1 0.024 -0.090 -0.226 0.048 -0.101 -0.220 
 (0.128) (0.109) (0.139) (0.125) (0.106) (0.131) 
Related Industry 0.085 0.224* 0.168 0.089 0.212* 0.151 
 (0.133) (0.118) (0.149) (0.135) (0.119) (0.151) 
Constant 1.048 0.613 0.475 1.189 0.486 0.450 
 (0.891) (0.781) (1.009) (0.882) (0.772) (0.989) 
N 90 74 57 90 74 57 
r2_a 0.164 0.333 0.145 0.158 0.337 0.151 
F 3.187 5.564 2.184 3.095 5.638 2.248 





Table 3-9 Panel A 
Target TMT Turnover and Acquirer’s performance  
This panel presents factors affect the unadjusted ROA post-acquisitions in acquirers. ROA is the operating profits divided by total assets. The dependent variable Π(-
i,+j) stands for the unadjusted acquirer ROA performance change between year +j and –i. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. I provide 
the significance of t-test whether the regression coefficient is significantly different from zero. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) 
Target TMT Turnover -0.035 -0.062** -0.030 -0.013 -0.054* -0.024 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.039) (0.028) (0.029) (0.040) 
Acquirer TMT Turnover    -0.185*** -0.073 -0.068 
      (0.048) (0.050) (0.072) 
Acquirer ROA(-1) -0.729*** -0.748*** -0.855*** -0.725*** -0.748*** -0.856*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.067) (0.046) (0.047) (0.067) 
Acquirer Post-deal TMT Size -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Acquirer Post-deal TMT Age -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Acquirer Post-deal TMT Tenure 0.006** 0.004 0.008** 0.004* 0.003 0.008** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Acquirer Ln(Total Asset) 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Acquirer Leverage1 0.027 0.032 0.034 0.023 0.031 0.033 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.038) (0.025) (0.027) (0.038) 
Related Industry -0.010 -0.020 0.007 -0.006 -0.018 0.008 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) 
Constant 0.060 0.016 0.101 0.111 0.035 0.117 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.110) (0.077) (0.078) (0.111) 
N 387 352 289 387 352 289 
r2_a 0.405 0.442 0.367 0.425 0.444 0.367 
F 33.81 35.79 21.89 32.75 32.15 19.55 




Table 3-9 Panel B 
Target Complete TMT Turnover and Acquirer’s performance  
This panel presents factors affect the unadjusted ROA post-acquisitions in acquirers. ROA is the operating profits divided by total assets. The dependent variable Π(-
i,+j) stands for the unadjusted acquirer ROA performance change between year +j and –i. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. I provide 
the significance of t-test whether the regression coefficient is significantly different from zero. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) 
Target Complete Turnover -0.027** -0.029** -0.043** -0.028** -0.030** -0.044** 
   (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) 
Acquirer TMT Turnover    -0.191*** -0.093* -0.083 
      (0.047) (0.049) (0.070) 
Acquirer ROA(-1) -0.741*** -0.758*** -0.876*** -0.735*** -0.758*** -0.877*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.066) (0.046) (0.047) (0.066) 
Acquirer Post-deal TMT Size -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Acquirer Post-deal TMT Age -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Acquirer Post-deal TMT Tenure 0.005** 0.004 0.008** 0.004 0.003 0.007* 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Acquirer Ln(Total Asset) 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Acquirer Leverage1 0.025 0.033 0.028 0.020 0.031 0.026 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.038) (0.025) (0.027) (0.038) 
Related Industry -0.009 -0.019 0.011 -0.004 -0.017 0.013 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) 
Constant 0.070 0.014 0.112 0.130* 0.041 0.134 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.109) (0.077) (0.078) (0.110) 
N 387 352 289 387 352 289 
r2_a 0.409 0.442 0.378 0.432 0.447 0.379 
F 34.39 35.80 22.87 33.64 32.47 20.52 






Table 3-10 Panel A Target TMT Turnover and Acquirer’s performance with interaction variable 
This panel presents factors affect the unadjusted ROA post-acquisitions in acquirers. The dependent variable Π(-i,+j) stands for the unadjusted acquirer ROA 
performance change between year +j and –i. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. I provide the significance of t-test whether the regression 
coefficient is significantly different from zero. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) 
Target TMT Turnover -0.069 -0.011 -0.176** -0.066 -0.011 -0.177** 
  (0.057) (0.057) (0.077) (0.056) (0.057) (0.077) 
Profitable Target Dummy -0.013 0.018 -0.069** -0.017 0.016 -0.071** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.035) (0.024) (0.025) (0.035) 
Target TMT Turnover * Profitable Target Dummy 0.044 -0.066 0.190** 0.072 -0.056 0.202** 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.088) (0.064) (0.065) (0.089) 
Acquirer TMT Turnover    -0.191*** -0.068 -0.085 
      (0.049) (0.050) (0.072) 
Acquirer ROA(-1) -0.729*** -0.749*** -0.855*** -0.724*** -0.749*** -0.856*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.066) (0.046) (0.047) (0.066) 
Acquirer Post-deal TMT Size -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Acquirer Post-deal TMT Age -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Acquirer Post-deal TMT Tenure 0.006** 0.004 0.008** 0.004 0.003 0.007* 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Acquirer Ln(Total Asset) 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Acquirer Leverage1 0.027 0.032 0.036 0.022 0.031 0.034 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.038) (0.025) (0.027) (0.038) 
Related Industry -0.010 -0.019 0.007 -0.006 -0.018 0.009 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) 
Constant 0.073 -0.001 0.168 0.127 0.018 0.189 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.115) (0.080) (0.082) (0.116) 
N 387 352 289 387 352 289 
r2_a 0.402 0.441 0.374 0.424 0.442 0.375 
F 26.99 28.65 18.20 26.86 26.28 16.69 




Table 3-10 Panel B Target Complete TMT Turnover and Acquirer’s performance with interaction variable 
This panel presents factors affect the unadjusted ROA post-acquisitions in acquirers. The dependent variable Π(-i,+j) stands for the unadjusted acquirer ROA 
performance change between year +j and –i. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. I provide the significance of t-test whether the regression 
coefficient is significantly different from zero. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) Π(-1,+1)   Π(-1,+2)  Π(-1,+3) 
Target Complete Turnover -0.038 -0.046 -0.017 -0.039 -0.049 -0.020 
  (0.030) (0.031) (0.042) (0.030) (0.031) (0.043) 
Profitable Target Dummy -0.009 -0.008 0.002 -0.008 -0.009 0.001 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.035) (0.024) (0.024) (0.035) 
Target Complete Turnover * Profitable Target Dummy 0.013 0.021 -0.034 0.014 0.023 -0.032 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.047) (0.033) (0.034) (0.047) 
Acquirer TMT Turnover    -0.191*** -0.094* -0.080 
      (0.047) (0.049) (0.070) 
Acquirer ROA(-1) -0.740*** -0.756*** -0.881*** -0.734*** -0.756*** -0.882*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.067) (0.046) (0.047) (0.067) 
Acquirer Post-deal TMT Size -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Acquirer Post-deal TMT Age -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Acquirer Post-deal TMT Tenure 0.005** 0.004 0.008** 0.004 0.003 0.007* 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Acquirer Ln(Total Asset) 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Acquirer Leverage1 0.025 0.033 0.029 0.021 0.031 0.027 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.038) (0.025) (0.027) (0.038) 
Related Industry -0.009 -0.019 0.012 -0.004 -0.016 0.014 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) 
Constant 0.078 0.020 0.114 0.136* 0.047 0.136 
 (0.080) (0.081) (0.114) (0.080) (0.081) (0.115) 
N 387 352 289 387 352 289 
r2_a 0.406 0.440 0.376 0.429 0.444 0.377 
F 27.40 28.55 18.34 27.41 26.50 16.81 




Appendix 3-1. The Sampling Period 
My sample period ranges from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2014 
for three reasons. First, the FAME subscription of University of 
Edinburgh Business School, including the website version of FAME 
database and FAME discs, provides financial statements between 2003 
and 2015.29 Targets and acquirers in my sample must have financial 
statements in years -1 and +1, where year 0 stands for the acquisition 
announcement year. Therefore, I restrict the latest acquisitions to be 
conducted in 2014.  
Second, all U.K. listed groups are required to switch to IFRS from 
January 2005 onwards. Excluding financial statement before 2005 
ensures that all financial statements of listed firms are under the 
constant accounting standards. Private limited firms must meet either 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or U.K. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practice (UK GAAP) (GOV.UK, 2014). I exclude 
acquisitions before 2006 to ensure that targets and acquirers meet 
consistent reporting requirements (either IFRS or UK GAAP) from years 
-1 and +3.  
Third, all U.K. listed groups are obliged to use acquisition accounting in 
their accounting reports starting on or after 1 January 2005 (FRS 6 
Acquisition and Merger Accounting; IFRS 3 Business Combinations). 
Although subsidiaries’ financial data are not affected directly, acquirers 
                                                          
29 The website version of FAME database only provides the most recent 10-years financial statements, 
which ranges from 2006 to 2016. The FAME discs include financial information between 2003 to 2010. 
I collected my sample between March and June 2016 and no 2016 financial statement are available at 
the sample collection time. 
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adopting acquisition accounting will show lower M&A profit than those 
using merger accounting (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1988). Excluding 
financial statement before 2005 ensures that all listed acquirers must 
adopt the same accounting treatement in the post-acquisition 
consolidation statement.  
Acquisitions conducted within non-listed groups (e.g., private to private 
acquisition) may allow merger accounting under FRS 6 Acquisition and 
Merger Accounting. I randomly select 40 private-to-private acquisitions 
and all private acquirers adopt acquisition accounting which does not 
allow goodwill amortization. The random selection result of purchase 
accounting suggests that at least some private acquirers do adopt 
purchase accounting after 2005.  
 
Appendix 3-2. The performance measurements: estimated 
operating cash flows versus accrual accounting-based 
performance 
Literature on M&A operating performance suggests that accrual 
accounting-based performance measures are less reliable than cash 
flow measures (Healy et al., 1992; Sudarsanam, 2003; Lin and Switzer, 
2001; Ghosh, 2001; Barber and Lyon, 1996; Powell and Stark, 2005). 
The cash flow measures avoid many of the distortions caused by the 
discretionary accounting rule choices that companies can make. For 
example, where acquisition accounting (also called purchase 




accounting (also called pooling accounting) is applied (Sudarsanam, 
2003). Cash flow measures are also conceptually better related to 
valuation, since the value of a company is the present value of its future 
cash flows (Healy et al., 1992).  The cash flows are not available for 
most target firms post-acquisition, since FRS 101 Para 8(h) enables a 
qualifying entity to take advantage of the disclosure exemptions of IAS 
7 Statement of Cash Flows. Previous studies estimate operating cash 
flows using financial information from annual reports (Powell and Stark, 
2005).  
Powell and Stark (2005) present three operating cash flow (OCF) 
measurements, which are Lawson’s OCF, Healy’s OCF and Lin’s OCF. 
I follow the OCF definition in Lin and Switzer (2001) and Ghosh (2001) 
which is EBITDA. There are 326 firms/observations with EBITDA 
information available from at least year -1 and +1. However, the values 
of variables are missing for the other two OCF measures. The accrual 
accounting-based performance measures do not suffer the missing 
values in most cash flow measures. Therefore, I apply three accrual 
accounting-based performance measures and one OCF measurement, 
which are profit and loss after tax/total assets, profit and loss before 
Interest/total assets, operating profit/total assets and EBITDA/total 
assets.  




Where the performance could be measured as profit and loss after 
tax/total assets, profit and loss before Interest/total assets, operating 
profit/total assets and EBITDA/total assets. 
I tried to use the other two OCF measures following Lawson (1985) and 
Healy et al. (1992). However, the variables are missing for most cash 
flow measures. Due to missing values of variables used in Lawson’s 
and Healy’s OCF definitions, there is 1 observation of Lawson’s OCF 
and 12 of Healy’s OCF available. Furthermore, I assume that the value 
of ExGainLoss, TotalOtherIncome, and ExceptionalItems can be zero. 
However, Depreciation and TotalAmortization cannot be zero for an 
operational firm. With the additional assumptions, I have 41 firms with 
Lawson’s OCF values available, and 57 firms with Healy’s OCF values 
available. 
Lawson (1985) define operating cash flow (OCF), as pre-depreciation 
profit adjusted for changes in working capital. 
 Lawson OCF= Profit & Loss for Period – Ex Gain & Loss + 
Depreciation + Total Amortisation – Total Other Income – 
Exceptional Items – deltaWC + Taxation + Interest Paid 
The deltaWC is the change of WC. WC stands for WorkingCapitalneeds 
accounting data from FAME. The  WorkingCapitalneeds =Stock&WIP + 
Trade Debtors (A) + trade creditors (L).  





Appendix 3-3. Alternative variable measurements and alternative 
models 
I apply alternative variable measurements in Models 1 and 2, and results hold 
consistently. The alternative variables are described as follows. 
Pre-deal TMT turnover: As target managers involved in the acquisition can 
choose to resign before the acquisition announcement, I also measure the pre-
acquisition TMT turnover, following Franks and Mayer (1996). The pre-
acquisition TMT turnover is measured as the proportion of target officers 
departing during the year prior to the acquisition announcement (Franks and 
Mayer, 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Kaplan, 1994). Pre-deal TMT 
turnover is the number of directors resigned between year -1 and 0 divided the 
number of directors on the board at year -1. 
Adjusted TMT Turnover:  I also measure the TMT turnover adjusted for 
officer turnovers in the non-M&A period (adj. TMT turnover) as the post-
acquisition TMT turnover during the (0, +1 year) minus the pre-acquisition five-
year average TMT turnover during (-5, -1).  
Cash payment and relative size of the deal: As a robustness check of 
analysis in Table 3-7 Panel B, I controll for cash payment and relative size of 
the acquisition. Similarly, the un-tabulated regression results provide 
consistent results that the TMT turnover and the complete TMT turnover have 
no significant impact on the post-acquisition peer-adjusted ROA of target firms. 
These results are consistent with the results in Table 3-7 Panels B to E and 
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fail to support Hypothesis 3-3 that replacement of target TMT is positively 
related to post-acquisition performance improvement in targets.  
The un-tabulated regression result also shows that cash payment has a 
significant positive impact on the peer-adjusted target ROA over a period to 
year +1 post-acquisition (significant at the 5% level), which is consistent with 
the expectation that cash deals generate higher returns than stock deals 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Ghosh, 2001; Linn and Switzer, 2001). The un-
tabulated regression result also shows that the relative size has a positive 
impact on the peer-adjusted target ROA over a two-year period to year +2 
post-acquisition (significant at the 5% level), which is consistent with the 
finding in Maksimovic et al. (2011) that acquisitions with larger relative size 
provide significantly higher announcement returns to the target. 
Subsample of financial targets: The un-tabulate regression in a subsample 
of financial firms provide consistent results with Table 3-7 Panels B to E. In 
financial firms, the TMT turnover does not have a significant impact on the 
post-acquisition unadjusted ROA of target firms. The un-tabulate regression of 
financial targets also shows that the TMT turnover and the complete TMT 
turnover have no significant impact on the peer-adjusted ROA of target firms 
post-acquisition. These results fail to support Hypothesis 3-3 that the 
replacement of TMT has a negative impact on the post-acquisition 




Chapter 4. Identifying leaders among IPO firms: a content 
analysis of analyst coverage reports 
4.1 Introduction 
In a coverage report, financial analysts provide quantitative outputs, such as 
stock recommendations, earnings forecasts and target prices, as well as text 
content. Francis and Soffer (1997) and Tsao (2002) argue that the textual 
content merely provides justifications for the quantitative outputs issued 
contemporaneously. In contrast, Twedt and Rees (2012) classify report 
sentences into those with positive and negative tone and find that after 
controlling for earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the tone of 
analyst reports has a significant positive impact on price reactions. Huang et 
al. (2014) also find that the positive or negative tone of text provides greater 
predictive power economically on earnings growth in the subsequent five years 
than do quantitative summary measures. These results suggest that text 
content may reflect predictive information of firm future performance.  
In this chapter, I investigate the informativeness of textual information in 
analyst reports. The main aims of Chapter 4 are firstly to examine whether 
analysts, at the time of initial coverage release, can accurately identify leader 
IPO firms with superior post-IPO operating performance and secondly whether 
the Global Settlement (GS) and underwriter affiliation of analysts affect the 
accuracy of their leadership identification.  
While the prior literature generally examines the informativeness of analysts’ 
quantitative outputs and the sentiment of text, I extend the literature by 
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focusing on firms’ leadership position identified by analysts. Using a content 
analysis approach, I extract sentences including the keyword “lead” from initial 
coverage reports (ICRs) and pick out sentences where the IPO firm is identified 
as either an “industry leader” or “partial leader”. My study empirically examines 
the post-IPO performance of firms identified as “leaders”. If financial analysts 
have superior information about the industry or accurately interpret a firm’s 
competitive position, I would expect to observe that leader firms provide 
superior performance to non-leaders in the same industry.  
Prior empirical studies generally suggest that the conflicts of interest arising 
from a lead-underwriter (LUW) affiliation of analysts affect the informativeness 
of analysts’ research outputs. LUW analysts have been found to be more 
optimistic in their recommendations than non-LUW analysts (Michaely and 
Womack, 1999; Dechow et al., 2000; Lin et al., 2005; Barber et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, Michaely and Womack (1999) find that firms recommended by 
LUWs generate lower long-run stock returns than those recommended by non-
LUWs. James and Karceski (2006) also find that LUWs tend to provide 
“booster shots” (stronger coverage) for underwriting firms that perform poorly 
after the IPOs. Therefore, I expect that a lead-underwriter affiliation could drive 
analysts to issue more optimistic leadership identification, and that LUW 
analysts provide less accurate leadership identification than non-LUWs. 
On the other hand, some studies find that LUWs are not necessarily more 
optimistic or less accurate in their forecasts than non-LUWs, Jacob et al. (2008) 
suggest that LUWs can provide more accurate earnings forecasts than non-




When providing recommendations and earnings forecasts, LUWs need to 
consider the trade-off between investment and underwriting business. James 
and Karceski (2006) suggests that LUWs are likely to provide an honest stock 
valuation to maintain long-term relations with their investing clients, especially 
large institutional clients. Furthermore, both LUWs and non-LUWs have 
economic incentives to issue favourable recommendations in an attempt to 
attract future investment banking revenues (Bradley et al., 2008).  
Furthermore, the conflicts of interest arising from a lead-underwriter (LUW) 
affiliation of analysts are likely to have been affected by regulatory reforms, 
such as the Global Analyst Research Settlement (GS) in 2003. The GS 
regulates the quantitative outputs of analysts. For example, analysts are 
required to disclose the proportion of favourable recommendations to the 
public (Kandan et al., 2009). While the GS require financial analysts, especially 
affiliated analysts, to disclose conflicts of interest and limit relations between 
research and investment banking departments, these regulations do not 
regulate the text of analyst reports (Kadan et al., 2009; Corwin et al., 2017). It 
is not clear, therefore, that the GS should have had an impact on the text in 
analyst reports. This is an open empirical question that is addressed in this 
chapter. I hypothesize that the GS has not affected the leadership identification 
reported in the text of analysts’ reports. 
I also examine the impact of analyst affiliation on the optimism and accuracy 
of leadership identification sentences of IPO firms in ICRs. Irvine (2003) 
suggests that ICRs reflect valuable information, as they represent the 
commitment of resources by financial analysts. Early studies also show that 
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significant positive abnormal stock returns are associated with the initiation of 
coverage (Peterson, 1987; Kim et al., 1997; Branson et al., 1998). An ICR may 
contain more information than subsequent coverage reports. McNichols and 
O’Brien (1997) indicate that ICRs are more accurate than subsequent 
coverage in terms of the absolute value of the price-deflated forecast error. 
Similarly, Irvine (2003) finds that ICR recommendations on average generate 
0.98% higher abnormal price returns than subsequent recommendations. 
Using a content analysis approach, I explore ICRs to test whether a firm is 
identified as a leader (existence), the number of leadership sentences 
(frequency) per report and the number of leadership sentences per page of 
report (intensity). 
If the text content in ICRs have valuable information on firms’ competitive 
position, leadership identification sentences should be associated with leader 
firms’ future superior performance. However, although some regression 
coefficients of the industry or partial leader identifications are significant, I find 
that there is no consistent pattern in the impact of leadership identification on 
peer-adjusted firm performance within three years post-IPO. The leadership 
identification may not capture superior peer-adjusted performance but rather 
reflect the financial characteristics of the firms. Un-tabulated regression results 
suggest that leader firms generate significantly higher un-adjusted (not 
adjusted for peer firms’ performance) profit margin and net sales than non-
leader firms and that leadership identifications are significantly positively 
correlated to the post-IPO un-adjusted performance. However, matching the 




non-leader firms. How analysts identify leader firms are black boxes. If 
analysts’ leadership identification captures the size effect, after controlling for 
the performance of peer firms with similar pre-listing size and performance, the 
peer-adjusted operating performance of leaders may not necessarily be 
superior to that of non-leaders.  
Contrary to the expectation that LUWs are optimistic and biased, I find that 
LUWs are not more likely to identify their IPO clients as leaders than non-
LUWs. Although LUWs appear to state more leadership sentences than non-
LUWs, LUWs issue longer reports. Analyst affiliation does not affect the 
number of leadership sentences per page of ICR. Furthermore, neither leader 
firms identified by LUWs or non-LUWs generate superior peer-adjusted 
operating performance to non-leader firms. Therefore, it is not clear whether 
LUWs or non-LUWs are more accurate.  One possible explanation is that both 
LUWs and non-LUWs need to weigh the costs and benefits between providing 
honest leadership identification to that of maintaining long-term relations with 
their investing clients and providing more optimistic leadership identification to 
attract potential underwriting business. 
My results suggest that the GS reduced the optimism of leadership 
identification by financial analysts, especially in partial leader firms. After the 
GS, analysts tend to be less likely to identify a firm as a partial leader, and 
reduce the number of partial leadership sentences per report and per page of 
report. The GS appears to affect analysts’ optimism in their leadership 
identifications, as well as in quantitative outputs. Kandan et al. (2009) observe 
that analysts are less likely to provide positive recommendations after the GS. 
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Corwin et al. (2017) find that the GS led to a substantial reduction in the 
difference between forecast and actual earnings for sanctioned banks. 
Although the text content in analyst reports is not subject to regulatory 
requirements, I find that analysts tend to be more conservative in the 
leadership identification of IPO firms after the GS.  
My study extends the prior literature in three ways. First, I investigate the 
informativeness of analysts’ text. According to Institutional Investor magazine’s 
annual survey of nearly 3,500 institutional investors since 1998, analysts’ 
report content is consistently ranked as far more important than stock 
recommendations and earnings forecasts (Huang et al., 2014). However, 
much less attention has been paid to the information released in analysts’ text 
content (Ramnath et al., 2008; Bradshaw, 2011; Huang et al., 2014). 
Prior studies on the role of analysts’ information generally focus on the 
informativeness of analysts’ quantitative outputs such as recommendations, 
target prices and earnings forecasts. Evidence on analysts’ research generally 
shows that quantitative outputs are informative. For example, Michaely and 
Womack (1999) show that investors on average react positively to a “buy” 
recommendation and negatively to a “sell” recommendation. Brav and Lehavy 
(2003) find that investors also show large and significant stock price reactions 
to target prices and earning forecast announcements. However, these prior 
studies fail to consider the informativeness of analyst report text, which may 
help develop a more comprehensive understanding of the role of analysts’ 




Text content could include non-financial information which is not yet 
recognised by the financial reporting system (Stocken and Verrecchia, 2004; 
Huang et al., 2014). Some sentiment studies suggest that the positive or 
negative tone of analysts’ report text could provide incremental information 
beyond quantitative outputs (Hirst et al., 1995; Asquith et al., 2005; Twedt and 
Rees, 2012; Huang et al., 2014). Prior literature suggests that non-financial 
measures, such as customer satisfaction, brand recognition and corporate 
social responsibility, determine firm value (Barth et al., 1998; Ittner and Larcker, 
1998; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2014). Analyst report text may reflect 
non-financial information undisclosed by managers due to proprietary cost 
(Verrecchia, 1983). These value determinants can be discussed in the text 
content of analyst reports. 
Second, text content in an ICR could reflect analysts’ understanding of IPO 
firms and industries. Huang et al. (2014) argue that non-financial information 
on topics such as an industry’s competitive landscape is challenging for 
investors to process. In this case, this text, which is a product of analysts’ 
superior industry knowledge and analytical skills, offers valuable information 
to investors. Michaely and Womack (1999) discuss that most analysts 
specialise in an industry. These analysts interpret information and value a 
firm’s position relative to its competitors (Michaely and Womack, 1999). 
Industry-specific analysts interpret financial performance and deliver their 
understanding and private information on firms to their customers. 
Furthermore, an investor could use analysts’ research ideas expressed in text 
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content to form his or her own investment decision, instead of simply following 
a stock recommendation (Huang et al., 2014). 
Third, my study extends the research on qualitative analyst outputs with a 
focus on firms’ leadership positions, a “tone” representing analysts’ view of the 
competitive advantages in a firm. A leadership position in an industry likely 
gives a firm the competitive advantage of scanning opportunities, building on 
strengths, and committing resources to serve consumers effectively (Golder 
and Tellis, 1993). Stock recommendations are generally short-lived, but the 
leadership identification may provide an idea of the firms’ long-term 
competitive advantage and can be expected to help predict long-run operating 
performance.  
My leadership identification is different from the “first-mover” identification in 
prior literature. Previous studies generally identify leaders as the “first or early 
mover in the market” based on the order of market entry (Tufano, 1989; 
Szymanski et al., 1995; Murthi et al., 1996; Kalyanaram and Wittink, 1994), the 
proportion of market share (Tufano, 1989; Kalyanaram and Wittink, 1994; 
Szymanski et al., 1995; Murthi et al., 1996), and self-reported pioneers in the 
PIMS and ASSESSOR databases (Robinson, 1988; Lambkin, 1988; Miller et 
al., 1989). Golder and Tellis (1993) suggest that these databases classify firms 
which entered the market first as leaders. 
Eisenmann (2006) suggests that these previous studies of first-movers 
typically focus on the impact of entry order on market share, rather than 




positions can only provide a firm with opportunities to gain positional 
advantages (Kerin et al., 1992). The actual competitive advantages of a firm, 
as argued by Kerin et al. (1992), depend more on product-market 
contingencies and the actions of all entrants rather than market entry order. In 
addition, Kerin et al. (1992) and Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) argue that 
a later entrant may benefit from lower imitation costs, free-rider effects, scope 
economies, and learning from the pioneer's mistakes. Similarly, firms enjoying 
“leadership advantage” are not necessarily the “first-mover” but may have 
resources and capabilities to generate competitive advantages. If financial 
analysts accurately interpret the competitive advantages, the leadership 
position identified in the coverage reports could provide valuable information 
to investors. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the 
research framework and develops hypotheses. Section 4.3 discusses the 
sample selection and data collection process and presents the models of 
leadership identification and firm performance. Section 4.4 examines the 
accuracy of leadership identification by investigating operating performance of 
leader and non-leader firms identified by analysts, and examines factors affect 
the leadership identification. Section 4.5 provides the robustness tests results. 
Section 4.6 concludes the paper. 
4.2 Research Framework and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 Leadership position and firm performance 
Unlike prior literature on the quantitative outputs in analyst reports, the text 
content in coverage reports is unstructured data, which varies from report to 
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report. The factors discussed around “leadership position” sentences can be 
anything from general economic conditions, such as industry prospects, to 
firm-specific competitive advantages and risks, such as market share, 
technology, and bargaining power with consumers and suppliers. The content 
analysis approach transfers these unstructured data into numerical data.30 
To investigate analysts’ view of the leadership position in IPO firms, I extract 
all sentences mentioning the keyword “lead” from initial coverage reports. The 
cognate words including “lead”, “leads”, “leader”, “leaders”, “leading” and 
“leadership”, are identified with the “lead” keyword. To investigate the tone of 
analysts’ leadership identification, I quantify each leadership position with 
leader sentences mentioned by analysts in ICRs. I measure the existence of 
two types of leaders. The existence of leadership position is presented as a 
dummy variable, which equals one if the IPO firm is identified as a leader at 
least once in an ICR, and zero otherwise.  
Following “first-mover” and “pioneer” studies, I classify analysts’ leadership 
identification into two types:31  
Type 1 leader describes IPO firms that are explicitly identified as “a 
market leader” or “an industry leader”, and 
                                                          
30 See Appendix 4-1 for examples of how financial analysts provide evidence to support their 
leadership identification.  
31 I also identify statements in ICRs referring to firms having the potential to become leaders and 
firms aiming to become leaders. I classify these as Type 3 (leader-to-be) and Type 4 (leaders aim to 





Type 2 leader describes IPO firms that hold a “partial leading 
position” in a particular product or asset. 
Type 1 and Type 2 leaders are firms which are perceived by analysts to hold 
a competitive advantage at the time of the IPOs. Previous studies generally 
compare first-movers or pioneers to followers in the same product category 
(Buzzell and Gale 1987; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Similarly, Type 1 
leaders are expected to hold competitive advantages over other firms in the 
same industry or market.  
Some studies suggest that a first-mover position could provide some elements 
of competitive advantage such as cost-efficient innovations or leading products 
(Tufano, 1989; Golder and Tellis, 1993). Type 2 leaders are expected to 
capture some competitive advantages, because they do one specific thing 
really well or in an innovative way. For example, Type 2 leaders are identified 
by analysts to have cost-efficiency, leading technology, or a leading product. 
Although there is no prior study examining the difference between market 
leaders and “partial leaders”, I expect market leaders to have stronger 
competitive advantages and influences in a market than partial leaders.  
My leadership position is different from the first-mover or pioneer position 
discussed in prior literature. Prior studies generally suggest that innovative 
pioneers, self-reported first-movers and future S&P 500 ranking firms capture 
some kind of benefits arising from the competitive position of firms (Urban et 
al., 1986; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Tufano, 1989; Colak and Gunay, 
2011). Tufano (1989) investigates the compensation of 58 financial innovators 
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during 1974-1986 and finds that these innovative investment banks capture a 
larger share of underwritings business compared to followers with imitative 
products. These innovative pioneers do not charge higher “monopoly” prices 
before imitative products appear, and even charge lower price than imitative 
rivals. Tufano (1989) conjectures that innovators enjoy lower costs of trading, 
underwriting, and marketing, although there is no direct examination of cost 
data. The innovative pioneer appears to capture market share, but it is not 
clear whether the pioneer can generate superior performance to that of 
followers.  
Early studies investigating the self-reported pioneers in PIMS (Profit Impact of 
Market Strategy) and Assessor databases generally suggest that pioneering 
manufacturing firms enjoy first-mover advantages, such as long survival time 
and large market share (Robinson and Fornell, 1985; Urban et al., 1986; 
Lambkin, 1988; Robinson, 1988; Miller et al., 1989; Robinson et al., 1992). 
However, Golder and Tellis (1993) state that the self-reported pioneer 
positions could be exaggerated due to respondents’ self-perception bias, as 
52% of firms in the PIMS database classify themselves as pioneers, including 
multiple competitors in the same product category (Buzzell and Gale 1987; 
Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Golder and Tellis (1993) suggest that 
these databases identify not competitive leaders but early movers, as the 
pioneers are classified based on the year a firm entered the market. 
First-movers may not hold a competitive position. Colak and Gunay (2011) find 
that IPOs firms that are later included in the S&P 500 index are not the first to 




delay their IPO processes and issue in the mid-stages of an expanding IPO 
cycle, which suggests that “first movers” may not necessarily be the best 
performing firms and first movers and leaders are not necessary the same 
thing (Colak and Cunay, 2011). Furthermore, it is hard for investors to predict 
future S&P 500 IPOs. Thus, the leadership identification in Colak and Gunay 
(2011) does not help investors to make any profit-making strategy before firms 
get into the S&P 500 index.  
Evidence from earlier studies suggests that first movers and pioneers are not 
necessarily the ones to capture the competitive advantages of a leader. If an 
early follower learns from the mistakes of the first-mover and dominates the 
market, it would be inappropriate to classify the first-mover as “an industry 
leader” (Golder and Tellis, 1993). My leadership identification reflects the 
analysts’ view of competitive advantages in the IPO firm, which is arguably 
more likely to capture leadership advantages than would a first-mover 
identification.  
If financial analysts accurately interpret competitive advantages and correctly 
identify the leadership position of an IPO firm, these “leader” firms should 
experience superior operating performance in my event window of three years. 
This leads to the first two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 4-1a: IPO firms identified as Type 1 leaders 




Hypothesis 4-1b: IPO firms identified as Type 2 leaders 
generate better operating performance post-listing than non-
leader firms. 
4.2.2 Conflicts of interest and regulatory reforms 
The Dotcom crash in 2000 raised the concern that analysts’ biased research 
outputs could mislead investors (Gao et al., 2013). Changes in the regulatory 
environment such as the Global Analyst Research Settlement (GS) aimed to 
address analysts’ conflicts of interest (Kadan et al., 2009). The purpose of the 
GS was to require strict disclosure of knowable conflicts of interest by 
securities analysts, to substantially limit relations between research and 
investment banking departments, and to regulate analysts to provide more 
meaningful research (Kadan et al., 2009).  
However, the regulations may have started to have an impact earlier than the 
GS in 2003. Changes in the regulatory environment began with the Regulation 
on Fair Disclosure, implemented in October 2000; NASD rule 2711 and NYSE 
rule 472, enacted in May 2002; the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 
enacted on July 30, 2002; and the Settlement and Regulation Analysts 
Certification (RAC) and Global Analyst Research Settlement (GS), both 
implemented in 2003 to address analyst conflicts of interest (Kadan et al., 
2009). For example, Barber et al. (2007) find that after the May 2002 
implementation of NASD Rule 2711, which requires the disclosure by rating 
agencies the distributions of their ratings to the public, the proportion of buy 




Before regulatory reforms, prior empirical studies generally suggested that due 
to conflicts of interest, LUWs appear to provide more optimistic and less 
accurate forecasts than non-LUWs (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Dechow et 
al., 2000; Lin et al., 2005; Barber et al., 2007). Michaely and Womack (1999) 
investigate 360 recommendations of 200 IPOs issued in 1990 and 1991 and 
find that LUW ratings are more optimistic than non-LUW ratings. Michaely and 
Womack (1999) find that stocks recommended by LUWs perform worse than 
stocks recommended by non-LUWs prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to 
the recommendation date. James and Karceski (2006) also find that IPO firms 
with a strong coverage from LUWs perform poorly post-IPO.  
Dechow et al. (2000) investigate common equity offerings issued during 1981-
1990 and find that firms with a higher level of earnings growth forecast by 
LUWs suffer lower stock returns and greater forecast errors, especially 
compared to firms covered by non-LUWs. Dechow et al. (2000) find that 
underwriting fees are positively correlated to the level of earnings growth 
forecasts of LUWs. Therefore, LUWs are likely to provide overly optimistic 
forecasts compared to non-LUWs.   
Furthermore, Barber et al. (2007) find that independent analysts’ buy portfolios 
significantly outperform LUWs’ buy portfolios and their hold/sell portfolios 
significantly underperform those of LUWs during the February 1996-June 2003 
period, especially in the early 2000s bear market. Barber et al. (2007) argue 
that LUWs’ underperformance and outperformance compared to independent 
analysts could both partially be due to LUWs’ reluctance to downgrade stocks 
issued during the early 2000s bear market. Lin et al. (2005) use duration 
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models of the time between an equity issue and the first downgrade and 
provide downgrading evidence consistent with Barber et al. (2007). Therefore, 
LUWs’ buy (hold/sell) recommendations were likely to be less (more) 
informative than those of independent analysts in the early 2000s bear market. 
This evidence suggests that before the GS, LUWs perhaps suffered conflicts 
of interest between their fiduciary responsibility to investing clients and their 
sales incentive to underwriting clients. 
Studies of regulatory reforms suggest that the implications of regulations tend 
to affect the optimism/pessimism tone of analysts and improve the accuracy of 
analysts’ forecasts (Barniv et al., 2009; Kadan et al., 2009; Corwin et al., 2017). 
Barniv et al. (2009) investigate analysts’ behaviour during 1993-2005, and find 
that after the regulatory reforms, analysts’ earnings forecasts are more 
positively correlated to firms’ future stock returns. The correlations between 
analysts’ stock recommendations and analysts’ earnings-based valuation 
change from negative in the pre-regulation period to zero or even positive after 
the regulatory reforms (Barniv et al., 2009).  
Furthermore, Kadan et al. (2009) investigate analysts’ stock recommendations 
in the pre-regulation (November 2000-August 2002) and post-regulation 
periods (September 2002-December 2004) and find that both LUWs and non-
LUW analysts are less likely to issue favourable recommendations in the post-
GS period than pre-GS. Kadan et al. (2009) find that LUWs were 22% more 
likely to issue favourable recommendations compared to non-LUWs before the 
GS, but as likely to provide favourable recommendations as non-LUWs after 




Corwin et al. (2017) further explore the investment banks-firm affiliation 
relationship with M&As and issues of equity and debt by listed firms during 
1996-2009. They investigate a large sample of 216,242 recommendation 
observations involving 4,628 analysts and 5,111 stocks. Corwin et al. (2017) 
find that the GS led to a substantial reduction in analyst affiliation bias32 for 
sanctioned banks, but did not affect non-sanctioned banks. Corwin et al. (2017) 
find that analysts at both types of banks exhibit significant affiliation bias in the 
pre-GS period, which is consistent with early empirical studies that LUWs are 
more optimistic and less accurate in the forecasts than non-LUWs in the pre-
GS period (e.g., Michaely and Womack, 1999).  
On the other hand, regardless of the impact of regulatory reforms, some 
studies suggest that LUWs are neither necessarily more optimistic nor less 
accurate in their forecasts than non-LUWs (Aggarwal et al., 2002; Bradley et 
al., 2004; Reuter, 2006; James and Karceski, 2006; Jacob et al., 2008; Bradley 
et al., 2008). Jacob et al. (2008) investigate recommendations during 1995-
2003 and suggest that LUWs provide more accurate earnings forecasts 
compared to non-LUWs, as LUWs may get inside information from the due-
diligence process. Furthermore, to maintain long-term relations with their 
investing clients, especially large institutional clients, LUWs are likely to make 
an effort to provide an honest appraisal of the stock’s value (James and 
Karceski, 2006).  
                                                          
32 Affiliation bias is measured as the relative forecast accuracy of the analyst which is the absolute value 
of the difference between the analyst’s most recent forecast of fiscal-year earnings and actual earnings, 
scaled by stock price the year before (Corwin et al., 2017). 
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In addition, both LUWs and non-LUWs have economic incentives to issue 
favourable recommendations in an attempt to attract future investment banking 
revenues (Bradley et al., 2008). Bradley et al. (2004) compare stock 
recommendations issued by LUW analysts and non-LUW analysts from 
January 2001 to mid-July 2002, and find that although LUW recommendations 
are modestly more favourable in magnitude, they are neither statistically nor 
economically different from non-LUW recommendations. Groysberg et al. 
(2011) find that analysts are not compensated for the accuracy of forecasts 
but are compensated for actions that increase brokerage and investment-
banking revenues. Therefore, both LUW and non-LUW analysts may be likely 
to issue more favourable recommendations to attract potential underwriting 
business and earn higher personal compensation. Analysts may also be more 
likely to align their forecasts with that of management to attract potential 
investment-banking business (Das et al., 1998; Lim, 2001; Libby et al., 2008; 
Mayew, 2008). 
These discussions above suggest that the impact of investment banking 
affiliation on the tone and accuracy of analysts’ research outputs is 
inconclusive. I investigate whether the affiliation position affect the accuracy of 
leadership identification and analysts’ optimism in leadership identification with 
the following hypotheses:33 
                                                          
33 I also conduct a robustness test to examine whether LUWs or non-LUWs provide more accurate 
leadership identification when they have contradictory opinions of an IPO firm’s leadership position. 




Hypothesis 4-2a: Firms identified as leaders are less likely to 
outperform if the leadership advantage is identified by LUWs. 
Hypothesis 4-2b: Firms identified as leaders are more likely to 
outperform if the leadership advantage is identified by non-
LUWs. 
Hypothesis 4-3a: LUWs are more likely to identify an IPO firm 
as a leader than non-LUWs are.34 
As discussed in Section 4.1, although prior studies of the regulatory changes 
generally suggest that the GS reduced optimistic recommendations and 
forecasts in analyst reports, whether the GS affected the qualitative text 
content has not, to the best of my awareness, been investigated in prior studies. 
Bradley et al. (2008) conjecture that analysts’ text content is not subject to the 
same regulatory restrictions that limit the information content of earnings 
forecasts and stock recommendations. Alternatively, financial analysts may 
still be cautious in their tone after the GS, and less optimistic in the leadership 
identification. I extend the literature by controlling for the impact of the GS on 
the optimism of analysts.  
Hypothesis 4-4a: The Global Settlement does not affect 
analysts’ likelihood of identifying a firm as a leader.35 
                                                          
34 I also investigate whether LUWs are more frequently or intensely to identify an IPO firm as a leader 
than non-LUWs are. Hypotheses 4-3b and 4-3c are discussed in Section 4.5 for. 
35 I also investigate whether the Global Settlement affect analysts’ frequency and intensity of 
leadership identification. Hypotheses 4-4b and 4-4c is discussed in Section 4.5. 
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4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
I obtain my IPO sample from the Thomson SDC New Issue database. 
Following Banerjee et al. (2016), I exclude closed-end funds, REITs, 
acquisition companies, depository institutions (banks, savings and loans), 
limited partnerships, American depositary receipts (ADR), unit offers 
(packages of shares and warrants), best effort issues and auctions. 
Furthermore, I require that IPO firms operating performance data is available 
from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) and that trading 
starts no later than ten days after the IPO date (Banerjee et al., 2016). These 
exclusions result in an initial sample of 1,850 completed IPOs issued between 
1 January 1999 and 31 December 2012. The sample period covers both 
economic boom and bust periods. 
I eliminate IPOs without ICRs within six-months after the IPOs, following 
Breton and Taffler (2001) and Das et al. (2006). The six-months cutoff period 
is chosen for two reasons. First, six-months is longer than the quiet period and 
thus covers ICRs issued by LUWs after the quiet period.36 Second, Barber et 
al. (1999) show that the average time between sequential recommendations 
for a firm is around 200 days. Therefore, a cutoff period of six-months is likely 
to capture most ICRs.  
ICRs are manually collected from Investext (via Thomson One). I manually 
search for “initiating coverage” reports released within six months of the IPO. 
                                                          
36 The SEC requires a quiet period in which insiders and affiliated underwriters are restricted from 




When an IPO firm has duplicate ICRs issued by the same analyst on the same 
date, I compare the content and keep the longer ICR. I exclude 299 IPO firms 
that have no initial coverage reports (ICRs) in Investext and 37 IPO firms that 
do not have ICRs within six months of the IPO.37 The remaining 1,514 IPOs 
have 4,068 ICRs in Investext.  
Furthermore, as ICRs are analysed by statistical software R, I exclude 47 ICRs 
that cannot be read by R.38 My final sample of IPOs consists of 1,501 IPOs 
going-public during 1999-2012 that have 4,021 ICRs issued by 180 analysts 
within six months of IPOs. 
As stated in Section 4.2.1, I extract all sentences including the keyword “lead” 
from initial coverage reports. The cognate words, including “lead”, “leads”, 
“leader”, “leaders”, “leading” and “leadership” are identified with the “lead” 
keyword. I manually check 33,384 sentences with the keyword “lead” in the 
final sample of 4,021 ICRs and exclude 23,558 sentences mentioning the 
phrases “lead to” (6,740), leading person (2,946), lead/main products or assets 
or departments in the IPO firm (626), “lead” metal (703), “leads/referral” (205), 
“lead times” (479), IPO firms used to be a leader (25), un-lead (51), “misleading” 
(512), leadership advantage in the IPO competitors (11,271), “leader to be” 
(638) and “leader aim to be (628)”.39 The remaining 8,560 sentences mention 
                                                          
37 As stated in Asquith et al. (2006), some LUWs could not be included in my study because their analyst 
reports are not provided to Investext (e.g., Goldman Sachs). In my initial sample of 1850 IPOs, there 
are 299 IPOs where no analyst reports are provided to Investext. I realise the potential bias arising from 
the uncovered investment banks, and discuss this further in Section 4.4.1. In the remaining 1,551 IPOs 
having initial coverage reports in Investext, initial coverage reports of 37 IPOs were issued more than 
six months after the IPO and are excluded from the analysis.  
38 For example, the report is in a picture format instead of text format. Or, the text in an ICR is encrypted 
and cannot be copied and pasted. 
39 Type 3 (leader-to-be) and Type 4 (leaders aim to be) leaders are discussed in Appendix 4-2. 
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the IPO firm’s “leadership advantage” and the sentences are classified into two 
types of “leader” IPOs.40 There are 859 sentences mentioning Type 1 leaders 
and 7,701 mentioning Type 2 leaders.  
I use the software R to generate information from the ICRs, which includes 
IPO firm names, financial analyst firm names, dates of ICR release, the 
number of pages in an ICR, the number of sentences in an ICR and stock 
recommendations.  
Following Banerjee et al. (2016), I collect IPO data from Thomson SDC, firms’ 
financial data from Compustat (in millions of U.S. dollars), price data from the 
CRSP, data on firm foundation years from the Field-Ritter dataset, and 
underwriter reputation rankings from Jay Ritter's webpage. The variable 
measurements and motivations for these variables are discussed further in 
Section 4.3.2 below.  
4.3.2 Methodology 
I use an OLS regression model to test whether firms identified as Type 1 or 
Type 2 leaders generate superior on-going operating performance post-IPO 
and whether LUWs or non-LUWs provide more accurate leadership 
identification. Model 1 use the firm-level data of leadership identification, which 
means that each IPO firm is observed once in my sample. An un-tabulated 
robustness test uses the report-level data of leadership identification and 
controls for the clustering of IPO firms, and regression results hold. The 
                                                          
40 I manually check the renamed IPO firms and make sure both the previous name and the current name 




following regression Model 1 examines the accuracy of analysts’ leadership 
identification: 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 1:  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑡+𝑝)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛                                            
+ 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛                                                                               
+ 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡−1                                      
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠                                         
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +   
Model 1 investigates hypotheses 4-1 and 4-2. I control for firm characteristics, 
market conditions, IPO characteristic and ICR characteristics on the 
unadjusted and peer-adjusted performance of IPO firms, following previous 
literature.  
Model 2 examines whether the affiliation position and the GS affect analysts’ 
leadership identification, which tests hypotheses 4-3 and 4-4. I use logit 
regression in Model 2 as the leadership existence is a 0-1 dummy variable. As 
an IPO firm can be observed several times in the report-level leadership 
identification, the Model 2 regressions control for the clustering of IPO firms.  
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 2: 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐺𝑆 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛                                     
+ 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝐺𝑆 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦                                                           
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡−1                                       
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠                                        
+ 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡  + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝑅 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +   
198 
 
Following Jain and Kini (1994) and Banerjee et al. (2016), I focus on the peer-
adjusted profit margin (EBITDA/total assets) of IPO firms, as a leader firm 
should take advantage of its leadership position to earn positive profits 
(Lieberman et al., 1988; Barber et al., 2001).41 EBITDA is earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Peer firms are listed for at least 
three years (36 months) matched in the same industry (3-digit SIC code), 
similar firm size (sales revenue at t-1 between 50% and 200% of IPO firm size), 
and the closest performance (EBITDA at t-1), and the peer firm must have a 
stock price of at least $5 during the fiscal year that precedes the IPO.42 For the 
full sample of 1,501 IPOs, I find peer firms for 1,010 IPOs. IPO firms without a 
peer are generally small firms. 
For firms with negative earnings the year prior to going public, an alternative 
performance measure is the peer-adjusted net sales. Jain and Kini (1994) 
observe that IPO firms with declining operating profits (compared to their pre-
listing profits) experience high growth in sales and capital expenditures post-
listing. Ritter and Welch (2002) also observe the changing composition of IPO 
issuers and note a growing number of firms with negative earnings the year 
prior to going public, especially in the technology industries. Therefore, for 
example, a technology leader firm may not be expected to earn positive 
earnings for years after going public, but could raise money from NASDAQ 
and use the capital to expand operations and product market share. 
                                                          
41 Peer-adjusted growth of profit margin and net sales have also been analysed as alternative measures 
of firm performance. The results are discussed in Appendix 4-4. 
42 The peer firm of a profitable IPO firm must be positive. I relax the restriction of positive EBITDA 




I control for the impact of ICR characteristics, the firm’s pre-IPO financial and 
non-financial characteristics, and economic conditions on analysts’ tone of 
leadership identification and IPO firms’ performance. ICR characteristics 
include recommendation, analyst affiliation and the regulatory changes.43 Firm 
pre-IPO financial characteristics include firm size and leverage. Firm non-
financial characteristics include firm age at the time of IPO, the existence of 
venture capital or private equity investment in the IPO firm at the time of IPO, 
and the reputation of underwriters. The economic conditions control for the 
market timing of IPOs and industry effect of firm performance. The expected 
impact of each factor on the leadership identification and operating 
performance is discussed below: 
Recommendation has three ratings in my sample of ICRs: +1 stands for a 
“buy” recommendation, 0 stands for a “hold” recommendation and -1 stands 
for a “sell” recommendation.44 I expect that financial analysts are more likely 
to identify leaders in a “buy” firm than in a “sell” firm and a positive correlation 
between stock recommendation and IPO firms’ operating performance. 
Affiliation captures the lead-underwriting relation between analysts and IPO 
firms. I classify an ICR as LUW affiliated if it is issued by an investment bank 
involved as one of the top four leading underwriters in an IPO; otherwise, an 
ICR is classified as a non-LUW ICR. For an IPO firm, the affiliation dummy 
equals one if the IPO firm was covered by at least one lead underwriter from 
                                                          
43 I also control for investment bank fixed effect of investment banks in the regressions, as discussed 
in Section 4.5. 
44 Kadan et al. (2009) find that following the GS, most leading investment banks moved from the 
traditional five-tier rating system to a three-tier rating system. I use a three-tier rating system as my 
sample covers initial coverage reports issued before and after the GS.  
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Investext within six months after the IPO, and zero otherwise. As discussed in 
Section 4.2.2, analyst affiliation could have a positive or negative impact on 
the likelihood and accuracy of leadership identification.  
The GS dummy equals one if an ICR was issued after the Global Settlement 
in 2003, and zero otherwise. Hypothesis 4-4 expects no impact of the GS on 
analysts’ leadership identification. The GS only directly regulated the 
quantitative information of ICRs. Therefore, it is not clear whether GS should 
have had an impact on the leadership identification. The GS should not affect 
firm performance but could affect analysts’ valuation of firm performance via 
leadership identification. For example, if the GS regulates analysts to provide 
more accurate leadership identification, I would observe that leader 
identification has a larger impact on firm performance in the post-GS than pre-
GS period.  
Ln(firm age) and ln(TA) are the natural log of the number of years between 
when the firm was founded and the IPO issue date and the natural log of the 
value of total assets of the IPO firm in the financial reports before the IPO issue, 
respectively. Banerjee et al. (2016) suggest that smaller/younger IPOs are 
more likely to have valuable growth opportunities than larger/older IPO firms, 
as smaller/younger IPOs are more likely to be early-stage firms. Therefore, I 
expect a negative relationship between operating performance changes and 
size/age.  
Leverage is defined as long-term debts divided by total assets. The leverage 




operating performance post-IPO. Renneboog (2000) suggests that high 
leverage is likely to be associated with a higher level of monitoring and more 
frequent interventions by creditors as the risk of financial distress increases. 
These pre-IPO financial characteristics such as firm age, firm size (total assets) 
and leverage could also affect the leadership identification as firms with a solid 
financial position are expected to perform well in the future and these firms are 
more likely to be identified as leaders.  
VC and PE are dummy variables which equals 1 if an IPO firm has a venture 
capital or private equity backing, respectively. Prior literature suggests a 
positive correlation between sponsorship and stock returns (Coakley et al., 
2007; Banerjee et al., 2016). Similarly, I expect a positive correlation between 
VCs and PEs’ sponsorship and operating performance. The intuition is that 
screening activities of reputable sponsors are more likely to lead to improved 
operating performance as a prestigious sponsor may protect their reputation 
by sponsorship IPOs that have relatively better long-run stock performance 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Coakley et al., 2007). For example, Jain and 
Kini (1995) suggest that VC sponsorship has a positive impact on firm’s stock 
market performance. Similarly, I control for the effects of PE backing with the 
dummy variable PE (Banerjee et al., 2016).  
Underwriters’ reputations (UW reputation) is a nine-point scale ranking 
following Loughran and Ritter (2004). An investment bank with a ranking of 
nine is treated as a high-prestige bank; one with a lower ranking is treated as 
a low-prestige bank. When there is more than one lead underwriter involved in 
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an IPO, following Banerjee et al. (2016), I use the highest-ranking of the 
underwriters. UW reputation are expected to be positively correlated to IPO 
firms’ stock performance (Michaely and Shaw, 1994; Carter et al., 1998). 
Measuring the underwriters’ reputation with the size of capital, Michaely and 
Shaw (1994) show that IPOs handled by prestigious underwriters tend to have 
higher excessive stock returns within two years post-listing than IPOs handled 
by smaller underwriters. Similarly, using a four-tier reputation ranking, Carter 
et al. (1998) find that IPOs handled by more prestigious underwriters suffer 
less from underperformance relative to the market over a three-year holding 
period. Therefore, I expect a positive correlation between UW reputation and 
firm operating performance.  
Hot market is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO was issued in rising 
IPO cycles (Banerjee et al., 2016).45 Banerjee et al. (2016) suggest that IPO 
firms issued in a hot or cold market have different qualities, as high-growth 
firms tend to lead the IPO cycle and low-growth firms tend to wait for the 
certainty over economic conditions. In contrast, Helwege and Liang (2004) 
observe that IPOs issued in hot and cold markets have similar post-IPO 
operating performance.46  
                                                          
45 Rising IPO cycles are identified as periods during which the 4-quarter moving average of IPO 
volume has risen for at least three quarters in a row (Banerjee et al., 2016). 
46 I also have two alternative measures of market timing, which are bubble period and early mover 






4.4.1 Descriptive statistics: characteristics of ICRs and IPO firms 
Table 4-1 provides the annual frequency of ICRs written by LUW and non-
LUW analysts. Both IPOs’ and ICRs’ frequencies show a cyclical nature. On 
average, 14% of LUW ICRs identify the industry leadership position in an IPO 
firm, while non-LUW ICRs show a proportion of 13% Type 1 leaders. There is 
a sharp drop in Type 1 and Type 2 leader identifications after the GS 
introduced in 2003. The proportion of Type 1 leader ICRs drops from more 
than 20% in 2001-2002 to 6% in 2003 according to LUW analysts. Similar 
trends are observed in non-LUW ICRs for Type 2 leaders. Unlike the 
conjecture in Stocken and Verrecchia (2004) and Bradley et al. (2008), 
although there are no explicit rules on the text content of analysts’ reports, 
analysts appear to identify firms’ leadership position less often after the GS.  
Type 2 leadership is characterised by a looser definition of competitive 
advantage than Type 1. My proportion of Type 2 leaders (57% in LUW reports 
and 60% in non-LUW reports) is similar to the proportion of self-reported 
pioneers in the PIMS database (52%) (Buzzell and Gale, 1987; Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988). Overall, financial analysts identify Type 1 leaders in 13.4% 
of ICRs and Type 2 leaders in 59.1% of ICRs (un-tabulated).  
[Insert Table 4-1 here] 
Table 4-2 Panel A describes the leadership identification by analysts in ICRs. 
LUWs appear not to be more likely to identify a firm as a Type 1 or 2 leader 
than non-LUWs. LUWs tend to mention Type 1 leaders significantly more 
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frequently than non-LUWs, but LUWs are not significantly more intense in the 
discussion of the leadership they identified than non-LUWs. Although LUWs 
on average use 0.05 more Type 1 leader sentences per ICR than non-LUWs, 
the result is driven by the report length. LUWs appear to have the same 
number of Type 1 leadership sentences per page of ICR (intensity) as non-
LUWs. 
Table 4-2 Panel A shows that ICRs by LUWs are on average 6.5 pages longer 
than those by non-LUWs. The longer reports either reflect a significant amount 
of firm-specific and industry knowledge obtained by LUW analysts from the 
due-diligence and book building processes (Michaely and Womack, 1999), or 
reflect LUW’s effort to reduce conflicts of interest with more text to support or 
justify recommendations (Huang et al., 2014). In my sample, LUWs are slightly 
more likely to make a favourable recommendation than non-LUWs. Overall, 
the descriptive statistics suggest that LUWs are not more optimistic than non-
LUWs in leadership identification.  
 [Insert Table 4-2 here] 
Table 4-2 Panel A also shows that 13% of ICRs on both profitable and 
unprofitable IPO firms are Type 1 leaders and 56% are Type 2 leaders. Table 
4-2 Panel A shows that analysts tend to issue longer reports for profitable firms 
than for unprofitable firms, and that unprofitable firms on average are more 
highly recommended than profitable firms.  
Table 4-2 Panel B shows that the GS significantly reduced analyst optimism, 




non-LUWs. Although the proportion and frequency of Type 1 leaders have not 
changed, both LUWs and non-LUWs use longer reports after the GS, and the 
intensity of Type 1 leadership identification significantly decreases in LUW 
reports. Furthermore, the existence, frequency and intensity of Type 2 
leadership identification are significantly reduced after the GS. The GS 
subgroup results indicate that Type 1 “industry or market leader” is used more 
rigidly by financial analysts than Type 2 leader identification, as a stricter 
regulation environment after the GS does not reduce the proportion and 
frequency of Type 1 leadership identification. 
After the GS, both LUWs and non-LUWs tend to increase their report length 
significantly, which suggests that analysts began to provide more explanation 
and information to investors. Table 4-2 Panel B also shows that the proportion 
of favourable recommendation reduced significantly after the GS, in ICRs by 
both LUWs and non-LUWs. Type 1 leader identification could provide 
incremental value beyond recommendations, especially in the post-GS period 
when analysts significantly reduced their favourable recommendations.  
Table 4-3 presents the post-listing performance, pre-listing firm characteristics 
of IPO firms and firm-level ICR characteristics. The firm-level leadership 
identification is the average of the report-level leadership identification for each 
IPO firm. Table 4-3 shows that both profitable and unprofitable IPO firms tend 
to generate significantly positive peer-adjusted profit margin and net sales, 
which suggests that IPO firms experience higher growth in profit and net sales 
compared to peer firms that are listed for more than three years. As discussed 
in Section 4.3.2, profitable firms and unprofitable firms appear to have different 
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short- to- medium-term performance aims. Unprofitable IPO firms, such as 
technology leaders, may raise money from the stock market and use the 
capital to expand their product market share. Therefore, in the following 
discussions, I focus on profit-related performance measurements in profitable 
IPOs and sales-related performance measurements in unprofitable IPOs. 
[Insert Table 4-3 here] 
Table 4-3 shows that the firm characteristics are different between profitable 
and unprofitable IPO firms. Unprofitable IPO firms are generally younger and 
smaller than profitable IPOs. On average, unprofitable IPO firms are 16.5 
years younger and total assets are $863 million less than profitable IPO firms. 
These results are consistent with the evidence in Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
that an increasing number of young and unprofitable companies went public 
during the internet bubble period. The median differences provide consistent 
results to the mean difference.  
Table 4-3 shows that unprofitable IPO firms have a lower proportion of long-
term debts to total assets compared to profitable IPO firms. The average 
leverage ratio is 13.4% in unprofitable IPO firms, which is significantly lower 
than the 27.4% in profitable IPO firms (significant at the 1% level). However, 
this result is driven by some extreme leverages in IPO firms. The median 
difference in leverage shows that profitable IPO firms have 4.9% lower 
leverage than unprofitable IPO firms, which is consistent with Rajan and 
Zingales’ (1995) finding that small firms generally have higher leverage than 




Table 4-3 also shows that the differences of firm-level leadership identification 
between profitable and unprofitable IPOs are generally consistent with those 
differences of report-level leadership identification in Table 4-2 Panel A. In 
Section 4.4.2, I further use the report-level leadership identification in Model 1, 
to examine the accuracy of leadership identification in profitable and 
unprofitable IPO firms separately.47  
Table 4-4 presents the correlations between each variable. The leadership 
identifications appear to not be significantly correlated to the peer-adjusted 
performance. Table 4-4 shows that the GS is negatively correlated to Type 2 
leadership identification, which is consistent with the result in Table 4-1 that 
analysts are less optimistic to identify Type 2 leadership position. Table 4-4 
shows that LUW coverage is positively correlated to Type 1 leadership 
existence and frequency, which suggests that LUWs are more likely to and 
more frequently to identify IPO firms as Type 1 leaders than non-LUWs. 
Furthermore, Table 4-4 finds that IPO firms with VC sponsorship or a high UW 
ranking are more likely to be identified as leaders. 
[Insert Table 4-4 here] 
Table 4-4 also shows that, on average, smaller/younger IPOs appear to have 
lower profit margins but higher net sales, which is consistent with the finding 
in Banerjee et al. (2016) that smaller/younger IPOs are more likely to be early-
stage firms and have valuable growth opportunities than their larger/older IPO 
                                                          
47 As a robustness check, I also use the report-level leadership identification in Model 1 to examine 
the accuracy of leadership identification, controlling for the cluster of ICRs for each IPO firm. This is 
discussed in Appendix 4-4. 
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counterparts (Banerjee et al., 2016). Underwriter’s ranking and the 
sponsorship of venture capital (VC) are positively correlated with the peer-
adjusted net sales of IPOs (significant at the 1% level), with is consistent with 
the findings in Carter et al. (1998) and Jain and Kini (1995). Carter et al. (1998) 
suggests that IPOs handled by more prestigious underwriters earn higher 
stock returns within three years post-listing than IPOs handled by less 
prestigious underwriters. Jain and Kini (1995) find that VC sponsorship has a 
positive impact on firms’ stock market performance.  
4.4.2 The accuracy of analysts’ leadership identification 
This section provides the regression results of factors driving post-IPO peer-
adjusted performance and investigates whether firms identified as leaders by 
analysts outperform non-leaders. Section 4.4.2.1 discusses the analyses 
related to Hypotheses 4-1a and 4-1b. Section 4.4.2.2 discusses the analyses 
related to Hypotheses 4-2a and 4-2b.  
4.4.2.1 Leadership positions and post-listing performance  
As I discussed in Section 4.3.2, profitable firms and unprofitable firms appear 
to have different short- to- medium-term performance aims, although, 
presumably, firms with rapid sales growth may still hope to deliver high profits 
eventually. I focus on profit-related performance in profitable IPOs and sales-
related performance in unprofitable firms. 
Table 4-5 investigates whether leadership identification by analysts accurately 
predicts IPO firms’ peer-adjusted performance post-listing. Table 4-5 provides 




that each IPO firm is observed once in my regression sample. If Type 1 and 2 
leaders are likely to hold competitive positions at the time initial coverage 
reports are issued, the identified competitive advantages could help to predict 
future superior operating performance. As the correlation coefficients of control 
variables are generally consistent with the finding in Table 4-5 Panel A, I simply 
show the correlation coefficients of Type 1 and 2 leadership identification in 
the following panels. The full tables are available upon request. 
Table 4-5 provides the regression results of peer-adjusted profit margin and 
net sales. Table 4-5 Panel A Columns 1-3 show that in profitable IPOs, Type 
1 leaders do not generate superior peer-adjusted profits compared to non-
Type 1 leaders. Table 4-5 Panel B Columns 1-3 show that in profitable IPOs, 
Type 2 leadership position has a significant positive impact on post-listing 
peer-adjusted profits over a two-year period to year +2 (significant at the 5% 
level). However, there is no consistent pattern of the impact of leadership 
identification on profit margins within three years post-IPO. Similarly, Table 4-
5 Panels C and D Columns 1-3 shows that although Type 1 and Type 2 
leadership positions have some positive impact on the peer-adjusted net sales 
of unprofitable IPO firms, there is no evidence that firms with Type 1 or Type 
2 leadership position consistently generate superior post-IPO performance to 
firms without leadership identification. Therefore, evidence from Type 1 and 
Type 2 leadership position fails to support Hypotheses 4-1a and 4-1b in 
profitable IPOs.48  
                                                          
48As a robustness check of analysis of firm-level leadership identification in Table 4-5, I examine the 
accuracy of leadership identification with the report-level leadership identification and controlling for 
the clustering by IPO firms. In the report-level data, each IPO firm could be observed several times in 
210 
 
[Insert Table 4-5 here] 
Table 4-5 also examines other factors that affect the post-listing peer-adjusted 
performance of IPO firms. Table 4-5 Panel A Columns 1-3 suggests that 
leadership identification by analysts provides information beyond stock 
recommendations, as leader firms sometimes generate higher peer-adjusted 
profit margins or net sales post-listing than non-leaders, while 
recommendation appears to have no impact on the post-listing performance in 
neither profitable nor unprofitable firms. Irvine (2003) suggests that, although 
stock recommendations can predict stock returns, this is generally short-lived 
and appears not to affect post-listing operating performance.  
Table 4-5 Panel A Columns 1-3 suggest that VC sponsorship have a significant 
positive impact on profitable firms’ profit margin changes over the period to 
year +1 (significant at the 1% level). This result is consistent with the findings 
in previous studies that having a prestigious sponsorship appears to have a 
significant positive impact on stock returns (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; 
Michaely and Shaw, 1994; Jain and Kini, 1995; Carter et al., 1998; Coakley et 
al., 2007).  
4.4.2.2 Lead underwriter affiliation and post-listing performance  
I find that analysts’ leadership identification tends not to accurately predict 
leader firms with superior on-going performance post-IPO. A possible 
explanation is that analyst affiliation affects the accuracy of leadership 
                                                          
my regression sample, as there could be more than one analyst issuing ICRs for each IPO firm. With 
the report-level data of leadership identification, the un-tabulated regressions generally provide results 
consistent with Table 4-5 (firm-level leadership identification) on the impact of leadership identification 




identification. Prior literature generally suggests that LUWs appear to provide 
more optimistic and less accurate forecasts than non-LUWs (Michaely and 
Womack, 1999; Dechow et al., 2000; Lin et al., 2005; Barber et al., 2007). I 
investigate whether IPO firms identified as leaders are more likely to 
outperform non-leaders if the leadership advantage is identified by LUWs or 
non-LUWs. I use aggregated leadership identification by LUWs (non-LUWs) to 
examine the accuracy of LUWs’ (non-LUWs’) leadership prediction. Analyses 
in Table 4-5 Panels A to D Columns 4-9 do not compare the accuracy of 
leadership identification by LUWs and non-LUWs, but test them separately in 
Hypotheses 4-2a and 4-2b.49  
Table 4-5 Panels A and B Columns 4-6 show that in profitable IPO firms, Type 
1 and 2 leaders identified by LUWs generally do not enjoy significantly higher 
peer-adjusted profit margins than firms not identified as leaders by LUWs. 
These results support Hypothesis 4-2a that firms identified as leaders are less 
likely to outperform if the leadership advantage is identified by LUWs. Table 4-
5 Panels A and B Columns 7-9 show Type 1 and Type 2 leadership 
identification by non-LUWs generally do not have a significant positive impact 
on post-listing peer-adjusted profits in profitable firms, which fails to support 
Hypothesis 4-2b that firms identified as leaders are more likely to outperform 
if the leadership advantage is identified by non-LUWs 
Similarly, Table 4-5 Panels C and D Columns 4-6 show that in unprofitable 
firms, Type 1 and 2 leadership identification by LUWs do not consistently affect 
                                                          
49 I also investigate the accuracy of LUWs versus non-LUWs when they have contradictory opinions of 
leadership positions of an IPO firm. This is discussed in Appendix 4-3. 
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the peer-adjusted net sales post-listing. These results support Hypothesis 4-
2a. Furthermore, Type 1 and Type 2 leader firms identified by non-LUWs do 
not tend to consistently generate higher peer-adjusted net sales than firms not 
identified as leaders by non-LUWs (Table 4-5 Panels C and D Columns 7-9), 
which fails to support Hypothesis 4-2b.  
Overall, results in Table 4-5 Panels A to D Columns 4-9 suggest that neither 
LUWs nor non-LUWs provide leadership identifications which accurately 
predict firms with constantly superior on-going performance within three years 
post-listing, which is consistent with the findings in Table 4-5 Panels A to D 
Columns 1-3 that analysts generally fail to provide informative leadership 
identification to pick out IPO firms with superior post-listing operating 
performance. These results are consistent with the finding in prior studies that 
LUWs are not necessarily less accurate in their forecasts than non-LUWs 
(Aggarwal et al., 2002; Bradley et al., 2004; Reuter, 2006; James and Karceski, 
2006; Jacob et al., 2008; Bradley et al., 2008). 
Analyst affiliation could have a positive or negative impact on the accuracy of 
leadership identification. On one hand, LUWs could have information 
advantages over non-LUWs, with a significant amount of firm-specific 
information obtained from the due-diligence and book building processes 
(Michaely and Womack, 1999; Jacob et al., 2008). On the other hand, the 
conflicts of interest theory suggests that the analyst affiliation could lead LUWs 
to provide more favourable opinions and reduce the quality of LUWs’ research 
outputs (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Dechow et al., 2000; Lin et al., 2005; 




Moreover, analyst affiliation may affect LUWs as well as non-LUWs. As 
discussed in Section 4.2.2, the compensation structure of analysts and the 
relation between investment banks and investing clients, could affect the 
accuracy of leadership identification by LUWs and non-LUWs. For example, if 
analysts are not compensated for the accuracy of forecast but are 
compensated for actions that increase brokerage and investment-banking 
revenues, LUWs may not have the incentive to take advantage of their insider 
information, if any, to enhance the accuracy of their leadership identification 
(Groysberg et al., 2011). Furthermore, both LUWs and non-LUWs may need 
to weigh the cost of issuing honest leadership identification to maintain long-
term relations with their investing clients, and the benefit of issuing more 
optimistic and less accurate leadership identification to attract future 
underwriting business (Das et al., 1998; Lim, 2001; James and Karceski, 2006; 
Libby et al., 2008; Mayew, 2008). Non-LUWs may be as likely as LUWs to 
align their forecasts to those of management and issue favourable forecasts 
to attract potential future underwriting business (Das et al., 1998; Lim, 2001; 
Libby et al., 2008; Mayew, 2008; Groysberg et al., 2011).  
In my study, neither LUWs nor non-LUWs tend to provide informative 
leadership identification, at least not as reflected in the IPO firms’ three-year 
post-IPO performance. LUWs appear to not have, or are unable to use, the 
private information of their clients to issue more accurate leadership 
identification than non-LUWs. Both LUWs and non-LUWs may need to 
consider the trade-off between providing more optimistic and less accurate 
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coverages to attract future underwriting business and more accurate forecasts 
to maintain investing business.  
If the uninformative leadership identification in LUWs are driven by optimistic 
forecasts, I would be more likely to observe that LUWs are more likely to 
provide leadership identifications than non-LUWs. If both LUWs and non-
LUWs tend to issue optimistic forecasts to attract future underwriting business, 
I would be more likely to observe that LUWs tend to have the same tone of 
leadership identification as non-LUWs. In Section 4.4.3, I investigate whether 
analyst affiliation tend to affect the optimistic leadership identifications.  
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, the GS aimed to address analysts’ conflicts of 
interest and require analysts to provide more meaningful research (Kadan et 
al., 2009). If the GS requirements are implemented effectively after 2003, I 
would be more likely to observe that LUWs are more optimistic before the GS 
than non-LUWs and that LUWs and non-LUWs tend to have the same tone of 
firm leadership after the GS. 
My study does not rule out other possible explanations of uninformative 
leadership identification by analysts, in terms of identify leader firms with 
superior operating performance. For example, the leadership identification in 
ICRs may capture the size effect of IPO firms and therefore, leader firms 
identified by financial analysts are not necessary to provide superior 




4.4.3 Factors affecting analysts’ leadership identification 
Table 4-6 investigates whether analyst affiliation and the GS affect the tone of 
analysts’ leadership identification at the report-level. Table 4-6 also presents 
the conditions under which an IPO firm is more likely to be identified as a leader 
by financial analysts and discusses factors that affect the frequency and the 
intensity of leadership positions.  
[Insert Table 4-6 here] 
Table 4-6 Columns 1 and 2 show that LUW analysts do not tend to be more 
likely to identify an IPO firm as a leader than non-LUW analysts. My results do 
not support Hypothesis 4-3a that LUWs are more optimistic than non-LUWs in 
the leadership position of IPO firms. 
Table 4-6 Column 2 shows that generally, the GS had a significantly negative 
impact on analysts’ tone of Type 2 leadership identification, which fails to 
support Hypotheses 4-4 that the GS does not affect leadership identification. 
After the GS, financial analysts tend to reduce the probability of Type 2 
leadership identification in ICRs. My results go against the conjecture in 
Stocken and Verrecchia (2004) and Bradley et al. (2008), that regulatory 
changes do not affect the text content of coverage report as there are no 
explicit rules on the text content of analyst reports. The GS, although not 
directly regulating analysts’ text outputs, appears to have affected financial 




Table 4-6 Column 1 also shows that the existence of Type 1 leadership 
identification is not affected by the GS, which supports Hypothesis 4-4a. If 
investors try to make investment decisions based on the analysts’ tone of 
leadership identification, an industry leader or market leader (Type 1 leader) 
tends to be less affected by regulatory changes than other types of leader.  
One possible explanation is that the phrase Type 1 “industry or market leader” 
is used more rigidly by financial analysts than Type 2 leader identification. 
Therefore, a stricter regulation environment after the GS does not reduce the 
existence of Type 1 leadership identification, which supports Hypothesis 4-4a.  
The Type 2 leadership identification contains contingent advantages that may 
or may not hold after IPOs. Analysts reduce the identification of Type 2 leaders 
after the GS, which fails to support Hypothesis 4-4a. The regulatory changes 
require analysts to provide more meaningful outputs; therefore, the contingent 
advantages are less likely to be mentioned in ICRs.  
To examine whether my LUW coverage coefficients are driven by my sample, 
which is dominated by post-GS ICRs, I investigate analysts’ leadership 
identification before and after the GS. Table 4-6 Columns 4-6 reveal no 
evidence of LUWs suffering from the affiliation optimism bias, either before or 
after the GS.  
Table 4-6 Columns 4-6 suggest that LUWs and non-LUWs tend to have the 
same existence and intensity of firm leadership before and after the GS, which 
indicates that even before the GS implementation, LUWs and non-LUWs 




that, before the GS are implemented effectively to limit the conflicts of interest 
in financial analysts, both LUWs and non-LUWs may consider the trade-off 
between providing more optimistic and less accurate coverages to attract 
future underwriting business and more accurate forecasts to maintain investing 
business.  
Overall, I find that leadership identification tends not to pick out leader firms 
with superior on-going performance post-listing and that the uninformativeness 
of leadership identification does not appear to be attributable to LUWs being 
excessively optimistic compared to non-LUWs. As how analysts identify a firm 
as an industry or partial leader are black boxes, the leadership identification 
may capture some firm characteristics other than the potential to generate 
superior performance. Table 4-6 suggests that large firms are more likely to be 
identified as Type 1 and 2 leaders than smaller firms, and that large firms are 
mentioned as a leader more frequently in the report and with greater intensity. 
These results are consistent with my discussion in Section 4.3.2 that firm size 
proxies for firm quality, and a large firm is more likely to hold a leadership 
position (Type 1 and Type 2 leaders) than small firms.  
Furthermore, the leadership identification may reflect firm characteristics 
drawing attention from prestigious sponsorship. My results show that VC 
sponsorship and the ranking of LUWs, positively affects Type 2 leader 
identification (Table 4-6 Columns 2, 4 and 6). There are at least two possible 
explanations for these results. First, financial analysts value the sponsorship 
and market conditions when analysing non-contingent leadership positions. 
For Type 1 leaders, the industry or market leading position is more obvious for 
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Type 2 leaders, and VC or LUW sponsorship does not provide additional 
competitive advantage information to financial analysts. For Type 2 leaders, 
sponsorship provides an additional signal, alongside the Type 2 leadership 
position, of the competitive position of IPO firms to financial analysts. Second, 
VCs and analysts are likely to make their own analyses of the IPO firms’ 
competitive advantage, and VCs may find firms with Type 2 leadership 
characteristics attractive investment targets. However, it is not clear whether 
VCs rely on analysts’ classifications or whether they reach their own 
independent conclusions with regard to the attractiveness of the firms for 
investments. As the sponsoring, underwriting and analysing decision 
processes are largely black boxes, my study cannot identify whether the first 
or second explanation leads to the positive correlations between sponsorship 
and Type 2 leadership. 
4.5 Robustness tests 
The results in Section 4 are based on the existence of leadership identification, 
which is a dummy variable. As discussed in Section 4.3.1, investment banks 
not-found in Investext could bias my classification of IPO firms not covered by 
LUWs. For example, Goldman Sachs was highly active in the LUW role, and 
as a LUW arguably would be more likely to identify leadership position among 
its clients. Therefore, the existence of leadership position in Table 4-2 Panel A 
are likely to be downward biased.  
I also measure the frequency and intensity of Type 1 and Type 2 leaders. The 
frequency of leadership position refers to the number of leadership sentences 




sentences scaled by the number of pages in an ICR. For these two 
measurements, however, the impacts, if any, of some investment banks been 
missing from Investext, on the frequency of leadership sentences and the 
leadership intensity, are unclear. I examine the impact of LUW affiliation and 
the GS on analysts’ frequency and intensity of leadership identification. This 
leads to the following four hypotheses:50 
Hypothesis 4-3b: LUWs mention leadership advantages more 
frequently than non-LUWs do. 
Hypothesis 4-3c: LUWs mention leadership advantages more 
intensely than non-LUWs do.  
Hypothesis 4-4b: The Global Settlement does not affect 
analysts’ frequency of leadership identification. 
Hypothesis 4-4c: The Global Settlement does not affect 
analysts’ intensity of leadership identification. 
When the leadership identification is the frequency of leadership position (a 
count variable) or intensity of leadership position (a continuous and non-
negative variable), Model 2 uses Poisson regression and censored Tobit 
regression, respectively. The regression coefficients of the intensity and 
frequency of leadership identification are still consistent with those in Tables 
4-5 and 4-6. 
                                                          
50 These hypotheses are extensions to Hypotheses 4-3a and 4-4a presented in Section 4.2.2. 
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The un-tabulated results show that neither frequency nor intensity of 
leadership sentences provide consistently significant impact on the post-listing 
performance. These results fail to support Hypotheses 4-1a and 4-1b that 
leader firms identified by analysts generate superior performance to non-
leaders. Furthermore, the results hold with leadership identification by either 
LUWs or non-LUWs, which fails to support Hypotheses 4-2a and 4-2b. Analyst 
affiliation tends not to affect the accuracy of leadership identification, with 
regard to the two proxies of leadership frequency and intensity. 
I also investigate factors affecting analysts’ leadership frequency and intensity. 
The un-tabulated results show that although LUWs tend to mention Type 1 and 
Type 2 leadership sentences more often than non-LUW analysts, as discussed 
in Section 4.4.1, these results are driven by the longer reports used by LUWs. 
After controlling for the impact of report length, LUWs do not mention 
leadership advantage more intensely than non-LUWs. These results support 
Hypothesis 4-3b and fail to support Hypothesis 4-3c. Generally, the results of 
leadership intensity are consistent to the findings with the existence of 
leadership identification. 
The un-tabulated results suggest that generally, the GS had a significantly 
negative impact on analysts’ frequency and intensity of Type 2 leadership 
identification, which fails to support Hypotheses 4-4b and 4-4c. These results 
are consistent to the findings in Table 4-6 that the GS does not affect 
leadership identification.  For example, after the GS, financial analysts tend to 




at the 1% level). Analysts also reduce the intensity of Types 1 and 2 leadership 
identification in ICRs after the GS. 
Furthermore, un-tabulated results suggest that LUW coverage is positively 
correlated to Type 1 and Type 2 leadership frequencies during both the pre-
GS and post-GS periods. For example, before the GS, LUWs’ ICRs include 
significantly more Type 1 sentences than non-LUWs’, with the coefficient of 
0.4, significant at the 1% level. However, after the GS, LUWs are likely to 
mention 0.2 more Type 1 sentences per ICR than non-LUWs, which is 
significant at the 5% level. Thus, both the coefficient and the significance of 
the LUW coverage are reduced after the GS. After controlling for report length, 
the un-tabulated results show that LUWs are not more likely to mention leaders 
more intensely in the pre-GS period compared to in the post-GS period. In both 
pre- and post-GS period, LUWs tend not to be more optimistic than non-LUWs. 
These results suggest that LUWs and non-LUWs tend to have the same 
existence and intensity of firm leadership before and after the GS, which 
indicates that even before the GS implementation, LUWs and non-LUWs 
appear to have the same level of conflicts of interest. These results suggest 
that, before the GS are implemented effectively to limit the conflicts of interest 
in financial analysts, both LUWs and non-LUWs may consider the trade-off 
between providing more optimistic and less accurate coverages to attract 




In my sample, the frequency and intensity of leadership position are often not 
observed. To model the non-negative dependent variables with clumping at 
zero, I also provide models with Zero-inflated Poisson regressions and Cragg’s 
Tobit regressions and these un-tabulated regression results are consistent 
with the findings which uses Poisson and Tobit regression models.  
4.6 Conclusions  
This paper examines how financial analysts identify IPO firms’ competitive 
position in initial coverage reports, and to what extent leadership identification 
by financial analysts accurately predicts post-listing performance. My results 
show that Type 1 (industry or market leader) and Type 2 (firms with partial 
leadership position) leaders tend not to generate superior performance 
compared to non-leaders. Furthermore, the inaccurate forecast does not 
appear to be due to the conflicts of interest in LUWs. I find that LUWs do not 
tend to provide more optimistic leadership identification than non-LUWs. Both 
LUWs and non-LUWs appear to not provide a leadership identification which 
consistently identify firms generating superior on-going performance.  
One possible explanation is that financial analysts, both LUWs and non-LUWs, 
need to weigh the costs of providing honest leadership identification to 
maintain long-term relations with their investing clients and the benefits of 
providing more optimistic leadership identification to attract potential 
underwriting business. Furthermore, the leadership identification tends to pick 




Analysts’ leadership identification, excepting industry or market leader 
identification, is affected by the regulatory changes such as the GS. My results 
show that the GS significantly reduced the existence, frequency and intensity 
of Type 2 leadership identification. These results are consistent with findings 
in Kadan et al. (2009) that the GS reduced the proportion of positive 
recommendations. Type 1 leadership identification tends to be less affected 
by the GS than other types of leaders, as financial analysts appear to use the 
Type 1 “industry leader” identification more rigidly than the Type 2 “partial 
leader” identification. The GS affected ICR statements on leadership positions, 







Breakdown of initial coverage reports by year and affiliation of analyst firms 
Type 1 and Type 2 stand for the proportion of initial coverage reports (ICRs) mentioning different types of leadership advantage by analyst firms. Type 1 stands for 
industry leaders and market leaders; Type 2 stands for a leadership position in specific area, such as technology leaders, cost leaders, and having a market-leading 
product. I split the ICRs based on the analyst affiliation. Within six-months after IPOs, leading underwriter (LUW) affiliated-analysts issued 1,169 ICRs while non-
LUW analysts issued 2,852 ICRs. The ICRs are split into before and after the Global Settlement (GS) based on the ICR release year. 





ICRs page  
NO of 
ICRs Type 1 Type 2 page  
NO of 
ICRs Type 1 Type 2 Page 
1999 319 707 17  154 14% 71% 18  553 12% 69% 17 
2000 298 689 18  154 15% 67% 21  535 16% 61% 17 
2001 54 130 19  26 27% 58% 23  104 14% 66% 18 
2002 48 116 22  24 21% 58% 25  92 14% 63% 22 
2003 41 98 22  32 6% 38% 22  66 8% 58% 21 
2004 113 301 21  86 10% 49% 25  215 11% 49% 20 
2005 111 304 25  107 10% 47% 29  197 8% 46% 23 
2006 122 331 27  106 8% 52% 32  225 11% 48% 25 
2007 118 356 27  107 14% 50% 31  249 18% 62% 25 
2008 11 51 26  10 10% 80% 29  41 22% 63% 25 
2009 37 124 28  44 23% 64% 31  80 16% 60% 27 
2010 74 203 28  94 14% 44% 32  109 10% 59% 25 
2011 72 286 30  95 20% 63% 35  191 12% 63% 28 
2012 83 325 30  130 16% 62% 35  195 11% 59% 27 
Before GS 719 1,639 18  356 16% 67% 20  1,283 14% 65% 17 
After GS 2,283 2,382 27  813 14% 53% 31  1,569 12% 56% 24 





Table 4-2  
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of leadership identification in initial coverage reports 
This panel provides the leadership identification by LUW and non-LUW analysts in initial coverage reports. Existence1 is a dummy variable equals one if the 
IPO firm is identified as a Type 1 leader at least once in an ICR, and zero otherwise. Daylag is the number of days between the IPO issue date and the ICR 
release date. Recommendation equals 1 for “buy”, 0 for “hold” and -1 for “sell” stock recommendation. Page is the number of pages per ICR. Sents is the number 
of sentences per ICR. Difference is the mean difference of variables between ICR by LUW analysts and ICR by non-LUW analysts. ***, **, * stand for the 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Full Sample 
 


















VARIABLES N mean  N mean  N mean  t-test  N mean  N mean  t-test 
Existence1 4021 0.134  1169 0.143  2852 0.130  0.013  1698 0.131  2323 0.136  -0.005 
Existence2 4021 0.591  1169 0.574  2852 0.598  -0.024  1698 0.601  2323 0.584  0.018 
Daylag 4021 56.028  1169 41.533  2852 61.970  -20.437***  1698 56.651  2323 55.712  0.939 
Recommendation 3988 0.799  1159 0.819  2829 0.791  0.027*  1698 0.837  2323 0.747  0.090*** 
Page 4021 23.116  1169 27.666  2852 21.251  6.416***  1698 21.176  2323 25.548  -4.372*** 
Sents 4021 1729.198  1169 2122.935  2852 1567.811  -555.124***  1698 1407.137  2323 2159.154  -752.017*** 
 
Panel B.  Descriptive Statistics of leadership identification breakdown by the GS 

















Existence1 0.142 0.128 0.015  0.160 0.135 0.025  0.137 0.124 0.014 
Existence2 0.655 0.547 0.107***  0.671 0.531 0.140***  0.650 0.556 0.094*** 
Daylag 55 56 -1  36 44 -8***  61 63 -2 
Recommendation 0.949 0.696 0.253***  0.986 0.745 0.241***  0.938 0.670 0.268*** 
Page 18 27 -9***  20 31 -11***  17 24 -7*** 





Descriptive Statistics of leadership identification breakdown by pre-listing profitability 
This panel provides the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics and peer-adjusted performances. Pages (Sents) stands for the average number of pages (sentences) 
in an initial coverage report (ICR). Coverage is the total number of analysts that issued initial coverage reports within six-months after IPOs. Leverage (debt/TA) 
stands for the pre-IPO year long-term debt (debt) divided by total assets. Adj_Profit+1 (Adj_Sale+1) is the peer-adjusted EBITDA/TA (net sales) at year +1. Existence1 
is a dummy variable equals one if the IPO firm is identified as a Type 1 leader at least once in an ICR, and zero otherwise. Daylag is the number of days between the 
IPO issue date and the ICR release date. Recommendation equals 1 for “buy”, 0 for “hold” and -1 for “sell” stock recommendation. Page is the number of pages per 
ICR. Sents is the number of sentences per ICR. Difference (mean) is the mean difference of variables between unprofitable and unprofitable IPOs. Difference (median) 
is the difference of variables’ median value between unprofitable and unprofitable IPOs. ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  Unprofitable IPOs  Profitable IPOs  Difference  Difference 
VARIABLES  N mean median  N mean median  mean  median 
Firm age  696 7.099*** 5  801 23.635*** 13  -16.536***  -8*** 
Total Assets  696 295.219 30.692  801 1158.532*** 224.330  -863.313***  -193.638*** 
Leverage  695 0.134*** 0.244  796 0.274*** 0.195  -0.140***  0.049*** 
EBITDA/TA  696 -0.544*** -0.356  779 0.150*** 0.115  -0.693***  -0.471*** 
Pages  696 20.547*** 19  805 24.227*** 23  -3.680  -4*** 
Sents  696 1376.520*** 893.5  805 1999.545*** 1517  -623.025  -623.5*** 
Coverage  696 2.504*** 2  805 3.071*** 3  -0.566***  -1*** 
NO. of UWs  681 1.314*** 1  786 1.852*** 2  -0.538***  -1*** 
Adj_Profit-1  422 0.042*** 0.040  577 0.001 0.001  0.041***  0.039*** 
Adj_Profit+1  371 -0.313 0.082  530 0.211*** 0.051  -0.523**  0.031 
Adj_Profit+2  315 1.144*** 0.387  474 0.436*** 0.086  0.707***  0.301** 
Adj_Profit+3  259 1.349*** 0.184  428 0.797*** 0.122  0.552*  0.062 
Adj_Sale-1  430 -6.162*** -2.151  587 -26.548 -11.480  20.386**  9.329** 
Adj_Sale+1  374 59.378*** 23.661  535 91.070*** 46.548  -31.693**  -22.887** 
Adj_Sale+2  318 58.698*** 13.506  476 110.856*** 49.397  -52.158  -35.891*** 
Adj_Sale+3  263 73.015*** 18.8568  431 155.334*** 62.507  -82.320***  -43.651*** 
Existence1  696 0.244*** 0  805 0.263*** 0  -0.019  0 
Existence2  696 0.718*** 1  805 0.774*** 1  -0.056**  0 
Daylag  696 52.320*** 41  805 54.174*** 41  -1.854  0 
Recomm  696 0.862*** 1  805 0.786*** 1  0.076***  0 
Page  696 20.547*** 19  805 24.227*** 23  -3.680***  -4*** 






Table 4-4 Correlation Matrix 
This table provides the pairwise correlation coefficients of leadership identifications, IPO firm characteristics, timing characteristics and post-listing firm performance. 
All variables are the firm-level data. Existence1 (Existence2) is the overall existence of Type 1 (Type 2) leadership positions. GS is the dummy of the Global Settlement. 
LUW is the dummy which equals one if the ICR was issued by LUW. Inage and lnTA is the natural log of the value of firm age and total assets pre-IPO. Leverage 
(EBITDA/TA) stands for the pre-IPO year long-term debt (EBITDA) divided by total assets. Hot Market dummy equals 1 for IPO issued in the hot markets and zero 
otherwise following Banerjee et al. (2016). VC dummy stands for the existence of venture capital holding at the time of IPO. LUW rank is the highest rank of lead 
underwriter(s). Adj_Profit+1 (Adj_Sale+1) is the peer-adjusted EBITDA/TA (net sales) at year+1. Adj_Profit1 (Adj_Sale1) is the peer-adjusted profit (net sales) 
between year -1, +1.  ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Adj_Profit+1 Adj_Profit+2 Adj_Profit+3 Adj_Profit-1 Adj_Sale+1 Adj_Sale+2 Adj_Sale+3 Adj_Sale-1 Existence1 Existence2 
Existence1 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.09** 0.08** 0.06 0.01 1 0.29*** 
Existence2 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.09*** 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.29*** 1 
GS 0.02 -0.12*** -0.07 -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.11*** 
LUW 0 -0.04 0 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0 -0.02 0.15*** 0.04 
lnage 0.04** -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.1*** 0.14*** 0.15*** -0.02 0.09*** 0.09*** 
lnTA -0.01 -0.11*** -0.1** -0.14*** 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.33*** -0.1*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 
Leverage 0.03 -0.14*** -0.09** -0.04 0.09** 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.07* 
VC -0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.12*** 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
Hot Market -0.05 -0.05 0 0 -0.06* -0.07* -0.02 -0.01 -0.05* 0.01 




Table 4-5 Panel A Factors affecting peer-adjusted profit margin post-IPO in profitable IPOs, firm-level Type 1 leadership identification 
Output of Model 2 OLS regression is reported for profitable IPOs. Dependent variables are the peer-adjusted profit (profit) at year +1, +2 and +3. Type 1 is the dummy 
of overall existence of Type 1 leadership. In Columns 1-3, Type 1 leaders are identified by all analysts. In Columns 4-6, Type 1 leaders are identified by LUW analysts. 
In Columns 7-9, Type 1 leaders are identified by non-LUW analysts. The pre-IPO financial characteristics include firm age, total assets, and leverage. Recommendation 
is a dummy equal 1 for “buys”, 0 for “hold” and -1 for “sell”. VC dummy stands for the existence of venture capital holding at the time of IPO. LUW rank is the 
highest rank of lead underwriters. Hot Market dummy equals 1 for IPO issued in the hot markets and zero otherwise following Banerjee et al. (2016). Standard errors 
are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All analysts All analysts All analysts LUWs LUWs LUWs Non-LUWs Non-LUWs Non-LUWs 
VARIABLES profit1 profit2 profit3 profit1 profit2 profit3 profit1 profit2 profit3 
Type 1 0.057 0.022 0.048 0.028 0.093 0.134 0.049 -0.004 0.097 
 (0.049) (0.092) (0.116) (0.079) (0.140) (0.197) (0.053) (0.102) (0.129) 
Recommendation -0.042 -0.064 0.005 -0.064 -0.088 0.034 -0.040 -0.084 -0.025 
 (0.048) (0.090) (0.117) (0.068) (0.118) (0.168) (0.049) (0.095) (0.123) 
lnAge -0.011 -0.029 -0.034 -0.019 0.022 0.020 -0.012 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.027) (0.053) (0.066) (0.038) (0.068) (0.095) (0.028) (0.056) (0.070) 
LnTA 0.019 0.014 -0.003 0.013 -0.014 -0.010 0.015 0.002 0.004 
 (0.017) (0.031) (0.039) (0.024) (0.040) (0.056) (0.018) (0.034) (0.043) 
Leverage -0.123 -0.224 -0.131 -0.146 -0.129 -0.090 -0.147* -0.296* -0.261 
 (0.077) (0.145) (0.183) (0.103) (0.176) (0.248) (0.082) (0.157) (0.199) 
VC 0.145*** 0.049 0.021 0.149** 0.029 -0.076 0.118** 0.060 0.070 
 (0.049) (0.093) (0.119) (0.067) (0.115) (0.166) (0.052) (0.101) (0.130) 
Hot Market 0.003 -0.110 0.006 -0.029 -0.051 0.093 -0.006 -0.135 -0.016 
 (0.043) (0.080) (0.102) (0.059) (0.100) (0.141) (0.045) (0.087) (0.111) 
LUW rank -0.021 -0.061 -0.013 -0.028 -0.036 -0.022 -0.028 -0.065 -0.018 
 (0.022) (0.042) (0.054) (0.029) (0.051) (0.072) (0.027) (0.051) (0.067) 
Profit_pre 0.776*** -0.399 -0.001 1.012*** 0.344 -0.132 0.820*** -0.535 -0.357 
 (0.209) (0.387) (0.503) (0.317) (0.532) (0.741) (0.222) (0.422) (0.553) 
Constant 0.091 0.757** 0.338 0.267 0.446 0.180 0.209 0.897 0.362 
 (0.190) (0.366) (0.476) (0.260) (0.454) (0.641) (0.226) (0.439) (0.582) 
N 504 448 407 306 272 248 452 400 363 
r2_a 0.0326 0.00235 -0.0180 0.0295 -0.0233 -0.0315 0.0315 0.0101 -0.0129 
F 2.885 1.117 0.205 2.031 0.315 0.163 2.630 1.454 0.489 




Table 4-5 Panel B Factors affecting peer-adjusted profit margin post-IPO in profitable IPOs, firm-level Type 2 leadership identification 
Output of Model 2 OLS regression is reported for profitable or unprofitable IPOs. Dependent variables are the peer-adjusted profit (profit) or peer-adjusted net sales 
(sale) at year +1, +2 and +3. Type 1 is the dummy of overall existence of Type 1 leadership. In Columns 1-3, Type 1 leaders are identified by all analysts. In Columns 
4-6, Type 1 leaders are identified by LUW analysts. In Columns 7-9, Type 1 leaders are identified by non-LUW analysts. The pre-IPO financial characteristics include 
firm age, total assets, and leverage. Recommendation is a dummy equal 1 for “buys”, 0 for “hold” and -1 for “sell”. VC dummy stands for the existence of venture 
capital holding at the time of IPO. LUW rank is the highest rank of lead underwriters. Hot Market dummy equals 1 for IPO issued in the hot markets and zero otherwise 
following Banerjee et al. (2016). Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
All analysts All analysts All analysts All analysts LUWs LUWs LUWs Non-LUWs Non-LUWs Non-LUWs 
VARIABLES profit1 profit2 profit3 profit1 profit2 profit3 profit1 profit2 profit3 
Type 2 0.054 0.206** 0.083 -0.021 0.187* -0.015 0.045 0.129 0.057 
 (0.052) (0.097) (0.122) (0.061) (0.108) (0.147) (0.051) (0.098) (0.122) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 504 448 407 306 272 248 452 400 363 
r2_a 0.0311 0.0137 -0.0173 0.0318 -0.0113 -0.0333 0.0309 0.0147 -0.0139 
F 2.797 1.692 0.234 2.113 0.664 0.115 2.596 1.663 0.448 
p 0.00329 0.0885 0.989 0.0284 0.741 0.999 0.00632 0.0961 0.908 
Panel C Factors affecting peer-adjusted net sales post-IPO in unprofitable firms, firm-level Type 1 leadership identification 
Output of Model 2 OLS regression is reported for unprofitable IPOs. Dependent variables are the peer-adjusted net sales (sale) at year +1, +2 and +3. 
VARIABLES sale1 sale2 sale3 sale1 sale2 sale3 sale1 sale2 sale3 
Type 1 13.056*** 7.158 24.894*** 17.422*** 13.612 17.446 10.278** 6.925 26.163*** 
 (4.197) (5.926) (8.232) (6.316) (10.496) (16.345) (4.937) (6.938) (9.704) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 357 303 250 206 170 133 312 268 219 
r2_a 0.113 0.0721 0.145 0.283 0.132 0.453 0.101 0.0643 0.148 
F 6.045 3.608 5.685 9.987 3.865 13.13 4.884 3.040 5.217 
p 6.85e-08 0.000278 3.86e-07 0 0.000187 0 4.05e-06 0.00179 2.11e-06 
Panel D Factors affecting peer-adjusted net sales post-IPO in unprofitable firms, firm-level Type 2 leadership identification 
Type 2 15.152*** 8.116 17.139* 7.532 8.187 29.027** 11.552** -2.864 4.157 
 (4.576) (6.558) (8.891) (5.391) (8.503) (12.002) (5.039) (7.213) (9.663) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 357 303 250 206 170 133 312 268 219 
r2_a 0.110 0.0706 0.105 0.258 0.122 0.530 0.0989 0.0537 0.0768 
F 5.873 3.551 4.231 8.900 3.619 17.52 4.793 2.683 3.015 
p 1.23e-07 0.000335 4.22e-05 0 0.000393 0 5.47e-06 0.00537 0.00210 
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Table 4-6 Determinants of IPO leadership identification by financial analysts 
Output of Model 1 logit regression is reported and the dependent variable is the dummy of leadership existence. I control for industry effects with the 2-digit SIC. The 
pre-IPO financial characteristics include firm age, total assets, and leverage.  GS, LUW and GS*LUW stand for the dummy of Global Settlement effect, dummy of 
lead-underwriter as the report issuer, and the interaction term, respectively. Hot Market dummy equals 1 for IPO issued in the hot markets and zero otherwise. VC 
dummy stands for the existence of venture capital holding at the time of IPO. LUW rank is the highest rank of lead underwriter(s). Standard errors are presented in 
parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All ICRs All ICRs ICRs issued before the GS ICRs issued after the GS 
VARIABLES Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 
LUW 0.216 0.121 0.202 0.105 0.203 0.061 
 (0.172) (0.138) (0.175) (0.140) (0.142) (0.102) 
GS -0.105 -0.404*** — — — — 
 (0.128) (0.096) — — — — 
GS*LUW -0.028 -0.063 — — — — 
 (0.222) (0.171) — — — — 
lnAge 0.118 0.269*** 0.174 0.292*** 0.035 0.231*** 
 (0.073) (0.053) (0.111) (0.089) (0.104) (0.071) 
LnTA 0.129*** 0.103*** 0.149*** 0.074* 0.072 0.135*** 
 (0.038) (0.028) (0.058) (0.043) (0.053) (0.041) 
Leverage -0.096 0.013 -1.391*** -0.565** 0.448** 0.197 
 (0.209) (0.139) (0.463) (0.268) (0.227) (0.162) 
VC 0.031 0.389*** 0.135 0.486*** -0.057 0.284** 
 (0.128) (0.094) (0.184) (0.137) (0.183) (0.137) 
Hot Market -0.006 0.215*** -0.184 0.216* 0.187 0.178* 
 (0.105) (0.078) (0.163) (0.130) (0.149) (0.105) 
LUW rank 0.048 0.131*** -0.119 0.067 0.264** 0.178*** 
 (0.071) (0.047) (0.096) (0.074) (0.117) (0.066) 
Constant -2.208** -1.293 -2.161** -1.248* -3.511*** -2.420** 
 (0.885) (0.896) (0.978) (0.721) (1.233) (0.998) 
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 3570 3792 1512 1554 1916 2214 
r2_p 0.0697 0.129 0.0537 0.0967 0.0946 0.153 
chi2 203.2 660.4 68.55 193.4 150.8 467.3 




Appendix 4-1. Content around “leadership identification”  
Generally, the evidence referred to by financial analysts to support statements 
referring to a firm’s leadership position shows the competitive advantages in 
some aspects (e.g., cost efficiency, technology pioneer). Some analysts tend 
to analyse the competitive advantages in detail, and some do it briefly. For 
example, the content in initial coverage reports of RealD Inc. (the IPO firm) 
shows that the two analysts (investment banks), William Blair and JP Morgan, 
have different styles of discussing RealD’s competitive advantage. When 
stating the market leader position of RealD Inc., in several sections William 
Blair discusses the industry potential and market share of RealD Inc., 
technology advantages, EPS power, products and licensing, valuation and risk 
factors. On the other hand, JP Morgan uses a three-sentence paragraph to 
summarise and interpret the sustainable competitive advantage in RealD Inc., 
including market share, brand awareness, and patent-protected technologies. 
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, the text content of a firm’s competitive 
advantages is unstructured data, which varies from report to report. To 
examine the unstructured data, I use a content analysis approach in an attempt 
to convert analysts’ understanding of a firm’s competitive position into a 
numerical category for the leadership identification.  
Appendix 4-2. Type 3 and Type 4 leadership identification  
In addition to the industrial or market leaders (Type 1 leader), and firms with 
partial leadership position (Type 2 leader), I identify two other types of 
leadership positions in ICRs. In ICRs, financial analysts could state that firms 
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may be a leader in the future (Type 3 leader) or that the firms are aiming to be 
a leader in the future (Type 4 leader).  
Type 3 leader describes IPO firms that financial analysts view as 
having the potential to become leaders in the future (leader-to-be); 
and  
Type 4 leader identifies IPO firms that state the aim to become a 
leader (leader-aim-to-be). 
There are 638 “leader to be” sentences and 628 “leader aim to be” sentences 
in my final sample. Type 3 and Type 4 leaders are firms that do not hold a 
competitive advantage at the time of IPOs but which analysts suggest may be 
expected to become leaders in the future. Financial analysts expect Type 3 
leaders to become a Type 1 or Type 2 leader in the future. Thus, a Type 3 
leader is more likely to hold resources and capabilities to build up its 
competitive position than a Type 4 leader. Any firm can express the hope to 
become a leader. Type 4 leader firms, if they lack other types of leadership 
identification, do not necessarily hold competitive advantages.   
For Type 3 and Type 4 leaders, as the firm does not hold the competitive 
advantages at the time of IPO, their potential leadership position is not strong 
enough to be expected to generate superior operating performance, at least in 
the short-run. These Type 3 or 4 leaders have the potential to become Type 1 
or 2 leaders in the future and presumably to generate superior performance in 
the long-run. However, facing competition from existing leaders and new 




advantages. Therefore, Type 3 and 4 leaders may or may not generate 
superior performance during my event window of three years post-listing. This 
leads to the following two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 4-1c: IPO firms identified as Type 3 leaders do not 
generate better operating performance post-listing than non-
leader firms.  
Hypothesis 4-1d: IPO firms identified as Type 4 leaders do not 
generate better operating performance post-listing than non-
leader firms. 
Un-tabulated results show that financial analysts identify Type 3 leaders in 
11.9% of ICRs and Type 4 leaders in 10.8% of ICRs. The descriptive statistics 
shows that financial analysts are less likely to mention contingent leaders 
(Type 3 and Type 4 leaders) than unconditional leaders (Type 1 and Type 2 
leaders). Consistent with the findings on Type 1 and 2 leadership 
identifications, I find that LUWs and non-LUWs have a similar level of existence 
and intensity of Type 3 and 4 leadership identifications and that LUWs have a 
higher level of Type 3 and 4 leadership frequency due to longer reports used 
in LUWs. The GS significantly reduced Type 3 and 4 leadership identification 
in both LUWs and non-LUWs.  
The regression results of Type 3 and Type 4 leadership positions show that 
generally, Type 3 and Type 4 leadership identifications do not consistently 
have a positive impact on the post-listing operating performance, which 
support hypothesis 4-1c and 4-1d. The sub-group regression results suggest 
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that neither LUWs nor non-LUWs’ leadership identification appear to 
consistently affect the post-listing performance, which is consistent with the 
results on Hypotheses 4-2a and 4-2b.  
I find that LUW analysts do not tend to be more likely to identify an IPO firm as 
a Type 3 or 4 leader than non-LUW analysts but have a higher frequency of 
Type 3 and 4 leaders than non-LUWs. This evidence is consistent with the 
findings on Type 1 and 2 leadership identification that after controlling for the 
longer report by LUWs, LUWs and non-LUWs tend to state Type 3 and 4 
leaders with the same intensity. I also find that the GS significantly reduced 
the firm-level existence, frequency and intensity of Type 3 and 4 leadership 
positions, which fails to support Hypothesis 4-4a, b and c that the GS does not 
affect the existence, frequency and intensity of leadership identification. 
Appendix 4-3. Contradictory opinions between LUWs and non-
LUWs 
I use a two-by-two matrix to identify the perception difference between LUW 
and non-LUW analysts (Table Appendix 4-1). Quadrant 1 stands for a situation 
where both LUW and non-LUW analysts perceive the IPO firm as a leader. 
Quadrant 2 stands for a situation where non-LUWs perceive the IPO firm as a 
leader while LUWs fail to state that the firm has a competitive advantage in the 
ICRs. Quadrant 3 stands for a situation where LUWs perceive the firm as a 
leader while non-LUWs analysts do not view the IPO firm as having a 
competitive advantage. Quadrant 4 stands for a situation where neither LUWs 




that there is a difference of opinion regarding the IPO firms’ leadership position 
between LUW and non-LUW analysts, while Quadrants 1 and 4 show a shared 
opinion of IPO firms’ leadership position between LUWs and non-LUWs.  
I investigate whether LUWs or non-LUWs provide more accurate leadership 
identification which picks out firms with superior future operating performance, 
when they have contradictory opinions of a firm’s leadership position:  
Hypothesis 4-2c: When LUWs and non-LUWs have different 
opinions of an IPO firm’s leadership position, Q3 leaders (IPO 
firms identified as leaders by LUWs but not by non-LUWs) are 
likely to perform worse than Q2 leaders (IPO firms identified as 
leaders by non-LUWs but not by LUWs analysts).  
I also investigate the accuracy of LUWs versus non-LUWs when they have 
contradictory opinions of leadership positions of an IPO firm. I use the report-
level leadership identification to test whether IPO firms identified as leaders by 
LUWs but not by non-LUWs are likely to perform worse than IPO firms 
identified as leaders by non-LUWs but not by LUWs analysts. As discussed in 
Section 4.2.2, if LUWs are more likely to suffer conflicts of interest between 
their fiduciary responsibility to investing clients and their sales incentive to 
underwriting clients, LUWs may provide less accurate leadership identification 
than non-LUWs. Un-tabulated regression results suggest that either LUWs or 
Table Appendix 4-1 
Perception bias of leadership identification between LUW and non-LUW 
Consistency of opinions LUW Leaders LUW non-leader 
Non-LUW leader Quadrant 1 
 shared opinion 
Quadrant 2 
different opinion 






non-LUWs sometimes tend to provide a leadership identification which 
positively correlated the post-listing performance. Therefore, it is not clear 
whether LUWs or non-LUWs are more accurate in identifying firms which go 
on to deliver superior performance post-listing when they have contradictory 
opinions. 
These results suggest that the affiliation position of financial analysts is not 
likely to affect the accuracy of their leadership identification.  
Appendix 4-4. Alternative variable measurements and alternative 
models 
I apply alternative variable measurements in Models 1 and 2, and results hold 
consistently. The alternative variables are described as follows. 
Alternative performance measurements: In addition to profit and sales 
growth used in the main analysis, analysis has also been undertaken using the 
peer-adjusted growth of profit margin and net sales as alternative performance 
measures. Prior literature on leader firm performance generally focuses on 
profits as a leader firm should take advantage of its leadership position to earn 
positive profits (e.g., Lieberman et al., 1988; Barber et al., 2001). My study not 
only explores the profitability, but also investigates the growth of sales of IPO 
firms. As my study investigates operating performance within three years of 
IPOs, the growth of sales could capture “leadership” advantages in growth IPO 
firms without positive earnings (Eisenmann, 2006; Mitchell, 1991; Colak and 




peer-adjusted operating performance are consistent with the findings using 
peer-adjusted profit margin and net sales.  
Alternative leadership sentence intensity measurement: An alternative 
measure for the intensity of leadership identification is measured as the 
number of leadership sentences per thousand of sentences in an ICR.  
Firm-level leadership identification: Table 4-6 investigates the analysts’ 
tone of leadership identification at the initial coverage report level. Thus, one 
IPO firm may have multiple observations of leadership identification by several 
financial analysts. To control the multiple observations effect, I examine 
Hypotheses 4-3 and 4-4 with the firm level data of leadership identification. In 
the firm level data, each IPO firm is observed once. The LUW dummy equals 
one if the IPO firm got initial coverage reports from at least one LUW. These 
results, with firm-level leadership identification, are consistent with those in 
Table 4-6 with report-level leadership identification. 
When aggregating analysts’ leadership identification in an IPO firm, I measure 
the existence, likelihood, frequency and intensity of leadership sentences. The 
firm-level existence of leadership position sentences is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the IPO firm is identified as a leader by at least one analyst. The 
likelihood of leadership position sentences is the proportion of ICRs (or 
analysts) mentioning the leadership position of an IPO firm. The firm-level 
frequency of leadership position sentences is the average number of 
leadership sentences per ICR. The firm-level intensity of leadership position 
sentences is the mean value of leadership intensity in all ICRs for an IPO firm.  
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Alternative general economic measurements: As an alternative to the 
dummy of hot market in an IPO wave, I control for the impact of market timing 
on post-IPO performance with a dummy for the bubble period and a dummy of 
early mover, and results are consistent with Tables 4-5 and 4-6. 
Coakley et al. (2007) investigate post-IPO operating performance of 590 U.K. 
IPOs in 1985-2003 and find that operating performance declined in IPOs 
issued during the 1998-2000 stock-market bubble period, but performed 
normally when issued in the remaining years. In contrast, Helwege and Liang 
(2004) observe that IPOs issued in hot and cold markets have similar post-IPO 
operating performance. Bubble period is a dummy which equals 1 if an IPO 
was issued between October 1999 and March 2000 (Banerjee et al., 2016). 
Another market timing feature is whether the IPO firm is an early mover. Prior 
studies on early-mover advantages suggest that early movers in a market have 
significantly superior skill and resource profiles to later movers (Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988; Robinson et al., 1992; VanderWerf and Mahon, 1997). 
Firms going public earlier in an IPO wave could generate higher profitability 
(Chemmanur and He, 2011; Banerjee et al., 2016) or lower profitability 
compared to firms going public later (Christoffersen et al., 2010).  Following 
Banerjee et al. (2016), early mover is a dummy which equals 1 if an IPO went 
public within the first two quarters of a rising IPO cycle, and taking the value 0 
if otherwise. 
The general changes in the industry could also affect operating performance 
in firms. Therefore, I control for the impact of general changes in the industry 




Firms in an industry enjoys positive shock are likely to outperform firms in other 
industries. The industry is classified based on 2-digit SIC codes. Results with 
the industry fixed effect are consistent with those in Tables 4-5 and 4-6.  
Appendix 4-5. Investment bank fixed effects 
As discussed in Appendix 4-1, ICRs from investment banks may identify 
leaders using different tones. Bradley et al. (2008) investigate the behaviour of 
analysts from four top underwriters (Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman 
Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley) and indicate that these four high 
prestige investment banks are more likely to be optimistic as a non-LUW than 
as a LUW. Therefore, to distinguish high- or low-prestige investment banks, I 
control for the investment bank fixed effect on analysts’ leadership 
identification. Results in Table 4-6 do not control the fixed effect of financial 
analysts. However, the un-tabulated regression results with investment bank 
fixed effects included provide results consistent with those reported in Table 
4-6. 
The leadership identification may vary across investment banks, regarding the 
LUW affiliation and types of leadership position. Table Appendix 4-2 lists the 
participation and the tone of leadership identification in top 20 LUW and top 20 
non-LUW analyst firms. Table Appendix 4-2 shows that investment banks, 
such as Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan, tend to be more active as 
underwriters than non-LUW analyst in the issuance of ICRs. During the sample 
period of 1999-2012, Morgan Stanley acted as a leading underwriter for 199 
IPO firms but issued non-LUW ICRs for only 34 IPOs. Furthermore, some 
investment banks (e.g., Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan) are more likely to 
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identify Type 1 leaders if they hold a lead-underwriting relation with the IPO 
firm. Table Appendix 4-2 indicates that different investment banks may have 
their own tone in the leadership identification with regard to the affiliation. I 









Table Appendix 4-2 Investment Banks’ tone of leadership identification 
This table provides the top 20 leading underwriter (LUW) affiliated analysts and top 20 
non-LUW analyst firms ranked by the number of initial coverage reports issued during 
1999-2012. N stands for the number of observations of initial coverage reports. Pages 
stands for the number of pages in an ICR.   
 Reports written by LUWs Reports written by non-LUWs 
Underwriter N Type 1 Type 2 N pages Type 1 
Morgan Stanley 199 19% 66% 34 29.50 3% 
Credit Suisse 157 17% 63% 104 27.44 13% 
JP Morgan 144 13% 56% 63 27.67 21% 
Deutsche Bank 107 21% 74% 109 27.11 14% 
UBS 62 10% 48% 77 23.95 18% 
Piper Jaffray 46 9% 22% 182 18.80 10% 
Jefferies 44 11% 48% 116 23.44 17% 
Lehman Brothers 35 11% 54% 39 20.05 15% 
Donaldson,Lufki
n,Jenrette 
32 0% 34% 38 13.79 8% 
Barclays 30 7% 67% 15 29.87 20% 
Bear Stearns 28 11% 43% 71 29.72 10% 
Citigroup 26 35% 69% 8 34.00 0% 
Salomon,Smith,
Barney 
24 13% 50% 84 19.44 18% 
SG Cowen 22 9% 45% 90 17.13 9% 
CIBC 20 15% 50% 115 27.95 12% 
Chase,Hambrech
t,Quist 
19 21% 84% 45 16.07 31% 
Will am Blair 14 21% 79% 135 25.78 16% 
Roberston 
Stephens 
19 16% 68% 93 12.88 12% 
Dain Rauscher 
Wessels 
6 17% 100% 97 10.38 14% 
RBC Capital 
Markets 
7 14% 29% 77 21.62 12% 
W chovia 12 8% 25% 58 23.47 21% 
Hambrecht & 
Quist 




11 0% 100% 29 10.00 17% 
ThinkEquity 1 0% 0% 53 20.51 15% 
Cowen Co. 8 0% 38% 52 25.25 10% 
Wells Fargo 10 10% 40% 44 26.93 11% 
All 1,169 14% 
 




Chapter 5. Summary and Contributions  
This chapter provides a summary of the main findings in the three empirical 
papers, discusses how these results relate to the hypotheses tested, explains 
the main contributions and implications for this thesis, discusses limitations of 
the current study and outlines potential extensions for further research. 
5.1 Summary 
This thesis examines four main research questions. Chapter 2 examines 
whether an IPO helps private acquirers to conduct acquisitions with superior 
returns in the U.K. acquisition market compared to reverse takeovers (RTs). 
Chapter 3 examines whether U.K. domestic acquisitions improve the long-run 
operating performance of target firms. Chapter 3 also examines how targets’ 
top management turnover, if applicable, affects the post-acquisition operating 
performance of target and acquirer firms in the U.K. Chapter 4 examines 
whether U.S. IPO firms with leadership positions identified by analysts 
generate superior operating performance post-listing. 
In addition, to further investigate factors affecting post-acquisition top 
management team (TMT) turnover and factors affecting analysts’ tone and 
accuracy of leadership identification, I raise additional questions as to whether 
pre-acquisition target performance affects TMT turnover in target firms (see 
Chapter 3), whether regulation reforms affect analysts’ tone of leadership 
identification (see Chapter 4), and whether analyst affiliation affects the tone 
and accuracy of leadership identification (see Chapter 4). 
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This section presents the main results of Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and discusses 
how these results relate to the nine hypotheses in this thesis. The first 
hypothesis, addressed in Chapter 2, relates to Hsieh et al.’s (2011) conjecture 
that an IPO leads to a more efficient acquisition strategy that enhances firm 
value compared to RTs conducted by private acquirers.  
Hypothesis 2-1: Acquisitions conducted by recently listed IPO 
firms outperform acquisitions conducted by private firms in a 
RT. 
To address the first question, I investigate 179 public acquirers in IPO-M&As 
and 66 private acquirers in RTs on the London Stock Exchange between 1 
January 1995 and 31 December 2012. The empirical evidence in Section 2.6 
fails to support Hypothesis 2-1. Acquirers earn significant negative post-
acquisition stock returns. The average of acquirers’ two-year CARs post-
acquisition is -35% in IPO-M&As and -45% in RTs, although the difference is 
not statistically significant. Controlling for the self-selection of acquisition-
driven IPO or RT listing-and-acquisition route and firm- and deal-specific 
characteristics, I find that undertaking an IPO prior to acquiring another firm 
has no positive impact on post-acquisition stock returns. Public acquirers 
appear to bear a higher agency cost due to less concentrated insider 
ownership. As presented in Section 2.6.4, public acquirers have lower 
executive ownership (or CEO/MD ownership) than private acquirers in RTs, 
and acquirers’ executive ownership (or CEO/MD ownership) has a significant 
positive impact on acquirers’ post-acquisition abnormal returns. Alternatively, 




benefits of valuation surprise or overvaluation in public acquirers’ capital do 
not outweigh the costs of overvalued synergy (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004).  
Chapter 3 examines four hypotheses. Hypothesis 3-1 tests the overall 
efficiency of the U.K. takeover market, which is the second research question. 
I investigate the post-acquisition operating performance of 498 targets in 
domestic acquisition announced and completed between 1 January 2006 and 
31 December 2014. 
Hypothesis 3-1: Target firms improve performance post-
acquisition in comparison to peer firms. 
Results in Section 3.5.1 support Hypothesis 3-1 with the evidence that peer-
adjusted operating performance improves significantly in unprofitable targets. 
On average, unprofitable targets’ peer-adjusted ROA increases significantly, 
by 16.3% and 25.2% over the period from year -1 to year +2 and +3, 
respectively. However, for profitable targets, peer-adjusted ROA does not 
change significantly. These results are consistent with most of the literature, 
which states that target firms on average gain from acquisitions (Bruner, 2002). 
Hypotheses 3-2 and 3-3 investigate the market discipline theory of acquisition, 
which addresses the relation between post-acquisition TMT turnover and pre- 
and post-acquisition performance of target firms.  
Hypothesis 3-2: Replacement of target TMT is negatively 
related to pre-acquisition performance in targets.  
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Prior studies on the market discipline theory of acquisition show that a target 
firm with poor pre-acquisition performance is more likely to experience high 
TMT turnover to remove inefficient TMTs (Martin and McConnell, 1991; Walsh 
and Ellwood, 1991; Walsh and Kosnik, 1993; Franks and Mayers, 1996; 
Kennedy and Limmack, 1996; Jang and Reisel, 2015). Consistent with prior 
studies, regression results in Section 3.5.2 tend to support Hypothesis 3-2, 
with the evidence that while TMT turnover is generally high in both profitable 
and unprofitable targets, profitable targets experience significantly lower TMT 
turnover, by 10%, than unprofitable targets. However, showing the negative 
correlation between TMT turnover and pre-acquisition performance may be 
necessary, but is not sufficient to support the market discipline hypothesis that 
removing inefficient TMTs creates value. Therefore, I extend prior literature on 
the market discipline theory of acquisition by investigating the impact of target 
TMT turnover on the long-run operating performance of both public listed and 
private targets in Hypothesis 3-3. 
Hypotheses 3-3 and 3-4 examine the third research question, which is the 
relation between TMT turnover and post-acquisition performance. More 
specifically, Hypothesis 3-3 examines the impact of post-acquisition TMT 
turnover in target firms on targets’ post-acquisition performance, and 
Hypothesis 3-4 examines the impact of post-acquisition TMT turnover in target 
firms on acquirers’ post-acquisition performance. The market discipline theory 
of acquisition suggests that replacement of inefficient TMTs enhances the 
post-acquisition performance of target firms. Alternatively, the resource-based 




insider information on target firms. Therefore, target TMT turnovers would 
harm the profitability of acquisitions and the stability of the integration process. 
Hypothesis 3-3: Replacement of target TMT is positively 
related to post-acquisition performance improvement in 
targets. 
Results in Section 3.5.3 show that target TMT turnover does not affect the 
post-acquisition peer-adjusted performance of target firms, regardless of how 
target TMT turnover is measured. These results fail to support Hypothesis 3-
3. Although pre-acquisition performance affects target TMT turnover, the 
replacement of TMTs does not appear to improve the peer-adjusted post-
acquisition performance of target firms.  
To compare my study with prior studies focusing on the impact of target TMT 
turnover on acquirers’ post-acquisition performance, I examine Hypothesis 3-
4.   
Hypothesis 3-4: Replacement of target TMT is negatively 
related to post-acquisition performance improvement in 
acquirers. 
Results in Section 3.5.4 show that a complete TMT turnover in targets on 
average significantly reduces acquirers’ peer-adjusted ROA by 3% to 4%, and 
the impacts are significant at the 5% level. This result is driven by the sub-
sample of acquisitions with profitable targets. Table 3-10 shows that a 
complete TMT turnover in profitable targets harms the post-acquisition ROAs 
of acquirers, but a complete TMT turnover in unprofitable targets does not 
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appear to affect acquirers’ post-acquisition ROAs.  These results support the 
resource-based management view in Hypothesis 3-4, with the evidence that a 
complete TMT replacement in profitable targets is harmful to the consolidated 
profits in acquirers, regardless of the small relative size of targets to acquirers.  
Overall, results in Sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 suggest that TMT turnover in target 
firms is much more complex than what is explained by the poor pre-acquisition 
performance. The TMT turnover may reflect TMTs’ psychological attributes 
and their perception of acquisition (e.g., culture fit) rather than the disciplining 
function of acquisitions (Krug et al., 2015). 
Chapter 4 investigates four hypotheses that relate to the tone and accuracy of 
analysts’ leadership identification. To address the fourth research question of 
whether U.S. IPO firms with leadership positions identified by analysts 
generate superior operating performance post-listing, I investigate 4,021 initial 
coverage reports of 1,501 U.S. IPOs issued between 1 January 1999 and 31 
December 2012. I classify analysts’ leadership identification into two types. 
Type 1 leader describes IPO firms that are explicitly identified as “a 
market leader” or “an industry leader”; and 
Type 2 leader describes IPO firms that hold a “partial leading 
position” in a particular product or asset. 
Hypothesis 4-1 examines the accuracy of analysts’ leadership identification. I 
split Hypothesis 4-1 into two sub-sample tests, each focusing on a type of 
leader. Type 1 and 2 leaders are expected to hold competitive advantages 




Hypothesis 4-1a: IPO firms identified as Type 1 leaders 
generate better operating performance post-listing than non-
leader firms. 
Hypothesis 4-1b: IPO firms identified as Type 2 leaders 
generate better operating performance post-listing than non-
leader firms. 
Results in Section 4.5.3 suggest that leaders identified by analysts tend not to 
generate superior performance to that of non-leaders. These results fail to 
support Hypotheses 4-1a and 4-1b that analysts provide informative 
leadership identification to help investors select firms with superior future 
performance.  
To investigate whether the uninformative leadership identification is driven by 
analyst affiliation, I examine whether lead-underwriters (LUWs) or non-LUWs 
provide more accurate leadership identification in Hypothesis 4-2 and whether 
analyst affiliation affect the leadership identification in Hypothesis 4-3. Some 
studies suggest that lead-underwriters (LUWs) are more likely to suffer from 
conflicts of interest due to their affiliation and provide more optimistic but less 
accurate forecasts (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Dechow et al., 2000; Lin et 
al., 2005; Barber et al., 2007).  
I examine the impact of analyst affiliation on the accuracy of leadership 
identification. I split Hypothesis 4-2 into two sub-sample tests, to investigate 




Hypothesis 4-2a: Firms identified as leaders are less likely to 
outperform if the leadership advantage is identified by LUWs. 
Hypothesis 4-2b: Firms identified as leaders are more likely to 
outperform if the leadership advantage is identified by non-
LUWs. 
The overall results in Section 4.5.2 reveal that it is not clear whether LUWs or 
non-LUWs provide more accurate leadership prediction. Both LUWs and non-
LUWs appear to not provide a leadership identification which consistently 
identify firms generating superior on-going performance. Therefore, these 
results suggest that analysts’ affiliation tends not to affect the accuracy of 
leadership identification, which fails to support Hypothesis 4-2s.  
Furthermore, I split Hypothesis 4-3 into three sub-sample tests, to investigate 
whether analyst affiliation affect the leadership identification by analysts. 
Hypothesis 4-3a: LUWs are more likely to identify an IPO firm 
as a leader than non-LUWs are. 
Hypothesis 4-3b: LUWs mention leadership advantages more 
frequently than non-LUWs do. 
Hypothesis 4-3c: LUWs mention leadership advantages more 
intensely than non-LUWs do. 
Results in Section 4.5.3 fail to support Hypotheses 4-3a and 4-3c. LUWs tend 
not to be more likely to identify their IPO clients as leaders than non-LUWs. 




LUWs, LUWs also tend to issue longer initial coverage reports than non-LUWs 
do. Controlling for report length, LUWs do not use leadership-related words 
more intensely than non-LUWs. 
The last hypothesis in this thesis explores the impact of the Global Settlement 
(GS) on the text content of analysts’ research outputs. The 2003 GS requires 
financial analysts (especially affiliated analysts) to disclose conflicts of interest 
and limit relations between research and investment banking departments 
(Kadan et al., 2009; Corwin et al., 2017). Although existing studies of regulation 
changes generally suggest that the GS reduced the optimistic 
recommendations and forecasts in analyst reports, whether it affected the 
qualitative text content has not, to the best of my awareness, been investigated 
in prior studies. As the GS does not restrict the text content in analyst reports, 
I expect that it does not affect analysts’ tone of leadership identification. I split 
Hypothesis 4-4 into three sub-sample tests, each focusing on a leadership 
identification measurement. 
Hypothesis 4-4a: The Global Settlement does not affect 
analysts’ likelihood of identifying a firm as a leader. 
Hypothesis 4-4b: The Global Settlement does not affect 
analysts’ frequency of leadership identification. 
Hypothesis 4-4c: The Global Settlement does not affect 
analysts’ intensity of leadership identification. 
Evidence in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.3 shows that although the text content in 
analyst reports, as opposed to their recommendations, is not subject to 
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regulation requirements, analysts tend to be more conservative in the 
leadership identification of IPO firms after the GS. For example, analysts 
reduce their Type 2 leadership identification by 0.215 sentences per ICR and 
the change is significant at the 1% level. My results fail to support Hypothesis 
4-4 and go against the conjecture in Stocken and Verrecchia (2004) and 
Bradley et al. (2008) that regulation changes do not affect the text content of 
coverage reports, as there are no explicit rules relate to the text content of 
analyst reports. 
5.2 Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this thesis 
provides empirical evidence on Hsieh et al.’s (2011) conjecture that an IPO 
helps acquirers to conduct optimal acquisitions. To assess this conjecture, I 
compare the stock returns of public acquirers in IPO-M&As and private 
acquirers in RTs. Previous studies argue that an IPO helps to facilitate 
subsequent acquisitions, with an infusion of cash and publicly traded stocks 
as acquisition currencies (Celikyurt et al., 2010; Hovakimian and Hutton, 2010). 
Hsieh et al. (2011) suggest that an IPO helps acquirers to conduct subsequent 
acquisitions at the optimal time and therefore public acquirers are more likely 
to conduct value-enhancing acquisitions than private acquirers are. However, 
these studies do not provide empirical evidence that acquisitions conducted 
by IPO firms outperform acquisitions conducted by private acquirers.  
Contrary to expectations and the conjecture in prior literature, Chapter 2 finds 
that acquisitions conducted by recently listed IPO firms do not tend to generate 




RTs. Public acquirers may bear a more severe problem of agency costs or 
overvalued synergy than private acquirers. This thesis extends existing 
research on acquisition-driven IPOs. Investors and shareholders of firms 
involved in acquisitions need to understand the potential costs and benefits 
brought by an IPO to subsequent acquisitions. 
Second, Chapter 2 extends existing RT literature. Prior RT studies focus 
predominantly on the public listing role of RT and overlook the acquisition 
feature in RTs (Gleason et al., 2005; Makamson, 2010). My study fills the gap 
by investigating the acquisition feature in RTs and exploring factors that 
influence the listing-and-acquisition choice between IPO-M&As and RTs. I 
explore the stock returns of 66 RTs that involve operational public targets, and 
find that RTs tend to have similar stock returns to acquisitions conducted by 
recently listed IPOs. 
Third, I investigate the post-listing ownership of RTs and IPOs. It is argued that 
private firms opting for a RT listing may have a preference for more 
concentrated ownership than firms opting for an IPO, as RTs are not required 
to issue capital to the public. However, results in Chapter 2 show that insiders 
in RT firms do not tend to hold a statistically higher proportion of ownership 
than those in IPOs. Therefore, in the U.K., firms opting for either listing-and-
acquisition route can have a similar level of control preference in terms of the 
proportion of common shares held by insiders post-listing. The inclusion of 
board characteristics also extends existing RT research by investigating the 
impact of corporate governance factors (such as executive ownership) on 
post-acquisition performance.  
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Fourth, most previous research on target firms focuses on public targets’ stock 
returns due to a lack of post-acquisition accounting data (Cannella and 
Hambric, 1993; Very et al., 1997; Zollo and Singh, 2004). In the U.S., there is 
no federal statutory requirement for unlisted firms to report financial statements 
to the public (FASB, 2013). However, in the U.K., all registered limited 
companies, including subsidiaries, must report their annual financial 
statements to the Companies House, who makes the information available to 
the public (GOV.UK, 2016). Chapter 3 extends existing literature by 
investigating the post-acquisition operating performance of public and private 
targets. I empirically test the overall efficiency of the takeover market in the 
U.K., and whether acquisitions improve the profitability of target firms. Chapter 
3 also includes an analysis of post-acquisition operating performance of public 
and private acquirers. Adding to the existing literature on post-acquisition 
performance, I show that unprofitable targets improve their peer-adjusted profit 
margins significantly.  
Fifth, I extend and strengthen the literature on TMT turnover. Prior studies on 
TMT turnover present two alternative theoretical arguments: the market 
discipline theory of acquisition suggests that acquisitions can be used as a 
mechanism to replace inefficient TMTs; the resource-based management view 
suggests that TMTs hold valuable inside information on the firm, and that 
replacing TMTs would harm firms performance. With the post-acquisition 
operating performance of targets and acquirers, I test both the market 
discipline role of acquisitions and resource-based management view of TMT. 




between pre-acquisition performance and TMT turnover (Martin and 
McConnell, 1991; Jang and Reisel, 2015). However, these studies fail to 
analyse whether replacing inefficient TMTs helps to improve the post-
acquisition performance. Chapter 3 fills the gap by showing that TMT turnover 
tends not to affect peer-adjusted post-acquisition performance. Thus, the 
reasons for TMT turnover appear to be much more complex than what the 
disciplinary theory of acquisitions explains.   
Sixth, this thesis provides the first study assessing leadership identification in 
analyst reports. Chapter 4 explores IPO firms’ leadership positions identified 
by analysts and investigates the accuracy of leadership identification in initial 
coverage reports. More specifically, I test whether these leadership positions 
benefit firms’ future operating performance.  
Seventh, previous studies examine the accuracy of stock recommendations 
and earnings forecasts in analyst reports and the sentiment of text content 
(e.g., Irvine 2003; Twedt and Rees, 2012). Chapter 4 differs from the existing 
literature as it focuses on the competitive advantages captured by a leadership 
position. Results in Chapter 4 suggest that leadership position text provides 
investors with additional information beyond stock recommendations. Eighth, 
existing literature on leadership advantages investigates the first mover or 
pioneer advantages. These studies generally identify leaders as the “first or 
early mover in the market” based on the order of market entry or the proportion 
of market shares (Tufano, 1989; Kalyanaram and Wittink, 1994; Szymanski et 
al., 1995; Murthi et al., 1996). First movers are distinct from industry leaders. 
For example, if an early follower learns from the mistakes of the first mover 
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and dominates the market, it would be inappropriate to classify the first mover 
as “an industry leader” (Golder and Tellis, 1993). Different from these studies, 
Chapter 4 focuses on the leadership position identified by analysts. The 
leadership identification reflects analysts’ superior industry and firm knowledge, 
and therefore, more likely to capture the competitive advantages of firms in a 
leadership position than what is captured by a first-mover position.  
5.3 Implications for practice 
The results presented in Chapter 2 have important implications for private firms 
that want to go public and take over another business. In the U.K., regardless 
of whether firms opt for an IPO or a RT, they face the same regulatory scrutiny 
and generate similar long-run stock returns. Insiders in firms opting for either 
route tend to have similar post-listing ownership. These results indicate that 
the route of listing-and-acquisition does not appear to significantly affect post-
acquisition performance. A private firm can select a suitable listing-and-
acquisition route based on its financial characteristics, transaction costs and 
the market timing. 
Chapter 3 shows that the operating performance of unprofitable targets 
improves significantly after acquisitions, but these improvements are not 
attributed to the replacement of TMT. These results indicate that other sources 
of value creation, such as increasing financing capacity provided by acquirers 
to targets, may explain the improved profit margin in target firms. Erel et al. 
(2015) show that acquisitions relieve target firms’ financial constraints. Thus, 
acquirers may need to pay more attention to other value-creation sources in 




Furthermore, Chapter 3 shows that high TMT turnover or a complete TMT 
turnover in targets tends not to improve post-acquisition performance. On the 
other hand, a complete TMT turnover harms the performance of acquirers. 
Acquirers may need to assess the value of insider information and knowledge 
held by target TMTs to make appointment or replacement decisions in target 
firms.  
Chapter 4 shows that although there are no explicit regulation requirements on 
the text content in analyst reports, analysts have become more conservative 
identifying a firm as a leader. Therefore, the GS tends to affect the text content 
in analyst reports. These results have important implications for both the 
regulatory authorities and investors. As I show, regulation requirements may 
indirectly regulate the text content in analyst reports and lead analysts to 
provide meaningful research outputs. Furthermore, investors could assess the 
text content as well as stock recommendations and earnings forecasts to make 
more profitable investment decisions.  
Chapter 4 also shows that LUWs appear not to be more optimistic than non-
LUWs in their leadership identification of IPO firms, however, nor are they more 
accurate than non-LUWs. These results may help investors and regulatory 
parties to understand the impact of analyst affiliation on the quality of analysts’ 
research output. Investors may use information from both LUWs’ and non-
LUWs’ reports to make their own investment decisions. The existing regulation 
requirements appear to limit the problem of conflicts of interest in LUWs, which 
could lead LUWs to issue more optimistic and less accurate research outputs 
than non-LUWs.  
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5.4 Limitations and opportunities for future research  
This thesis cannot cover research topics from all possible perspectives. Some 
research questions have been left outside the scope of this thesis. This section 
intends to address some of the main limitations of this thesis and discuss future 
research projects which may help to overcome these limitations.  
Chapter 2 suggests that public acquirers are more likely to bear higher agency 
costs or overvalued synergy, and provides empirical evidence to support the 
identification of agency costs. However, Chapter 2 does not examine whether 
there is a trade-off between overvalued acquirers’ stocks and overvalued 
synergy, nor does it distinguish whether agency costs or overvalued synergy 
has more impact on public acquirers’ performance. New measures of stock 
valuation and synergy valuation need to be developed to assess these 
questions.  
The analysis in Chapter 3 suggests that the market discipline role of 
acquisitions does not tend to explain the high TMT turnover in both profitable 
and unprofitable target firms. The reasons for TMT turnover around 
acquisitions could be complex and require further exploration. Krug et al. (2015) 
suggest that the TMT turnover may reflect TMTs’ psychological attributes, 
such as culture fit and the age of retirement of directors. A study of the purpose 
of TMT turnover would help to understand the high TMT turnover around 
acquisitions.  
Martin and McConnell (1991) investigate reasons for departures of 111 top 




Martin and McConnell (1991) find that 53% of TMT departures are due to 
“change in control”. “Normal retirement”, “accepted high-level position in 
acquirer”, “policy differences”, “early retirement”, “took similar position with 
another firm”, and “other personal or business interests” are also cited as TMT 
departure reasons. As firms may not publicly disclose the reason for TMT 
turnover in targets, especially private targets, a survey of TMTs involved in 
acquisitions may indicate reasons for TMT replacement and retainment 
decisions.  
The analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that analysts’ leadership identification 
provides valuable information to investors. But how do analysts identify a firm 
as an industry leader? This process remains a black box, and data on it may 
be very difficult to obtain. A survey or interview study which gathers proprietary 
data from financial institutions may help investors and regulatory authorities 
understand the research process of analysts. Such a study is, however, 











Adjei, F., Cyree, K. and Walker, M. (2008) The determinants and survival of 
reverse mergers vs IPOs. Journal of Economics and Finance, 32, pp.176-194. 
Aggarwal, R., Prabhala, N.R. and Puri, M. (2002) Institutional allocation in 
initial public offerings: Empirical evidence. The Journal of Finance, 57(3), 
pp.1421-1442. 
Aivazian, V.A., Ge, Y. and Qiu, J. (2005) The impact of leverage on firm 
investment: Canadian evidence. Journal of corporate finance, 11(1), pp.277-
291. 
Amor, S. B. and Kooli, M. (2015) Do acquisitions affect IPO long-run 
performance? Evidence from single vs. multiple acquirers. Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 40, pp.63-79. 
Andersson, U., Cuervo-Cazurra, A. and Nielsen, B. (2014) From the Editors: 
Explaining interaction effects within and across levels of analysis, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 45(9), pp.1063-1071 
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M. L., and Stafford, E. (2001) New evidence and 
perspectives on mergers. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), pp. 103-
120. 
Andrade, G., and Stafford, E. (2004) Investigating the economic role of 
mergers. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(1), pp.1-36. 
Ang, J. S., Cole, R. A. and Lin, J. W. (2000) Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure. Journal of Finance, 55, pp.81-106. 
Appadu, N., Faelten, A. and Levis, M. (2014) Reverse Takeovers: The Other 




Asker, J., Farre-Mensa, J. and Ljungqvist, A. (2011) Comparing the investment 
behavior of public and private firms. Working paper. Accessed on 1 June 2015. 
Available from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2284657 
Asquith, P. and Rock, K. (2011) A test of IPO theories using reverse mergers. 
Working paper. Accessed on 1 January 2014. Available from: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1737742 
Asquith, P., Mikhail, M.B. and Au, A.S. (2005) Information content of equity 
analyst reports. Journal of financial economics, 75(2), pp.245-282. 
262 
 
Aydogdu, M., Shekhar, C. and Torbey, V. (2007) Shell companies as IPO 
alternatives: an analysis of trading activity around reverse mergers. Applied 
Financial Economics, 17, pp.1335-1347. 
Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. (2002) Market Timing and Capital Structure. The 
Journal of Finance, 57, pp.1-32. 
Ball, B., Kothari, S.P., and Robin, A., (2000), The effect of international 
institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 29(1), pp.1-51. 
Banerjee, S., Güçbilmez, U. and Pawlina, G. (2016) Leaders and followers in 
Hot IPO markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 37, pp.309-334. 
Barber, B., Lyon, J. (1996) Detecting abnormal operating performance: the 
empirical power and specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 41, pp.359– 399. 
Barber, B., Lehavy, R., McNichols, M. and Trueman, B. (2001) Can investors 
profit from the prophets? Security analyst recommendations and stock returns. 
The Journal of Finance, 56(2), pp.531-563. 
Barber, B.M., Lehavy, R. and Trueman, B. (2007) Comparing the stock 
recommendation performance of investment banks and independent research 
firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 85(2), pp.490-517. 
Bargeron, L. L., Schlingemann, F. P., Stulz, R. M. and Zutter, C. J. (2008) Why 
do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 89, 375-390. 
Barth, M. E., Clement, M. B., Foster, G. and Kasznik, R. (1998) Brand values 
and capital market valuation. Review of Accounting Studies, 3, pp.41–68. 
Barniv, R., Hope, O.K., Myring, M.J. and Thomas, W.B. (2009) Do analysts 
practice what they preach and should investors listen? Effects of recent 
regulations. The Accounting Review, 84(4), pp.1015-1039. 
Beaumont, S. J. (2015) An investigation of the short- and long-run relations 
between executive cash bonus payments and firm financial performance: a 
pitch. Accounting and Finance, 55, pp.337-343. 
Beitel, P., Schiereck, D., and Wahrenburg, M. (2004) Explaining M&A success 
in European banks.    European Financial Management, 10(1), pp.109-139.  
Bena, J. A. N., and Li, K. A. I. (2014) Corporate Innovations and Mergers and 
Acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, 69(5), pp.1923-1960. 
Bhide, A. (1993) The hidden costs of stock market liquidity. Journal of Financial 




Boone, A.L., Field, L.C., Karpoff, J.M. and Raheja, C.G. (2007) The 
determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 85(1), s66-101. 
Borokhovich, K. A., Parrino, R., and Trapani, T. (1996). Outside directors and 
ceo selection. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3), 337-355. 
Bradley, M., Desai, A., and Kim, E. H. (1988) Synergistic gains from corporate 
acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring 
firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 21(1), pp.3-40.  
Bradley, D.J., Jordan, B.D. and Ritter, J.R. (2008) Analyst behavior following 
IPOs: the “bubble period” evidence. Review of financial studies, 21(1), pp.101-
133. 
Bradley, D.J., Jordan, B.D, Ritter, J.R., and Wolf, J. (2004) The IPO quiet 
period revisited. Journal of Investment Management, 2(3), pp.1-11. 
Bradshaw, M.T. (2004) How do analysts use their earnings forecasts in 
generating stock recommendations? The Accounting Review, 79 (1), pp.25-
50. 
Bradshaw, M.T. (2009) Analysts information processing, financial regulation, 
and academic research. The Accounting Review, 84(4), pp.1047-1083. 
Bradshaw, M.T. (2011) Analysts’ Forecasts: What Do We Know after Decades 
of Work? Working paper. Accessed on 1 May 2016. Available from: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1880339 
Brav, A. and Lehavy, R. (2003) An empirical analysis of analysts' target prices: 
Short‐term informativeness and long‐term dynamics. The Journal of Finance, 
58(5), pp.1933-1968. 
Brau, J. C., Couch, R. B. and Sutton, N. K. (2012) The Desire to Acquire and 
IPO Long-Run Underperformance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 47, pp.493-510. 
Brau, J. C., Francis, B. and Kohers, N. (2003) The Choice of IPO versus 
Takeover: Empirical Evidence. Journal of Business, 76, pp.583-612. 
Brau, J. C. and Fawcett, S. E. (2006). Initial public offerings: an analysis of 
theory and practice. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 61(1), pp.399-436. 
Breton, G. and Taffler, R.J. (2001) Accounting information and analyst stock 
recommendation decisions: a content analysis approach. Accounting and 
business research, 31(2), pp.91-101. 
Bruner, R. F. (2002) Does M&A Pay? A Survey of Evidence for the Decision-
Maker. Journal of Applied Finance, 12(1), pp.48-68.  
264 
 
Bruner, R.F. (2004) Applied Mergers and Acquisitions. John Wiley & Sons, 
Hoboken, N.J. 
Brown, P., Ferguson, A. and Lam, P. (2010) What’s in a Shell? Analysing the 
Gain to Shareholders from Reverse Takeovers. Analysing the Gain to 
Shareholders from Reverse Takeovers (November 30, 2010). 
Buzzell, R. D. and Gale, B. T. (1987) The PIMS Principles: linking strategy to 
performance. New York: The Free Press. 
Cai, J., and Vijh, A. M. (2007) Incentive effects of stock and option holdings of 
target and acquirer CEOs. The Journal of Finance, 62(4), pp.1891-1933.  
Campa, J. M., and Hernando, I. (2004) Shareholder Value Creation in 
European M&As. European Financial Management, 10(1), pp.47-81.  
Cannella, A. A., and Hambrick, D. C. (1993) Effects of executive departures 
on the performance of acquired firms. Strategic Management Journal, 14(S1), 
pp.137-152.  
Capron, L., and Shen, J. C. (2007) Acquisitions of private vs. public firms: 
Private information, target selection, and acquirer returns. Strategic 
Management Journal, 28(9), pp.891-911.  
Carter, R.B., Dark, F.H., and Singh, A.K. (1998) Underwriter reputation, initial 
returns, and the long-run performance of ipo stocks. Journal of Finance, 53 (1), 
pp.285-311. 
Celikyurt, U., Sevilir, M. and Shivdasani, A. (2010) Going public to acquire? 
The acquisition motive in IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 96, pp.345-
363. 
Chemmanur, T. J., and Fulghieri, P. (1994). Investment bank reputation, 
information production, and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance, 49(1), 
pp.57-79. 
Chemmanur, T.J. and He, J. (2011) IPO waves, product market competition, 
and the going public decision: Theory and evidence. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 101(2), pp.382-412. 
Chen, H. C. and Ritter, J. R. (2000) The Seven Percent Solution. The Journal 
of Finance, 55, pp.1105-1131. 
Christoffersen, S., Nain, A., and Tang, Y. (2010) IPO cycles, firm 
characteristics, and the role of underwriters. Working Paper. Access on 20 
May 2017. Available from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572102 
Coelho, L. M. S. (2015) Bad news does not always travel fast: evidence from 




Conn, R. L. (1976) Acquired firm performance after conglomerate merger. 
Southern Economic Journal, 43(2), pp.1170-1173.  
Conn, R. L., and Connell, F. (1990) International mergers: Returns to US and 
British firms. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 17(5), pp.689-711.  
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., and Larcker, D. F. (1999) Corporate 
governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), pp.371-406.  
Corwin, S.A., Larocque, S.A. and Stegemoller, M.A. (2017) Investment 
banking relationships and analyst affiliation bias: The impact of the global 
settlement on sanctioned and non-sanctioned banks. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 124(3), pp.614-631. 
Cumming, D., Haß, L. H. and Schweizer, D. (2014) The fast track IPO – 
Success factors for taking firms public with SPACs. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 47, pp.198-213. 
Cuñat, V., Gine, M. and Guadalupe, M. (2012) The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of 
Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value. Journal of Finance, 67, 
pp.1943-1977. 
Dahya, J., Mcconnell, J. J. and Travlos, N. G. (2002) The Cadbury Committee, 
Corporate Performance, and Top Management Turnover. Journal of Finance, 
57, pp.461-483. 
Daily, C. M. and Johnson, J. L. (1997) Sources of CEO Power and Firm 
Financial Performance: A Longitudinal Assessment. Journal of Management, 
23(2), pp.97-117. 
Danbolt, J., and Maciver, G. (2012) Cross-Border versus Domestic 
Acquisitions and the Impact on Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, 39(7/8), pp.1028-1067.  
Das, S., Levine, C., Sivaramakrishnan, K. (1998) Earnings Predictability and 
Bias in Analysts‟ Earning Forecasts. The Accounting Review 73, pp.277-294. 
Das, S., Guo, R.J. and Zhang, H., (2006) Analysts' selective coverage and 
subsequent performance of newly public firms. The Journal of Finance, 61(3), 
pp.1159-1185. 
Dechow, P.M., Hutton, A.P. and Sloan, R.G. (2000) The relation between 
analysts' forecasts of long‐term earnings growth and stock price performance 
following equity offerings. Contemporary Accounting Research, 17(1), pp.1-32. 
Denis, D. J. and Sibilkov, V. (2009) Financial constraints, investment, and the 
value of cash holdings. Review of Financial Studies, 23(1), pp.247-269. 
Derrien, F. and Kecskés, A. (2007) The Initial Public Offerings of Listed Firms. 
Journal of Finance, 62, pp.447-479. 
266 
 
Dhaliwal, D. S., Li, O. Z., Tsang, A. and Yang, Y. G. (2011) Voluntary 
nonfinancial disclosure and the cost of equity capital: The initiation of corporate 
social responsibility reporting. The Accounting Review. 86 (1): 59–100. 
Dickerson, A. P., Gibson, H. D., and Tsakalotos, E. (1997) The impact of 
acquisitions on company performance: Evidence from a large panel of UK 
firms. Oxford Economic Papers, 49(3), pp.344-361.  
Duchin, R. and Schmidt, B. (2013) Riding the merger wave: Uncertainty, 
reduced monitoring, and bad acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 107, 
pp.69-88. 
Eckbo, B. E., and Langohr, H. (1989) Information disclosure, method of 
payment, and takeover premiums. Journal of Financial Economics, 24(2), 
pp.363-403.  
Eckbo, B. E., Giammarino, R. M. and Heinkel, R. L. (1990) Asymmetric 
Information and the Medium of Exchange in Takeovers: Theory and Tests. 
Review of Financial Studies, 3, pp.651-675 
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S. and Wells, M. T. (1998) Larger board size and 
decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 48, 
pp.35-54. 
Eisenmann, T.R. (2006) Internet companies' growth strategies: determinants 
of investment intensity and long‐term performance. Strategic Management 
Journal, 27(12), pp.1183-1204. 
Erel, I., Jang, Y. and Weisbach, M.S. (2015) Do acquisitions relieve target firms’ 
financial constraints? The Journal of Finance, 70(1), pp.289-328. 
Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C. (1983a) Agency problems and residual claims. 
The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), pp.327-349.  
Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C. (1983b) Separation of ownership and control. 
The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), pp.301-325.  
Feldman, D. N. (2005) Reverse Mergers + PIPEs: The New Small-Cap IPO, 
Reprinted and updated from PIPEs: Revised and Updated Edition-A Guide to 
Private Investments in Public Equity (Bloomberg Press, 2005). Business Law 
Brief, 3, pp.34-44. 
Feldman, D. N. (2006) Taking a Company Public Without An IPO. New York: 
Bloomberg Press. 
Feldman, D. N. (2010) Reverse mergers: and other alternatives to traditional 
IPOs, John Wiley & Sons. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and Private Company Council 
(PCC), (2013). Private Company Decision-Making Framework, A Guide for 







Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), (2001). Financial Conduct Authority’s 
Handbook. Available from: 
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/ukla/knowledge-base/tn-601-1.pdf 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), (2004). Listing Rules. Available from: 
http://www.complianceexchange.com/governance/library/Listing%20Rules%2
0April%202010.pdf  
Fich, E. M., Officer, M., and Tran, A. L. (2016) Do acquirers benefit from 
retaining target CEOs? Working paper. Access on 21 January 2017. Available 
from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2729881 
Floros, I. V. and Sapp, T. R. A. (2011) Shell games: On the value of shell 
companies. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, pp.850-867. 
Floros, I. V. and Shatri, K. (2009) A comparison of Penny Stock Initial Public 
Offerings and Reverse Mergers as Alternative Mechanisms for Going Public. 
Working paper. Available from:  https://ssrn.com/abstract=1460979. 
Francis, J. and Soffer, L. (1997) The relative informativeness of analysts' stock 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 35(2), pp.193-211. 
Franks, J., and Mayer, C. (1996) Hostile takeovers and the correction of 
managerial failure. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(1), pp.163-181.   
Franks, J., Mayer, C., and Renneboog, L. (2001) Who disciplines management 
in poorly performing companies? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 10(3-4), 
pp.209-248. 
Gao, X., Ritter, J.R. and Zhu, Z. (2013) Where have all the IPOs gone?. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48(06), pp.1663-1692. 
Ghosh, A. (2001) Does operating performance really improve following 
corporate acquisitions? Journal of Corporate Finance, 7, pp.151–178. 
Gleason, C.A. and Lee, C.M. (2003) Analyst forecast revisions and market 
price discovery. The Accounting Review, 78(1), pp.193-225. 
Gleason, K. C., Rosenthal, L. and Wiggins III, R. A. (2005) Backing into being 
public: an exploratory analysis of reverse takeovers. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 12, pp.54-79. 
Golder, P.N. and Tellis, G.J., (1993) Pioneer advantage: Marketing logic or 
marketing legend?. Journal of marketing research, pp.158-170. 
268 
 
GOV.UK (2014). Guidance for limited companies, partnerships and other 
company types. Access on 12 December 2015. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house 
GOV. UK (2016). Working after State Pension age. Access on 8 October 2016. 
Available from: https://www.gov.uk/working-retirement-pension-age 
Gugler, K., Mueller, D. C., Yurtoglu, B. B., and Zulehner, C. (2003) The effects 
of mergers: an international comparison. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 21(5), pp.625-653.  
Groysberg, B., Healy, P.M. and Maber, D.A. (2011) What Drives Sell‐Side 
Analyst Compensation at High‐Status Investment Banks?. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 49(4), pp.969-1000. 
Hambrick, D. C., and Cannella, A. A. (1993) Relative standing: A framework 
for understanding departures of acquired executives. Academy of 
Management Journal, 36(4), pp.733-762.  
Harford, J. (2005) What drives merger waves? Journal of Financial Economics, 
77(3), pp.529-560.  
Harford, J. and Li, K. A. I. (2007) Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm 
Performance: The Case of Acquiring CEOs. The Journal of Finance, 62, 
pp.917-949. 
Healy, P.M., Palepu, K.G. and Ruback, R.S. (1992) Does corporate 
performance improve after mergers?. Journal of financial economics, 31(2), 
pp.135-175. 
Heckman, J. J. and Robb, R. (1985) Alternative methods for evaluating the 
impact of interventions: An overview. Journal of econometrics, 30, pp.239-267. 
Hermalin, B. E., and Weisbach, M. S. (1988) The determinants of board 
composition. The RAND Journal of Economics, pp.589-606.  
Hermalin, B. E., and Weisbach, M. S. (2003) Boards of directors as an 
endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature. 
Economic Policy Review, 9(1), pp.7-26.  
Hirst, D. E., Koonce, L., and Simko, P. (1995) Investor reactions to financial 
analysts’ research reports. Journal of Accounting Research, 33 (2), pp.335–
351. 
Holmen, M., and Knopf, J. D. (2004) Minority shareholder protections and the 
private benefits of control for Swedish mergers. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 39(01), pp.167-191.  
Hovakimian, A. and Hutton, I. (2010) Merger-Motivated IPOs. Financial 




Hsieh, J., Lyandres, E., and Zhdanov, A. (2011) A Theory of Merger-Driven 
IPOs. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(5), pp.1367-1405.  
Huang, A.H., Zang, A.Y. and Zheng, R. (2014) Evidence on the information 
content of text in analyst reports. The Accounting Review, 89(6), pp.2151-2180 
Irvine, P.J. (2003) The incremental impact of analyst initiation of coverage. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 9(4), pp.431-451. 
Ittner, C. D., and Larcker, D. F. (1998) Are nonfinancial measures leading 
indicators of financial performance? An analysis of customer satisfaction. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 36, pp.1-35. 
Ivković, Z. and Jegadeesh, N. (2004) The timing and value of forecast and 
recommendation revisions. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(3), pp.433-463. 
Jacob, J., Rock, S. and Weber, D.P. (2008) Do non-investment bank analysts 
make better earnings forecasts?. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 
23(1), pp.23-61. 
Jain, B. A. and Kini, O. (1994) The Post-Issue Operating Performance of IPO 
Firms. The Journal of Finance, 49, pp.1699-1726. 
Jang, Y. and Reisel, N. (2015) Why Are Firms Sold? Evidence from 
Acquisitions of European Private Firms. Evidence from Acquisitions of 
European Private Firms (September 30, 2015). EFMA conference paper 
Jambal, K., Lee, B. S., Lee, S. W. and Park, K. (2012) Reverse Takeover and 
Firm Survivability. Working paper. Access on 15 January 2014. Available from: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2104974. 
James, C. and Karceski, J. (2006) Strength of analyst coverage following IPOs. 
Journal of financial Economics, 82(1), pp.1-34. 
Jemison, D. B., and Sitkin, S. B. (1986) Corporate acquisitions: A process 
perspective. Academy Of Management Review, 11(1), pp.145-163.  
Jensen, M. C., and Ruback, R. S. (1983) The market for corporate control: The 
scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1), pp.5-50.  
Jensen, M. C. (1986) Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and 
takeovers. The American economic review, 76, pp.323-329. 
Jensen, M. C. (2004) The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current 
State of Corporate Finance. European Financial Management, 10, pp.549-565. 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H (1979) Theory of the firm: Managerial 
behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure, Springer. 
Jindra, J., Voetmannb, T., and Walkingc, R. A. (2012) Reverse Mergers: The 




Jo, H. and Harjoto, M. (2012) The Causal Effect of Corporate Governance on 
Corporate Social Responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 106, pp.53-72. 
Kadan, O., Madureira, L., Wang, R. and Zach, T. (2009) Conflicts of interest 
and stock recommendations: The effects of the global settlement and related 
regulations. Review of Financial Studies, 22(10), pp.4189-4217. 
Kalyanaram, G. and Wittink, D.R. (1994) Heterogeneity in entry effects 
between nondurable consumer product categories, International Journal of 
Research in Marketing, 11(3), pp.219–231. 
Kaplan, S. N. (1994) Top executives, turnover and firm performance in 
Germany. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 10 (1), pp.142-159. 
Kaplan, S. N., and Minton, B. (2006) How has CEO turnover changed? 
Increasingly performance sensitive boards and increasingly uneasy CEOs: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Kennedy, V. A., and Limmack, R. J. (1996) Takeover activity, ceo turnover, 
and the market for corporate control. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, 23(2), pp.267-285.  
Kerin, R., Varadarajan, R. R., and Peterson, R. (1992) First-mover advantage: 
a synthesis, conceptual framework, and research proporsitions. Journal of 
Marketing, 56 (4), pp.33-52. 
Kim, S., Lin, J., and Slovin, M. (1997) Market structure, informed trading and 
analysts’ recommendations. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32, 
pp.507-524. 
Kim, C. S., Mauer, D. C. and Sherman, A. E. (1998) The Determinants of 
Corporate Liquidity: Theory and Evidence. The Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 33, pp.335-359. 
Krishnan, H. A., Miller, A., and Judge, W. Q. (1997) Diversification and top 
management team complementarity: Is performance improved by merging 
similar or dissimilar teams? Strategic Management Journal, 18(5), pp.361-374.  
Krug, J. A., Wright, P., and Kroll, M. J. (2015) Top management turnover 
following mergers and acquisitions: solid research to date but still much to be 
learned. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 28(2), pp.147-163.  
Lambkin, M. (1988) Order of Entry and Performance in New Markets. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9, pp.127-40. 
Lawson, G. (1985) The measurement of corporate performance on a cash flow 





Lee, C. M., Li, K. K. and Zhang, R. (2014) Shell Games: The Long Term 
Performance of Chinese Reverse Merger Firms. The Accounting Review. 
90(4), pp.1547-1589 
Libby, R., Hunton, J., Tan, H., Seybert, N. (2008) Relationship Incentives and 
the Optimistic/ Pessimistic Pattern In Analysts’ Forecasts. Journal of 
Accounting Research 46, pp.173-198. 
Lieberman, M.B. and Montgomery, D.B. (1988) First-mover advantages. 
Strategic management journal, 9(S1), pp.41-58. 
Lim, T. (2001) Rationality and analysts' forecast bias. The Journal of Finance, 
56(1), pp.369-385. 
Lin, H., McNichols, M., and O’Brien, P. (2005) Analyst impartiality and 
investment banking relationships. Journal of Accounting Research, 43 (4), 
pp.623-650. 
Linn, S., Switzer, J. (2001) Are cash acquisitions associated with better post 
combination operating performance than stock acquisitions? Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 25, pp.1113– 1138. 
Loughran, T., Ritter, R. (1997) The operating performance of firms conducting 
seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Finance, 52, pp.1823– 1850. 
Loughran, T., Ritter, R. (2004) Why has IPO underpricing changed over time? 
Financial Management, 33 (3), pp.5–37. 
Loughran, T. and McDonald, B. (2013) IPO first-day returns, offer price 
revisions, volatility, and form S-1 language. Journal of Financial Economics, 
109(2), pp.307-326. 
Lys, T. and Sohn, S. (1990) The association between revisions of financial 
analysts' earnings forecasts and security-price changes. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 13(4), pp.341-363. 
Malmendier, U. and Shanthikumar, D. (2004) Are investors naive about 
incentives? Working paper. Access on 21 January 2016.  Available from: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=591684 
Makamson, E. L. (2010) The Reverse Takeover: Implications for Strategy. 
Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 9, pp.111-126. 
Maksimovic, V. and Phillips, G. (2001) The market for corporate assets: Who 
engages in mergers and asset sales and are there efficiency gains?. The 
Journal of Finance, 56(6), pp.2019-2065. 
Maksimovic, V., Phillips, G., and Prabhala, N. R. (2011) Post-merger 
restructuring and the boundaries of the firm. Journal of Financial Economics, 
102(2), pp.317-343.  
272 
 
Maksimovic, V., Phillips, G., and Yang, L. (2013) Private and public merger 
waves. The Journal of Finance, 68(5), pp.2177-2217.  
Malmendier, U. and Tate, G. (2008) Who makes acquisitions? CEO 
overconfidence and the market's reaction. Journal of Financial Economics, 89, 
pp.20-43. 
Manne, H. G., (1965) Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal of 
Political Economy, 73, pp.110-120. 
Martin, K.J. and McConnell, J.J. (1991) Corporate performance, corporate 
takeovers, and management turnover. The Journal of Finance, 46(2), pp.671-
687. 
Maury, B. (2006) Corporate Performance, Corporate Governance and Top 
Executive Turnover in Finland. European Financial Management, 12(2), 
pp.221-248.  
Mayew, W. (2008) Evidence of Management Discrimination Among Analysts 
During Earnings Conference Calls. Journal of Accounting Research, 46, 
pp.627-659. 
McConnell, J. J. and Servaes, H. (1990) Additional evidence on equity 
ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics, 27, pp.595-
612. 
McKnight, P. J. and Weir, C. (2009) Agency costs, corporate governance 
mechanisms and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: 
A panel data analysis. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49, 
pp.139-158. 
McNichols, M. and O'Brien, P.C. (1997) Self-selection and analyst coverage. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 35, pp.167-199. 
Mello, A. S. and Parsons, J. E. (1998) Going public and the ownership 
structure of the firm. Journal of Financial Economics, 49, pp.79-109. 
Michaely, R. and Womack, K.L. (1999) Conflict of interest and the credibility of 
underwriter analyst recommendations. Review of financial studies, 12(4), 
pp.653-686. 
Miller, A., Gartner, W.B. and Wilson, R. (1989) Entry order, market share, and 
competitive advantage: A study of their relationships in new corporate ventures. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 4(3), pp.197-209. 
Mikkelson, W. H., and Partch, M. M. (1997) The decline of takeovers and 





Mikkelson, W. H., M. M. Partch, and Shah, K. (1997) Ownership and Operating 
Performance of Companies That Go Public. Journal of Financial Economics, 
44, pp.281-307. 
Mitchell, W. (1991) Dual Clocks: Entry Order Influences on Incumbent and 
Newcomer Market Share and Survival When Specialized Assets Retain Their 
Value, Strategic Management Journal, 11 (January-February), pp.85-100. 
Mitchell, M. L., and Mulherin, J. H. (1996) The impact of industry shocks on 
takeover and restructuring activity. Journal of Financial Economics, 41(2), 
pp.193-229.  
Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F. P. and Stulz, R. M. (2005) Wealth Destruction 
on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger 
Wave. Journal of Finance, 60, pp.757-782. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1988) Alternative mechanisms for 
corporate control: National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., 
USA.?? 
Murthi, B.P., Srinivasan, K., and Kalyanaram, G. (1996) Controlling for 
observed and unobserved managerial skills in determining first-mover market 
share advantages, Journal of Marketing Research, 33(3), pp.329–336. 
Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. S. (1984) Corporate financing and investment 
decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 13, pp.187-221. 
Opler, T. C. and Titman, S. (1994) Financial Distress and Corporate 
Performance. The Journal of Finance, 49, pp.1015-1040. 
Pagano, M. and Roell, A. (1998) The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: 
Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to go Public. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 113, pp.187-225. 
Parrino, R. (1997) CEO turnover and outside succession a cross-sectional 
analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 46(2), pp.165-197.  
Pavkov, A. R. (2006) Ghouls and Godsends? A Critique of “Reverse Merger” 
Policy. Berkeley Business Law Journal, 3, pp.475-514. 
Pearce, J. A. and Zahra, S. A. (1992) Board composition from a strategic 
contingency perspective. Journal of management studies, 29, pp.411-438. 
Penrose, E. T. (1995) The Theory of the Growth of the Firm: Oxford University 
Press, USA. 
Peters, F. S., and Wagner, A. F. (2014) The Executive Turnover Risk Premium. 
The Journal of Finance, 69(4), pp.1529-1563.  
274 
 
Peterson, D. (1987) Security price reactions to initial reviews of common stock 
by the value line investment survey. Journal of Finance and Quantitative 
Analysis, 22, pp. 483-494. 
Phillips, G. M., and Zhdanov, A. (2013) R&D and the Incentives from Merger 
and Acquisition Activity. Review of Financial Studies, 26(1), pp.34-78.  
Poulsen, A. B. and Stegemoller, M. (2008) Moving from Private to Public 
Ownership: Selling Out to Public Firms versus Initial Public Offerings. Financial 
Management, 37, pp.81-101. 
Powell, R.G. and Stark, A.W. (2005) Does operating performance increase 
post-takeover for UK takeovers? A comparison of performance measures and 
benchmarks. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(1), pp.293-317. 
Prabhala, N. R. 2008. Self-selection models in corporate finance. Handbook 
of Empirical Corporate Finance SET, 1, pp.37-86. 
Previts, G.J., Bricker, R.J., Robinson, T.R., and Young, S.J. (1994) A content 
analysis of sell-side financial analyst company reports. Accounting Horizons, 
8(2), pp.55–70. 
Ragozzino, R. and Reuer, J.J. (2009) Contingent earnouts in acquisitions of 
privately held targets. Journal of Management, 35(4), pp.857-879. 
Ravenscraft, D. J., and Scherer, F. (1988) Mergers and managerial 
performance. Knights, raiders, and targets: The impact of the hostile takeover, 
7(1), pp.194-210.  
Rajan, R. and Zingales L. (1995). What do we know about capital structure? 
Some evidence from International data. The Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1421–
1460. 
Ramnath, S., Rock, S. and Shane, P. (2008) The financial analyst forecasting 
literature: A taxonomy with suggestions for further research. International 
Journal of Forecasting, 24(1), pp.34-45. 
Reuter, J. (2006) Are IPO allocations for sale? Evidence from mutual funds. 
The Journal of Finance, 61(5), pp.2289-2324. 
Renneboog, L. (2000) Ownership, managerial control and the governance of 
companies listed on the Brussels stock exchange. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 24(12), pp.1959-1995. 
Ritter, J. R. (1984) The "Hot Issue" Market of 1980. The Journal of Business, 
57, pp.215-240. 
Ritter, J.R. and Welch, I. (2002) A review of IPO activity, pricing, and 




Rhodes-Kropf, M. and Viswanathan, S. (2004) Market Valuation and Merger 
Waves. Journal of Finance, 59, pp.2685-2718. 
Rhodes-Kropf, M., Robinson, D. T. and Viswanathan, S. (2005) Valuation 
waves and merger activity: The empirical evidence. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 77, pp.561-603. 
Robinson, W.T. (1988) Sources of Market Pioneer Advantages: The Case of 
Industrial Goods Industries, Journal of Marketing Research, 25 (February), 
pp.87-94 
Robinson, W.T. and Fornell, C. (1985) Sources of market pioneer advantages 
in consumer goods industries. Journal of Marketing Research, pp.305-317. 
Robinson, W.T., and Fornell, C., and Sullivan, M. (1992) Are Market Pioneers 
Intrinsically Stronger than Later Entrants?. Strategic Management Journal, 13 
(November), pp.609-624. 
Schultz, P. and Zaman, M. (2001) Do the individuals closest to internet firms 
believe they are overvalued. Journal of Financial Economics, 59(3), pp.347-
381. 
Securities Data Company (SDC), 2014, M&A SDC Definitions. Accessed on 
12 January 2015. Available at: 
https://deals.ib.thomsonone.com/DealsWeb/help/def.htm 
Semenenko, I. (2011) Reverse Merger Waves, Market Timing and Managerial 
Behavior. International Research Journal of Applied Finance, 2, pp.1453-1481. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (2003) Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 70, pp.295-311. 
Singh, M. and Davidson III, W. N. (2003) Agency costs, ownership structure 
and corporate governance mechanisms. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27, 
pp.793-816. 
Sjostrom, J. W. K. (2007) Truth about Reverse Mergers. Entrepreneurial 
Business Law Journal, 2, pp.743-760. 
Stocken, P. C., and Verrecchia, R. E. (2004) Financial reporting system choice 
and disclosure management. The Accounting Review, 79 (4), pp.1181–1203. 
Sudarsanam, S. (2003) Creating value from mergers and acquisitions: The 
challenges: An integrated and international perspective: Pearson Education. 
Szymanski, D., Troy, L., and Bharadwaj, S. (1995) Order of entry and business 
performance: An empirical synthesis and reexamination, Journal of Marketing, 
59(4), pp.17–33. 
Tsao, Amy, 2002. When A Stock's Rating and Target Collide. Business Week 





Tolmunen, P. and Torstila, S. (2005) Cross-Listings and M&A Activity: 
Transatlantic Evidence. Financial Management, 34, pp.123-142. 
Tufano, P. (1989) Financial innovation and first-mover advantages, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 25(2), pp.213-240. 
Twedt, B. and Rees, L. (2012) Reading between the lines: An empirical 
examination of qualitative attributes of financial analysts’ reports. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 31(1), pp.1-21. 
Urban, G.L., Carter, T., Gaskin, S. and Mucha, Z. (1986) Market share rewards 
to pioneering brands: an empirical analysis and strategic implications. 
Management Science, 32(6), pp.645-659. 
VanderWerf, P.A. and Mahon, J.F. (1997) Meta-analysis of the impact of 
research methods on findings of first-mover advantage. Management Science, 
43(11), pp.1510-1519. 
Very, P., Lubatkin, M., Calori, R., and Veiga, J. (1997) Relative standing and 
the performance of recently acquired European firms. Strategic Management 
Journal, 18(8), pp.593-614.  
Verrecchia, R. E. (1983) Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 5, pp.179-194. 
Walsh, J.P. and Ellwood, J.W. (1991) Mergers, acquisitions, and the pruning 
of managerial deadwood. Strategic Management Journal, 12(3), pp.201-217 
Walsh, J.P. and Kosnik, R.D. (1993) Corporate raiders and their disciplinary 
role in the market for corporate control. Academy of Management Journal, 
36(4), pp.671-700. 
Warner, J. B., Watts, R. L., and Wruck, K. H. (1988) Stock prices and top 
management changes. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.461-492.  
Yermack, D. (1996) Higher market valuation of companies with a small board 
of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), pp.185-211.  
Zollo, M., and Singh, H. (2004) Deliberate learning in corporate acquisitions: 
post-acquisition strategies and integration capability in U.S. bank mergers. 
Strategic Management Journal, 25(13), pp.1233-1256.  
 
 
 
 
